This memorandum, and the conclusion quoted, constitute the considered
policy of the Department. The memorandum is for your own confidential
information and should not be quoted from or referred to, nor should any
reference be made at the present time to the conclusion reached. I am
considering the manner in which the policy enunciated in the memorandum
will be made known to the Governments of Central America, and will give
you appropriate instructions in the matter in the future.
Reports from missions in Central America indicate that it would be
helpful to have some general statement of the attitude which should be
taken by this Government’s diplomatic representatives when they are
requested, or there appears to be an opportunity, to use their influence
or good offices in connection (1) with some internal political
situation, or (2) with some situation which may arise between two or
more states and which may threaten to disturb relations between those
states. The opinion has been expressed that the friendly advice
[Page 135]
or good offices of our
representatives might be helpful in overcoming situations apparently
prejudicial to the country or countries concerned, and that such action
on the part of our representatives would constitute real assistance
within the meaning of the Good Neighbor policy.
It is undoubtedly true that in the past certain of our representatives in
Central America have been able to be of assistance in the sense
suggested, and their efforts have resulted in advantage to the countries
concerned. In other cases, however, the efforts of our representatives
have been less successful, and have not only resulted in no advantage to
the countries in which they resided, but have prejudiced the relations
of this Government with those countries and other countries of Latin
America.
Concerning the Department’s attitude toward informal advice, whether
solicited or not, in connection with the purely internal affairs of the
Central American States, I desire to make it clear that the Department
expects its diplomatic representatives in Central America to conduct
themselves in their relations with the Governments to which they are
accredited, and with the people of the countries, in exactly the same
manner they would if they were accredited to one of the large republics
of South America or with any non-American power; that is to say, they
should abstain from offering advice on any domestic question, and if
requested to give such advice they should decline to do so.
I am not unmindful of the fact that particularly in the absence of any
tendency on the part of this Government to become involved in the
internal affairs of Central America, there has existed a tendency on the
part of some of those Governments, or at least on the part of important
elements within the countries, to seek our advice. In many cases in the
past we have yielded to the requests of those Governments or groups. It
has usually developed, however, that such advice rapidly came to be
considered as intervention and, in fact sometimes terminated in actual
intervention. The result in a majority of cases was that at the best
doubtful assistance was rendered to the Governments, and the relations
of the United States with those Governments, and with other Latin
American Governments, were actually prejudiced.
The Department desires to make very clear that in instructing you in this
manner it is, in the fullest sense, applying the Good Neighbor policy to
Central America. This Government is desirous of carrying on with the
Central American republics a policy of constructive and effective
friendship, based upon mutual respect for each other’s rights and
interests. It would obviously be incompatible with this policy to become
involved in the domestic concerns of any of the Central
[Page 136]
American republics. It has been adequately
demonstrated that there is great danger that such involvement in matters
which are not directly of concern to us will prejudice not only the
interests of the United States in Central America, but the interests of
the countries of Central America as well.
With regard to questions which have arisen, or appear to be likely to
arise which may affect the relations between two or more Central
American Republics, the representatives of this Government will, of
course, inform the Department in detail concerning such situations,
together with recommendations as to possible action by this Government,
in order that the Department, after consideration of all the information
available, may issue appropriate instructions if they appear to be
called for.
Identical instructions are being transmitted to the missions in the other
Central American countries.
[Enclosure]
Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the
Division of Latin American Affairs (Beaulac)
[Washington,] February 18,
1936.
Recommendation That American
Policy in Central America No Longer Be Affected by Any Provision
of the Central American General Treaty of Peace and Amity
of 1923
Support of the 1923 Treaty by the
United States.
The Conference of Central American States, at which the 1923 General
Treaty of Peace and Amity was signed, was held in Washington and
sponsored by the Government of the United States. Since the
signature of the treaty, it has been the announced policy of the
Government of the United States to be guided by the provisions of
Article II of the Treaty in extending or denying recognition to new
governments in Central America.
Article II of the Treaty reads as follows:
“Desiring to make secure in the Republics of Central America
the benefits which are derived from the maintenance of free
institutions and to contribute at the same time toward
strengthening their stability, and the prestige with which
they should be surrounded, they declare that every act,
disposition or measure which alters the constitutional
organization in any of them is to be deemed a menace to the
peace of said Republics, whether it proceed from any public
power or from the private citizens.
