852.00/5933: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State
[Received 3:35 p.m.]
931–932. Yesterday afternoon Léger gave me a detailed account of the point of view of the French Government with regard to the Spanish crisis.
He was extremely pessimistic. He said that the report that Franco was ready to agree to the withdrawal of volunteers was based on nothing more concrete than third hand information from Herbette, the French Ambassador to Spain, who is living at Hendaye. The French Government would be ready to recognize Franco as a belligerent only on condition that before such recognition all volunteers should have been withdrawn from Spain and an effective system of control imposed which would prevent their return. Italy, Germany, and Franco would refuse these conditions.
No compromise proposal that seemed to have the slightest chance of success had been devised by either the French or British Governments. It was still the desire of the French to have the maintenance of control of Spanish waters entrusted to French and British ships with neutral observers. The French Government hoped that aside from Germany and Italy only two other countries represented on the Non-intervention Committee would vote against this proposal. The French Government was still attempting to persuade the British Government to face the issue and wants to leave overwhelming majority of the Non-intervention Committee to impose control by French and British ships with neutral observers whether the Italians and Germans liked it or not.
Léger added that his latest information led him to believe that the British would not agree to this proposal. The Admiralty authorities were definitely opposed to it. They did not wish to put such a burden on the British fleet and they did not wish to face the possible consequences among which might be war.
Léger said that he was confident that if France and England should take this strong position now Germany and Italy would back down. Hitler was not really interested in pushing the Spanish affair to extremes. Mussolini desired to. Léger said that he believed Mussolini was trying to provoke war. He was following the old policy of Cavour of getting a strong nation to pull the chestnuts out of the fire for his weak state. The information of the Quai d’Orsay was that Mussolini had definitely given Hitler a free hand with regard to Austria and Czechoslovakia in return for promises of German support [Page 357] for Italy’s ambitions in the Mediterranean. Hitler today could take Austria at any moment he might wish without war. Mussolini was attempting before Hitler should take Austria to get his end of the bargain.
Léger then predicted that when the British technically refused to go ahead with the imposition of control by British and French ships there would be a number of compromise proposals none of which would be successful.
The Italian and German Governments had proposed that the French should maintain control on the Pyrenean frontier. The French Government would say it was quite ready to agree to this provided Germany and Italy should accept control of their frontiers and permit the placing of control officers in German and Italian ports and on German and Italian aviation fields. He added that he had not the slightest expectation that this proposal would be accepted.
Léger said that he expected the British then to propose that control should be established along frontiers of Spain; that control officers should be established in all Spanish ports and the control of French and Portuguese frontiers should be established on the Spanish side of those frontiers. He felt certain that this proposal would be rejected by both the Franco government and the Valencia Government. He expressed the opinion that in reality both the Franco and the Valencia Government would prefer to return to the system of no control whatsoever.
He said that he believed the negotiations with regard to this latter proposal might give a further breathing space of 10 days to 2 weeks and during that time it might be possible to invent some new compromise of which no one had thought; but he expected that within 2 weeks all control would be removed and a race would then begin between the Italians and Germans on one side and the friends of the Valencia Government on the other to see which one could supply the contending forces with the greatest amount of assistance. This would lead to a situation approaching war.
I discussed Léger’s views with Sir Eric Phipps, the British Ambassador. Phipps was not nearly so pessimistic. He said that he believed Franco was now displeased with the presence of so many Italians in Spain and was prepared to agree to withdrawal of “volunteers”. He added that the French Government had never proposed formally and officially to the British Government that control should be imposed by the British and French against the will of Germany and Italy and it had been made clear in informal conversations that Great Britain would not agree to action which might provoke war.