852.00/5931: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State

438. I am basing my reply to the Department’s 265, June 30, noon, on conversations I have had with both officials and colleagues in London and after my conversation with Mr. Eden this morning. Eden stated that both his Government and the French Government were determined for the present to maintain a stiff attitude; extraordinary meeting had been called for the full membership of the Non-intervention Committee on Friday at which meeting the British would make no proposals nor in his opinion would the French and that the meeting might adjourn without result. He said that his Government would take no steps towards granting belligerent rights for the present nor would it take such steps at any time unless the Germans and Italians should agree to the withdrawal of the so-called volunteers in Spain. This would be an antecedent and necessary condition for even any [Page 354] consideration on the part of his Government to the granting of belligerent rights; nor was his Government committed to discuss belligerent rights even on these terms although it was a matter he had in mind and which he intended to discuss with the Prime Minister this morning. Meanwhile, he was setting forth this as his personal view to me in the utmost confidence.

In addition also in confidence he told me that he had direct information from the Portuguese that they were determined to remain within the British orbit and had informed Franco they would not stand for any form of German or Italian or combined German-Italian control in Spain; that Franco had assured the Portuguese that he was as determined as they were on this point; that the German material and technical aid supplied had been of excellent quality but both the Italian material and Italian troops were inferior and that there was friction between Franco and the Italians; that in the end Franco would have to compensate the Germans and Italians but was determined to pay them only commercially and his whole purpose was an Iberian policy as he termed it with Spaniards in control in Spain and all German and Italian influence eliminated.

Eden reiterated the determination of his Government to maintain a stiff attitude; to take no steps between now and Friday and to make no proposals at the Friday meeting.

He went on to say that technically it cannot be considered that a state of war exists between the Spanish Government on the one hand and Germany and Italy on the other or for that matter with the Franco Government on the one hand and any other nation on the other as long the the Non-intervention Committee continues to function under the authorization of the member governments even though the eventuality may come about that belligerent rights should be granted.

In an earlier Foreign Office conversation reference was made to Eden’s speech last Saturday28 in which he stressed that England’s great interest in Spain was to keep the situation localized and that although various European partisans had been willing to burn their fingers on one side or another nevertheless no Government had been willing to intervene to the point of creating an insoluble crisis. Indeed there are partisans in England as well as other countries who are willing to make the Spanish situation an instrument of policy for the favoring of one political wing of thought as against another but the policy adopted by the British Cabinet had set its face against any “such measures” in this country and has endeavored and would continue to endeavor so to handle the situation that the conflict may remain [Page 355] localized and the issue eventually be left in the hands of the Spaniards themselves.

I saw the French Ambassador this morning just after his conference with Eden who told me that French public opinion was greatly aroused against the recent German proposals and that his Government not only resented them but was unwilling even to discuss the subject of granting belligerent rights. In fact the statements made to me by the French Ambassador were much more extreme than the tenor of Eden’s remarks to me and lent color to the viewpoint of some of my colleagues that since the tension of last Friday the British have moved further towards analyzing a possible compromise position which would maintain the framework of the Non-intervention Committee than have the French Government; especially in view of the reported French threat to open the French frontier to the shipment of arms to the Valencia Government if the naval controls are not maintained.

The result of my conversations leads me to make the following points in connection with your 265, of June 30, noon:

In the first place “the continuous and direct government intervention” which you refer to is not confined to Italy and Germany but is equally true of Russia and was at one time and may be again equally true of France. Therefore any interpretation of our neutrality legislation which leads us to impose an embargo on Germany and Italy today might also have to be extended to other nations.

In the second place any departure from the spirit of the legislation which is one of strict neutrality would be regarded by Europe as a gratuitous interference in continental affairs particularly as all important European governments are members of the Non-intervention Committee which does not consider that a state of war exists between the German and Italian Governments on the one hand and the Spanish Government on the other or between the Franco government and Russia.

Thirdly, in answer to the specific question as to the British Government’s opinion “on the effect which any such action would produce upon the British and European Governments” it seems that it would complicate the British Government’s main object which is to foster a withdrawal of foreign interference in Spain so as to eliminate the danger of an extension of the conflict beyond the confines of Spain; and Eden, when I indicated in vague terms the fact that certain groups were urging such a course of action upon the United States Government, said that such a thing was “to say the least, premature” and intimated it would complicate his task.

Bingham
  1. Reference is evidently to Eden’s speech at Coughton Court in Warwickshire, July 4, 1947.