“Consequently, the Governments of the Contracting Parties
will not recognize any other Government which may come into
power in any of the five Republics through a coup d’état or a revolution
[Page 137]
against a
recognized Government, so long as the freely elected
representatives of the people thereof have not
constitutionally reorganized the country. And even in such a
case they obligate themselves not to acknowledge the
recognition if any of the persons elected as President,
Vice-President or Chief of State designate should fall under
any of the following heads:
- “1) If he should be the leader or one of the
leaders of a coup d’état or
revolution, or through blood relationship or
marriage, be an ascendant or descendant or brother
of such leader or leaders.
- “2) If he should have been a Secretary of State or
should have held some high military command during
the accomplishment of the coup
d’état, the revolution, or while the election
was being carried on, or if he should have held this
office or command within the six months preceding
the coup d’état, revolution,
or the election.
“Furthermore, in no case shall recognition be accorded to a
government which arises from election to power of a citizen
expressly and unquestionably disqualified by the
Constitution of his country as eligible to election as
President, Vice-President or Chief of State designate.”
Announced attitude of the United
States toward Treaty.
Notice of the American attitude was given in the following telegram,
dated June 30, 1923, to the Legation at Tegucigalpa,14 which was
instructed to transmit it to the political leaders of Honduras and
to give it the widest publicity:
“The attitude of the Government of the United States with
respect to the recognition of new Governments in the five
Central American Republics whose representatives signed at
Washington on February 7, 1923, a General Treaty of Peace
and Amity, to which the United States was not a party, but
with the provisions of which it is in the most hearty
accord, will be consonant with the provisions of Article II
thereof which stipulates that the contracting parties: ‘will
not recognize any other Government which may come into power
in any of the five Republics through a coup d’état or a revolution against a recognized
Government, so long as the freely elected representatives of
the people thereof have not constitutionally reorganized the
country. And even in such a case they obligate themselves
not to acknowledge the recognition if any of the persons
elected as President, Vice-president or Chief of State
designate should fall under any of the following heads:
- “‘1) If he should be the leader or one of the
leaders of a coup d’etat or
revolution, or through blood relationship or
marriage, be an ascendant or descendant or brother
of such leader or leaders.
- “‘2) If he should have been a Secretary of State
or should have held some high military command
during the accomplishment of the coup d’état, the revolution, or while the
election was being carried on, or if he should have
held this office or command within the six months
preceding the coup d’état,
revolution, or the election.’”
That this Government was determined to apply the principle of
non-recognition set forth in Article II regardless of whether
Article II or any other part of the treaty were in force with
respect to a
[Page 138]
particular
country, is demonstrated by the following telegram dated July 14,
1923, from the Department to the Legation at Tegucigalpa:15
“For your information. The Department’s No. 26, June 30, 3
p.m., sets forth the position of this Government as regards
the recognition of new governments in Central America, and
any modifications of the Treaty of Peace and Amity of
February 7, last, made by the congresses of any of the
Central American states in ratifying that Treaty would, of
course, have no effect as regards the policy of the United
States, which is not even a signatory of the Treaty. As
clearly set forth in the Department’s telegram above
mentioned, the attitude of this Government in recognizing
new governments in the five Central American Republics will
be consonant with the provisions of Article II of the
general Treaty of Peace and Amity, as signed at Washington
on February 7, 1923.”
On the date this policy was announced by the United States, only one
Central American country, Nicaragua, had ratified the Treaty. It had
therefore not entered into effect in the case of any country, since
the treaty itself provides that it “shall take effect with respect
to the Parties that have ratified it, from the date of its
ratification by at least three of the signatory States.”
In other words, the policy announced in the telegrams quoted above
was that the United States would be guided by the provisions of
Article II of the 1923 Treaty in its attitude with respect to the
recognition of new governments in the five Central American
Republics, whether or not those governments were parties to the
treaty.
Modification of American
attitude.
This policy was modified later when, following the denunciation of
the 1923 Treaty by the Government of El Salvador,16 the United
States extended recognition to the régime of President
Martínez,17 to whom recognition could not have been
accorded under the provisions of Article II.
