Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1936, The American Republics, Volume V

834.00/803: Telegram

The Minister in Paraguay (Howard) to the Secretary of State

Asunción, February 27, 1936—7 p.m.
[Received February 28—8:45 a.m.¹²]

30. Your 2, February 21, 2 p.m. My views with respect to the new regime in Paraguay are as follows:

1. Popular support. Public opinion in Paraguay has been suppressed throughout almost the entire history of the nation. Long accustomed to repression and sudden changes of government the general public has become highly conformable. Consequently, despite nominal or sincere party affiliations, it may be assumed, and reports so indicate, that in general the inhabitants of the country accept with relative indifference the fait accompli of the new Government. There are, moreover, many Paraguayans, especially of the laboring and farming classes, who consider that they have been the unheeded victims of an unfair politico-economic system and who look to the new regime to better their condition. Finally, it is becoming apparent that the Republican (Colorado) Party is favored by and favorable to the new order and it is to be assumed that it will lend its support to the Franco government and eventually become an important part of it. This party, however, still is not reunited and a section may hold aloof. On the other hand, of course, are the militant liberals now demoralized but who presumably will take the first opportunity to overthrow the new regime and regain control. This group possesses influence and leaders, not all of whom have been apprehended.

2. Ability to maintain itself. The insurrection of February 17th was organized and executed principally by the army, with the support of the ex-combatants and the later accretion of the students and civilian elements, some of which were of extremist and Communist tendencies and affiliations. Not all the army however was involved in the insurrection and the authorities are now engaged in the elimination of those officers, especially of high rank, with respect to whose wholehearted allegiance they are doubtful. A group of such officials is said already to have been despatched to the penal island of Pena Hermosa, in the Paraguay River above Puerto Sastre. As was reported in telegram 29, February 26, 6 p.m., whatever may have been the personal views of the members of the new regime they seem already to have perceived the unwisdom of becoming identified with the extremists and are now disposed to attempt early separation from them. If this military and political rehabilitation can be effected the internal structure of the government should be strengthened. The bulk of the army and of the association of ex-combatants (of which Franco was chief and which claims a membership of 60,000) appear unquestionably to support the new regime and able to maintain it against any effort to overthrow it by external attack.

3. Ability to carry out functions of a stable government. Railway and river traffic, street car and bus services, the postal, telephone, and telegraph services, and all administrative offices are operating in a normal manner, although of course the rearrangement of the Cabinet and induction of new personnel have impaired the functioning of some Government bureaus. Business establishments and banks are also functioning, the former subject to certain control as to the prices of prime materials and the latter as to transfers and exchange operations. The exchange office has been “intervened” and the “Bank of the Republic of Paraguay” established in its stead and with its resources. New police and municipal authorities have been designated and all city activities appear to be proceeding normally. It is understood that similar administrative normality prevails elsewhere in the Republic.

4. Intention to comply with international obligations. An unrefuted “manifesto” issued by Colonel Franco February 6th and published in the Buenos Aires La Prensa of February 19th asserts that the military victory of the Chaco was about to be lost through diplomacy and that “our triumphal military advance was checked by the criminal armistice of the field as well as in the mistaken peace protocol of June made before the imminent capture of the Standard Oil wells and the invasion of Santa Cruz”. In an undated quotation from La Razon of Buenos Aires he is further said to have asserted that the general situation in Paraguay was aggravated upon receipt of knowledge of the terms of the peace protocols as “these conventions have not satisfied Paraguayan opinion which considers that the victory on the field of battle has been sacrificed”. The new “Colorado” sheet Patria in an editorial on February 21st denounced the Buenos Aires protocols as incompatible with the ends of the revolution and advocated an army of 25,000 men with corresponding equipment.

However, since assuming the provisional presidency Colonel Franco has modified his public attitude toward the Chaco peace proposals’, as is shown by his statements cited in telegrams 28, February 16 [26], 4 p.m.; and 29, February 16 [26], 6 p.m. The same is true of Dr. Stefanich, who has made similar attacks in the past.

As to international obligations in Geneva, Dr. Stefanich yesterday assured the diplomatic representatives who conferred with him that the new Government will respect all previously contracted obligations—such as the London loans, the railway concessions, et cetera.

To summarize: it is my judgment that the Franco regime enjoys at the moment a popular acceptance ranging from apathetic acquiescence to enthusiastic support, with the exception of the more aggressive element of the Liberal Party; that it is able to maintain itself against any immediately foreseeable external attack, although no opinion can be formed as to its probable immunity from internal disruption; that it is able to carry out the functions of a stable government and is discreetly doing so, including the affording of protection to foreign interests and activities despite the inimical attitude of a radical and anti-foreign element in its ranks; and finally, that notwithstanding earlier ill-advised utterances of Colonel Franco and other evidences of antagonism toward the Chaco peace protocols (based in part upon the restrictions they impose upon the army) the new regime will consider it expedient to uphold them, as well as other international obligations previously contracted. In this connection, it is my impression that the delay in obtaining recognition is causing concern to the Franco regime, and that in return therefor it would be disposed to give formal and satisfactory assurances that it will faithfully execute the Chaco peace protocols.

Howard

12. Telegram in two sections.