852.00/5924: Telegram
The Ambassador in Germany (Dodd) to the Secretary of State
[Received 1:15 p.m.]
153. The negotiations in London regarding Spain appear to be proceeding along the general lines indicated in our recent reports as likely. It is becoming more evident in our opinion that the immediate purpose of German-Italian diplomatic maneuvers are to bring about a speedy victory for Franco or at least a favorable basis for compromise in Spain which would exclude any “Red” preponderance in authority there. Ultimately we believe Germany still considers of first importance her relations with England with particular reference to her primary ambition of the domination and exploitation of Central and Southeastern Europe. (Please see despatch No. 3544 of June 28, 1937.27) Equally we believe Italy is ultimately concerned with her relations with England in the Mediterranean. For both Germany and Italy the present negotiations in London regarding Spain could have a “nuisance” value and advantage in the working out of these ultimate aims while at the same time benefiting the near term purposes. In all this we feel that regard should be paid to the definite apprehension of and antipathy of Hitler and Mussolini toward the establishment of a “Red” Government in Spain which unquestionably is a motivating factor in their Spanish policy.
We are informed from a reliable but unofficial source that the British Government opinion is stiffening against the German and Italian attitude in the non-intervention question and that the recent rather blunt statements in London have had somewhat sobering effect. We hope this is the case since we believe that it is time for the British to adopt a firmer attitude and be their more normal Elizabethan selves if, at the same time, they face the facts of the Spanish situation, the German geographical position and aims in Central and Southeastern Europe, et cetera, and taking the lead in the Anglo-French entente, refuse to be dissuaded by certain French and Little Entente influences from a comprehensive constructive policy toward Germany which should be strong but not dilatory or niggardly.
We are of this opinion all the more because we consider that Germany’s attitude in London is largely one of bluff. We do not believe Germany is in a position to wage a major war and that she knows it. For example, as the Military Attaché states, Germany has an inconsiderable trained reserve; an inadequate matériel reserve; a highly inadequate reserve of raw materials, gold and foodstuffs and is facing at best a less than average crop. Her air force both as to matériel [Page 353] and personnel is nowhere near satisfactorily organized and completed and will not be for another 2 years. Likewise the German Navy is in process of organization and her Army generally requires at least the same period to bring it up to a satisfactory level to fight a major war on two fronts which she must envisage as possible, if not probable, should she cooperate with Italy in endangering any vital Franco-British interests.
In considering the moves and dangers of the moment and the desirability of a firmer British attitude in this relation, the European military forces with particular respect to British rearmament is to be kept in mind. We feel that this must exercise a considerable influence on the two dictators either pressing them toward more precipitate and immediate action in the promotion of their legitimate participation in “marauding” ambitions or counselling a more temperate frame of mind.
In brief we consider that apart from other considerations the German military situation is such that there is little likelihood of Hitler deliberately involving himself in an armed conflict with France and England, et cetera, but that the German Army is sufficiently formidable at this date to permit Hitler to embark on a Czechoslovak adventure if he could be reasonably sure that this would not entail the entry of France and England into the arena.
Repeated by mail to London, Paris, Rome, Geneva.
- Not printed.↩