The policy of this Government, therefore, with reference to the
recognition of new governments in Central America, as announced, and
modified in practice, is to be guided by Article II of the 1923
General Treaty of Peace and Amity in the cases of the countries
still Parties to the Treaty, and to apply the ordinary rules of
recognition in the cases of the countries not Parties to the
Treaty.
Parties to Treaty.
The General Treaty of Peace and Amity of 1923, orginally subscribed
to and ratified by all five Central American countries, is still
[Page 139]
in effect among Guatemala,
Honduras and Nicaragua.18 El Salvador and Costa
Rica are no longer parties to it.
Pertinent Provisions.
Article II has already been quoted. Its last paragraph reads as
follows:
“Furthermore, in no case shall recognition be accorded to a
government which arises from election to power of a citizen
expressly and unquestionably disqualified by the
Constitution of his country as eligible to election as
President, Vice-President or Chief of State designate.”
Article V of the Treaty reads as follows:
“The Contracting Parties obligate themselves to maintain in
their respective Constitutions the principle of
non-re-election to the office of President and Vice
President of the Republic; and those of the Contracting
Parties whose Constitutions permit such re-election,
obligate themselves to introduce a constitutional reform to
this effect in their next legislative session after the
ratification of the present Treaty.”
The provisions quoted are aimed at (1) preventing the rise to power
or continuance in power of a régime disqualified by the Constitution
from exercising power; and (2) preventing a President or a Vice
President from perpetuating himself in office.
Furthermore, as already noted, the first paragraph of Article II
provides that “every act, disposition or measure which alters the
constitutional organization in any of them is to be deemed a menace
to the peace of said Republics, whether it proceed from any public
power or from the private citizens [”].
Extension of Term of Office of
President Ubico.
On April 2, 1935, the Guatemalan Legislative Assembly, then in
session, received a communication from the Minister of Government
and Justice transcribing certain recommendations of President Ubico
with regard to changes in the Guatemalan Constitution which the
latter felt to be necessary in order to provide the Government with
more ample administrative powers.
While the Assembly had this document under consideration it received
numerous petitions, obviously inspired, from the municipalities of
the Republic, private individuals, and organizations within the
Liberal Progresista Party (President Ubico’s party), requesting the
inclusion of Articles 66, 69, and 99, dealing with the succession to
the presidency, among those which the Assembly had under
advisement.
[Page 140]
Articles 66 and 99 read as follows:
- “Article 66. The Presidential term shall be six
non-extendable years, and he who has exercised the
Presidency by popular election, cannot be reelected,
except after twelve years from the date of his having
ceased in the exercise of his office.”
- “Article 99. The total or partial reform of the
Constitution shall be decreed only by the vote of at
least two-thirds parts of the total number of Deputies,
who form the Legislative Assembly, which shall set forth
for that purpose the article or articles which are to be
reformed.
“In any case in which there is sought the total reform of the
Constitution or of articles 66 and 69 and of the present, or
of one or various of these three, it can be decreed only
when at least two-thirds of the votes aforementioned so
decree it, in two distinct and consecutive periods of the
ordinary sessions of the Legislative Assembly, and even
thus, the Constitutional Assembly shall not be able to meet
to take cognizance of the reform in such a case, until six
years have passed counted from the time it was decreed.
“The reform of the Constitution can consist: of modifying,
suppressing, adding to, substituting for or adding
articles.”
The Legislative Assembly agreed to all the changes proposed by the
Executive.
With reference to the amendment of the articles relating to the
succession to the Presidency, the Assembly stated that it felt the
Constitution prohibited it from taking action, and that it would
refer the question of possible changes in Articles 66, 69 and 99,
together with the petitions requesting the changes, to the
Constituent Assembly for its consideration and action.
In addition to the provisions of Article 99 with reference to the
amendment of the Constitution, Article 100 provides further as
follows:
“Article 100. When the reform is decreed, the Legislative
Assembly shall call elections for a Constituent Assembly,
which should be set up within sixty days following the date
of the call, except in the event contemplated in the
preceding article, with respect to the reform of the 66th
and 69th articles or any one of them, and the whole of the
Constitution; in which event the call should be made by the
Legislative Assembly, which holds office the fifth year,
counting from the date on which the reform has been decreed,
so that the installation of the Constituent Assembly may be
verified at the end of the fixed term of six years.
“The article or articles whose reform may have been decreed,
shall be inserted in the call.”
