740.00/134: Telegram
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State
[Received March 31—4:40 p.m.]
180. The following telegram is based on recent conversations and should be read with my 133, March 11, 9 p.m.58 and 173, March 25, 10 p.m.59 and memorandum of conversation due by pouch arriving in Washington tomorrow as background.60
In view of your 110, March 27, 5 p.m., I venture to outline my personal views at some length:
Germany in official eyes remains the greatest threat to European peace. The British Government’s attitude towards the Spanish situation has been from the beginning that a decisive victory by either of the contending sides would endanger European equilibrium—rather peace without victory was preferable, with the situation ending in stalemate after withdrawal of foreign volunteers, leaving a settlement to be negotiated between the contending elements in Spain on a basis of provincial autonomy. It was with this in mind that English diplomacy has been concentrated on the maintenance of the work of the Non-Intervention Committee and this will continue to be the ultimate objective of British policy even under the most extreme circumstances.
Mussolini’s position at the present moment is difficult. Rising commodity costs embarrass him; also the continuing expenses of the Abyssinian adventure together with the costs of his rearmament program and the undercurrent of unpopularity of the Fascist adventure in Spain. He had “roared magnificently in response to recent pin pricks of various sorts from this country” but it is not believed here that he wishes on top of his other difficulties to debar by his actions the possibility of improvement in Anglo-Italian relations. The British Government on its part does not wish to alienate Mussolini and I foresee further moves from London intended to appease him such as recognition of the Italian empire. In this connection it is suggestive of the British Government’s current policy of handling [Page 271] the Italian problem that encouragement was given Regent Paul of Yugoslavia by the British Foreign Office for the recent negotiations with Ciano. However, in the recent attempts at a rapprochement between England and Italy some incident has always arisen to keep open the wound; for the most recent instance, that of the meeting of the Non-Intervention Committee of March 23, the Soviets are blamed. These meetings are by agreement secret and the only public reports are the official communiqués given out at the end of each session by the chairman with the concurrence of the delegates. Nevertheless, when, after the recent defeat of Italian troops outside Madrid, the Italian Ambassador pressed by Soviet Ambassador Maisky refused at that particular juncture to discuss the withdrawal of volunteers, an explanation of a statement in the Committee appeared in the local press even before the official communiqué of the Committee meeting had been drawn up. This leakage which served to arouse fresh popular indignation against Mussolini is attributed to the Soviets. The Non-intervention Committee is on holiday until next week but the Board of Control meets again today to determine further the setting up of observation points and observers on the Spanish land frontiers and the international naval controls in Spanish waters. It is doubtful whether these controls at the very earliest can be established before 2 weeks.
Three courses are open to Mussolini in view of the recent defeat of Italian troops with insurgent forces: (1) He may regard them as volunteers infected by foreign propaganda and leave them to their fate. (2) Mussolini can undoubtedly find examples today of material and men now reaching the Madrid Government from Soviet sources and also from France, and with some pretense of regularity in this critical period until the effective controls of the International Board of Control are established, support Italian volunteers in Spain temporarily with materials and men. Neither of these two courses would present difficulties that could not predictably be handled by the Non-intervention Committee. (3) Mussolini might decide to support his volunteers in Spain openly in violation of the Non-intervention Agreement. This would undoubtedly create a crisis in which the reaction in France would be immediate and violent and would likewise encourage that numerous body of opinion in this country which had favored the imposition of sanctions against Italy in the Abyssinian crisis to believe a second chance had been given this Government to call “the dictators bluff”.
I venture to point out, however, that the English entente is with France and not with the Front Populaire. Thus if, as might be expected, the extreme French Left should react violently against Italy in such a crisis, it is undoubtedly true that such a reaction would cause all public opinion in this country to take a second thought before [Page 272] joining with French communistic elements in any venture outside the confines of the Non-intervention Committee.
So it is conceivable that the reaction to any Italian official military venture in Spain would be to create a tension between the British and French Governments augmented by the fact that Soviet influences would encourage an aggressiveness on the part of France. In such a situation between France and England Hitler, who has been liquidating his commitments in the Spanish situation, would be given his opening to make every advance to England. These considerations would doubtless give a breathing space which would permit the British Government to reaffirm before public opinion in this country its policy against using force or even putting the British fleet between Italy and the shores of Spain. Thus, it is my opinion that in the hypothetical situation suggested in the Department’s 110, March 27, 5 p.m. should Italy make an official armed move in Spain, the British Government, of course, influenced at that time by imponderables in the situation would nevertheless endeavor to work with and on the French, both inside and outside the Non-intervention Committee, to maintain their original policy of stalemate or peace without victory in the Spanish situation but certainly without resort to armed intervention.