710.11/2060
Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Latin American Affairs (Beaulac)11
Our New Policy in Reference to the 1923 General Treaty of Peace and Amity12
Now that the Department has made a decision no longer to be guided by Article II of the 1923 Treaty in extending or denying recognition to new governments in Central America, the question arises as to the procedure to be followed in making that decision publicly known. Ordinarily our decision might be made known by a simple announcement of the Secretary of State. In the present case, however, such an announcement might be interpreted by General Somoza and by others in Nicaragua, and outside of Nicaragua, as an invitation to General Somoza to rebel against the Government. It is known that General Somoza’s fear that we would not recognize him if he carried out a successful coup d’état or revolution has been a strong deterrent to him in the past. It would be particularly unfortunate from our point of view if the impression were created that we were encouraging General Somoza, since he is, of course, already considered by many to be “our man”.
On the other hand, if we make no announcement at this time of our policy, there is the possibility that Somoza will take over the Government in any case. Under our new policy, if General Somoza headed a régime which effectively governed the country and fulfilled its international obligations we would extend recognition to him regardless of his eligibility to recognition under the 1923 Treaty. If we should thus recognize General Somoza without having previously given notice of a change in our announced policy, the case against us might be even stronger because it would be alleged that we altered our policy after the event in order to be able to recognize General Somoza.
Our problem would be solved if one of the three remaining parties to the Treaty should express an intention to denounce it. After denunciation by one it would cease to be in effect as regards any country. From the information we have at hand, however, there is little prospect of denunciation by any of the three countries in the near future. President Sacasa is anxious to retain the Treaty for his own protection. Presidents Ubico and Carias, although themselves violating the Treaty, have taken no steps to denounce it, and one is led to believe [Page 133] that they may wish to retain it in order to discourage revolt against their Governments.
I discussed this subject at great length with Minister Hanna before he returned to Guatemala the last time, and it was agreed that Mr. Hanna would very discreetly probe the prospects of a denunciation of the Treaty by Guatemala. I never heard from Mr. Hanna on the subject and I doubt that he had the opportunity to go into this.
It has been suggested that during the peace conference at Buenos Aires, the conference might find an opportunity to declare that, in accordance with the policy of non-intervention, special rules of recognition would not be applied to any American states. Specific reference need not be made to Central America but such a declaration could be used as a point of departure for any action we might take under our new policy.
I don’t know whether this idea is a practical one at all, but it might be explored by someone who is familiar with the work the conference may be expected to do.