Articles 66, 69, 99 and 100 of the Guatemalan Constitution were given
their present form when the Constitution was amended in 1927, and it
is well known that the purpose was to make it impossible for a
president to succeed himself or for him to be reelected before the
end of twelve years following the expiration of his term of
office.
[Page 141]
The Constituent Assembly met on May 15, 1935. President Ubico
attended the inaugural session and read a message in which, with
reference to the petitions the Legislature had received favoring his
continuance in office beyond the six years prescribed in the
Constitution, he suggested that as a preliminary step the
inhabitants of the Republic, without distinction as to sex or
nationality, be consulted in a plebiscite. (There is no provision in
the Guatemalan Constitution for the holding of a “plebiscite”. On
the other hand, as already noted, there are provisions which limit
the presidential term to six years, and which prohibit
reelection.)
A decree of the Constituent Assembly approved by President Ubico on
May 27, 1935, called for a three-day “consultation” of all
inhabitants of the Republic having civil rights, without distinction
of sex or nationality, in which they might express their opinion
concerning the following point: “Whether, in view of external
circumstances which influence the internal life of the country, the
permanence of General Jorge Ubico in the Presidency of the Republic
beyond March 15, 1937, for a period which shall not exceed six
years, is convenient to the interests of the nation.”
The “consultation” was held on June 22, 23 and 24, and resulted in
the expression of 843,168 affirmative opinions as against 1,227
negative.
Basing its action on the results of the “consultation”, the
Constituent Assembly, on July 11, 1935, “suspended the effects” of
Article 66 of the Constitution for a period to expire March 15,
1943. Article I of the Decree of the Constituent Assembly reads in
translation as follows:
“Article I. The constitutional presidency of General Jorge
Ubico will terminate on the 15th of March, 1943, and to this
end the effects of Article 66 of the Constitution are
suspended until that date.”
Circular Note of July
17.19
On July 17, 1935, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Guatemala
addressed a circular note to the heads of the diplomatic missions in
Guatemala City reviewing briefly the history of the extension of
President Ubico’s term of office. In this note the Minister of
Foreign Affairs stated that:
“One of the principal objects of General Ubico is to work
zealously for the maintenance and the consolidation of the
cordial relations which happily unite Guatemala and (name of
country). The Government of Guatemala, to that noble end,
has the hope of counting on Your Honor’s most valued
cooperation”.
[Page 142]
While signed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, it will be seen that
the note had somewhat the character of an autographed letter.
Reply of American
Government.
The American Chargé d’Affaires ad interim in Guatemala acknowledged
the receipt of the note, and stated that he had referred it to the
Department of State.
When some time passed and no communication from the Department of
State with reference to the note was received, the Guatemalan
Minister of Foreign Affairs expressed to the American Chargé
d’Affaires his interest in obtaining some sort of reply from the
Department.
Because of the apparent relation between the extension of President
Ubico’s term of office and Articles II and V of the General Treaty
of Peace and Amity, and because the United States had followed the
policy of supporting the Treaty to the extent that it had made its
attitude with respect to the recognition of new governments in
Central America consonant with the provisions of Article II thereof,
the Department determined, before replying to the note of the
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Guatemala, to ascertain what replies,
if any, Honduras and Nicaragua, the other Parties to the Treaty, had
made.
The American Legation at Tegucigalpa reported that the Honduran
Government had instructed its Minister in Guatemala to make a reply
reciprocating the cordial sentiments expressed by the Guatemalan
Minister of Foreign Affairs.
The Nicaraguan Minister of Foreign Affairs informed our Minister that
he had received no word regarding the receipt of the note of July 17
from the Guatemalan Minister of Foreign Affairs.
On September 10, 1935, the Department addressed a telegram to the
American Chargé d’Affaires in Guatemala20 saying
that it had not considered that a reply by the Department to the
Minister of Foreign Affairs’ note of July 17 was called for,
inasmuch as that note was addressed to the Legation and not to the
Department. It stated further, however, that if the Minister of
Foreign Affairs expected the Department to reply it would be glad to
do so provided that other Governments had made replies. The Chargé
d’Affaires was instructed to ask the Minister of Foreign Affairs
what replies he had received from the other Central American
Governments, and to transmit copies of the replies. Copies of the
replies of the Central American Governments, including those of
Honduras and Nicaragua, addressed by their representatives in
Guatemala City, were duly received. The Nicaraguan Chargé d’Affaires
had made a very cordial reply and had stated in his note that he was
acting under instructions from his Government.
[Page 143]
Reply of the United
States.
On September 13, 1935, the American Chargé d’Affaires in Guatemala,
under instructions from the Department,21 replied to the note of
July 17, 1935, in the following language:
“I have the honor to refer to Your Excellency’s courteous
note to this Legation of July 17, 1935, a copy of which I
duly transmitted to my Government. I have now been
instructed to inform Your Excellency that my Government has
taken note of the contents of Your Excellency’s
communication and warmly reciprocates the cordial sentiments
contained therein.”
Autographed letter of President
Ubico and consultation by President of Nicaragua.
On September 20, 1935, the American Minister in Nicaragua
reported22 that President Sacasa had received a
letter, dated July 30, from President Ubico (presumbaly an
autographed letter), with reference to the extension of his term of
office. President Sacasa said that he was sounding out the other
Central American countries regarding their replies, and expressed
the hope that this Government would inform him of our reply.
The Department, on September 25, 1935, informed Minister Lane23 of the receipt of an autographed letter
dated July 30, 1935, from President Ubico,24 announcing his continuance in office until
March 15, 1943, and stated that the usual reply would be made by the
President to this autographed letter. (Such a reply was later
made.)25
With the same communication the Department transmitted to the
Minister a copy of the note of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of
Guatemala to the American Legation at Guatemala dated July 17, 1935,
and informed the Minister of the steps the Department had taken
prior to instructing the Legation at Guatemala to reply in the sense
already expressed. A copy of the reply of the Nicaraguan Chargé d’
Affaires in Guatemala to the circular note of July 17 addressed to
him was also transmitted. In addition, the language of the
Department’s instruction concerning the reply the American Chargé d’
Affaires was to make was quoted. Minister Lane was authorized to
communicate the contents of the instruction and its enclosures
orally and confidentially to President Sacasa.
Minister Lane informed President Sacasa of the contents of the
Department’s instruction and its enclosures, and the latter,
together with the Minister of Foreign Affaires, informed him that
the Nicaraguan
[Page 144]
Chargé
d’Affaires at Guatemala had had no instructions to address his note
of July 24 to the Guatemalan Government. President Sacasa said that
the text of the Chargé d’ Affaires’ note was especially distasteful
to him because of his belief that the extension of President Ubico’s
term of office was a violation of the General Treaty of Peace and
Amity of 1923 to which Guatemala was still a party. He stated,
however, that his reply to President Ubico’s autographed letter of
July 30 would be along the lines of the reply the Department
authorized the Chargé d’Affaires in Guatemala to make to the
Minister of Foreign Affairs’ note of July 17.
Recently, Dr. Arguello, Nicaraguan Minister for Foreign Affairs,
visited Guatemala, apparently in the interests of his own candidacy
for the presidential nomination in Nicaragua, and the Legation in
Guatemala has reported that while the Minister of Foreign Affairs
was in Guatemala he rebuked the Nicaraguan Chargé d’Affaires for his
unauthorized reply to the Guatemalan Minister for Foreign Affairs’
note of July 17. Dr. Arguello is reported to have told the
Nicaraguan Chargé d’Affaires of the fact that consultations between
the American Legation in Managua and the Nicaraguan Government had
been held with reference to the Guatemalan Minister for Foreign
Affairs’ note of July 17 and President Ubico’s autographed letter of
July 30. Since Mr. Evertez, the Nicaraguan Chargé d’Affaires in
Guatemala, is a close personal friend of President Ubico, it is to
be presumed that President Ubico is now aware that the Guatemalan
note and autographed letter have been the subject of discussions
between our representative in Nicaragua and the Nicaraguan
Government.
The Present Situation in the
Central American Countries Still Parties to the Treaty.
Guatemala
The action of Guatemala in “suspending” the constitutional obstacles
to President Ubico’s continuance in office lays it open to the
charge that it has violated Article V of the 1923 Treaty, which is
again quoted for ready reference:
“The Contracting Parties obligate themselves to maintain in
their respective Constitutions the principle of
non-re-election to the office of President and Vice
President of the Republic; and those of the Contracting
Parties whose Constitutions permit such re-election,
obligate themselves to introduce a constitutional reform to
this effect in their next legislative session after the
ratification of the present Treaty.”
Furthermore, Guatemala’s action was so lacking in constitutional
sanction that in officially recognizing it, without protest,
Honduras and Nicaragua have left themselves open to the charge of
violating Article II of the 1923 Treaty, the last paragraph of which
again is quoted:
[Page 145]
“Furthermore, in no case shall recognition be accorded to a
government which arises from election to power of a citizen
expressly and unquestionably disqualified by the
Constitution of his country as eligible to election as
President, Vice President or Chief of State designate.”
Whether or not the action of Guatemala was in technical violation of
Article V of the Treaty, or the action of Honduras and Nicaragua was
in technical violation of Article II, the acts of the three
countries referred to obviously have been in flagrant violation of
the spirit of the 1923 Treaty, and have had the effect of defeating,
in this case, one of the principal purposes of the Treaty—the
prevention of the continuance in office of a Central American
president.
In addition to the above, it is pertinent to consider the Guatemalan
action in the light of the first paragraph of Article II of the 1923
Treaty which declares that “every act, disposition or measure which
alters the constitutional organization in any of them is to be
deemed a menace to the peace of said Republics, whether it proceed
from any public power or from the private citizens”.
Despite the action it has taken, Guatemala has not denounced the 1923
Treaty, and it is entirely possible that the régime of President
Ubico hopes that, while itself taking action in violation of the
Treaty, it may continue to use the Treaty, particularly Article II
thereof, to discourage any coup d’état or
revolution which its own arbitrary action may tend to provoke.
Nicaragua
General Somoza, Commander of the Nicaraguan National Guard, has
expressed his determination to succeed Dr. Sacasa as President of
Nicaragua despite the circumstance that he is apparently prohibited
by the Nicaraguan Constitution from becoming a candidate. He has
repeatedly endeavored to obtain some intimation from Minister Lane
regarding the probable attitude of this Government in the event he
succeeded to the Presidency through a coup
d’état or a revolution, or some unconstitutional procedure,
and Minister Lane has told him on a number of occasions, with the
Department’s authorization, that he has not been informed that the
Department’s attitude toward the 1923 Treaty has changed. He has
told him also, of course, likewise with the Department’s
authorization, that this Government could not commit itself to any
course of action it might take in a hypothetical situation.
On October 8, 1935, the Department addressed a telegram to the
Legation at Managua26 for the Minister’s strictly
confidential information, in which it referred to its instruction of
September 25, 1935, mentioned above, informing the Minister of its
action in authorizing
[Page 146]
the
Chargé d’Affaires in Guatemala to reply to the Guatemalan Minister
of Foreign Affairs’ note of July 17. The Department stated that it
desired the Minister to “make no further statement which might
appear to commit this Government to any action in accordance with
any of the provisions of the Central American General Treaty of
Peace and Amity of 1923, or which might be intended to imply the
possibility of any such action.”
Honduras
President Carías of Honduras is openly planning to extend his term of
office in contravention of the Constitution of his country. The
Government press regards President Roosevelt’s autographed letter to
President Ubico as approval of what the latter did in Guatemala, and
cites it as justification for similar action by President Carías in
Honduras.
In the case of Honduras, the Government fully expects armed revolt
against the action it is taking, and it is conceivable, in its case,
too, that it hopes that, while itself violating the 1923 Treaty, it
may by remaining a party to it, use Article II to limit the strength
of the revolt.
The present situation is therefore as follows:
- 1.
- This Government’s recent practice has been to follow
Article II as a guide in extending or denying recognition to
new governments in countries parties to the Treaty.
- 2.
- Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua are still Parties to the
Treaty.
- 3.
- The action of Guatemala, in “suspending” Article 66 of the
Constitution, and extending the term of office of President
Ubico, was in violation of provisions of its own
Constitution and Article V of the Treaty. Its alteration of
the “constitutional organization” was one of those acts
which under the first paragraph of Article II of the Treaty
were to be considered “a menace to the peace of said
Republics”.
- 4.
- President Carías, in Honduras, plans to effect a similar
extension of his term of office, contrary to existing
provisions of the Honduran Constitution.
- 5.
- Neither Guatemala nor Honduras has taken any step to
denounce the 1923 Treaty. While violating it, or intending
to violate it in order to continue themselves in power, it
is very possible that the present régimes in those countries
wish to retain the Treaty in the hope that Article II will
serve to discourage revolutions or coups
d’état against them.
- 6.
- In Nicaragua, President Sacasa is fearful that General
Somoza will endeavor to succeed to the presidency through
some unconstitutional means, possibly through violence. He
is especially anxious, therefore, that the Treaty,
especially Article II thereof, remain in force.
- 7.
- Nevertheless, both Nicaragua and Honduras have addressed
communications to the Government of Guatemala, in which they
have taken official cognizance, without protest, of the
action of President
[Page 147]
Ubico in extending his term of office in apparent
violation of the 1923 Treaty. In the case of Honduras the
communication was doubtless inspired, in part at least, by a
desire on the part of President Carias to emulate President
Ubico. In the case of Nicaragua, the Nicaraguan Chargé
d’Affaires at Guatemala communicated with the Guatemalan
Government without instructions from his own Government,
although falsely stating that he was acting under
instructions. The Nicaraguan Government, nevertheless, did
not withdraw the note of its Chargé d’Affaires, or otherwise
repudiate the action taken by him, although President Sacasa
has made it clear in conversation that he considers the
extension of President Ubico’s term of office to be in
violation of the Treaty.
- 8.
- After informing itself that Honduras and Nicaragua had
addressed formal communications to the Guatemalan Government
in the sense already referred to, the United States, through
its Chargé d’Affaires in Guatemala, addressed a similar
communication to the Government of Guatemala.
- 9.
- In an effort to assist in the preservation of peace in
Nicaragua, our Minister has, on several occasions, with the
Department’s authorization, told General Somoza that he has
not been informed that the attitude of this Government with
reference to the Treaty has changed.
- 10.
- Following the communications of Honduras, Nicaragua, and
the United States to the Government of Guatemala, in which
cognizance was taken of the extension of President Ubico’s
term of office, the Department instructed our Minister in
Nicaragua thenceforth to refrain from making any statement
that might appear to commit this Government to any action
under the 1923 Treaty.
Recommendation as to the Policy of
the United States.
As has been noted, this Government, following the signature of the
1923 General Treaty of Peace and Amity, pursued a policy of applying
the terms of Article II of the Treaty in extending or denying
recognition to new governments in Central America, whether or not
the countries concerned were parties to the Treaty.
By recognizing the régime of General Martínez in El Salvador, in the
manner we did, our practice was amended in the sense that:
- 1.
- We allowed the countries still Parties to the Treaty to
take the lead in interpreting Article II (in this case in
such manner as to preclude its application to El Salvador).
Prior to then, we had, while not a Party to the Treaty,
taken the lead in interpreting and applying Article II, and
had exerted great moral pressure on the governments of
Central America to follow our lead.
- 2.
- We implied by our action that we would no longer apply the
policy outlined in Article II to countries not Parties to
the Treaty.
In the case of the extension of the term of office of President
Ubico, we took great care not to reply to the initial communication
of the Guatemalan Government announcing the extension, until
Honduras and Nicaragua, the other Parties to the Treaty, had
themselves taken such action; and the record is clear on that
point.
[Page 148]
The initiative was taken by Honduras and Nicaragua themselves and the
action they took constituted, from our point of view, a violation of
the treaty.
Now, so long as the countries Parties to the Treaty themselves
continued to observe it we could find justification for our policy
of following Article II in extending or denying recognition to new
governments. However, in view of the acts of Guatemala, Honduras and
even of Nicaragua, described above, we are no longer warranted in
invoking the Treaty as a reason for denying recognition to any
régime in Central America, since obviously we (who are not even a
party to the Treaty) cannot justly invoke it in the case of one
violation when the Parties to it themselves have both violated it
and failed to invoke it in the cases of other and previous
violations. To endeavor to do so would be arbitrary and capricious
and would constitute “meddling” of a flagrant kind.
Therefore, the United States should no longer be guided by Article II
of the General Treaty of Peace and Amity of 1923 in extending or
denying recognition to Governments in Central America, nor should it
endeavor to utilize that Treaty as justification for any other
action it may take or fail to take.
