Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1936, The Far East, Volume IV

894.00/634

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

No. 1735

Tokyo, March 19, 1936.
[Received April 6.]

Sir: I have the honor to report that the outbreak of February 26–29 has had the effect of stimulating the Government to the adoption of many of the reforms which the insurgents demanded.

I. Aims of the Insurgents Which Met With Substantial Success

It is true that the insurrection was successfully quelled in a military way, that the radical or “direct action” group in the Army and its civilian sympathizers are at present in disfavor and are being rounded up by the authorities for eventual trial^*, that several of the revolting officers have committed suicide, and that the remainder have been expelled from the Army. On the other hand the actions of the younger officers who took part in the revolt have definitely borne fruit in line with the program of grievances of these officers. It has been stated recently by Army leaders now in control that not only must stricter discipline in the Army be established but that also the “fundamental causes” of the insurrection must be wiped out. For example, General Terauchi, the newly appointed War Minister, issued a statement on March 9 in which, among other things, he said: “As for the Incident, the causes of it were widespread and deeply rooted. It should be made the occasion for endeavors to clarify the principles of the foundation of the Army and remove the evils with which it is affected. Efforts must be made to make it manifest that the Army is under the direct command of the Emperor.” Incidentally, an “Army under the direct command of the Emperor” was one of the battlecries of the insurgents and the banners flown from their headquarters stated: “Loyalty to the Emperor and up with the pure Army.”^† General Terauchi went on to state that when discipline in the Army had been perfected, efforts should be made to clarify the national polity, promote the welfare of the people, make administrative reforms and strengthen national defense. The adoption of such a program was an important part of the rebels’ plans.

Furthermore, according to the Asahi of March 7, on that day General Terauchi told Mr. Hirota that the Army insisted upon utilizing the February 26 incidents as a turning point in Japanese policy and on establishing a fundamental policy based on state control and complete reform of the national administration, with the rejection of the liberal policy pursued since the Meiji Restoration. There are distinct indications that the Army’s desires as expressed by the War Minister will meet with fulfilment at the hands of the Cabinet. Mr. Hirota has reportedly stated that his views are not at variance with those of the War Minister. In his “verbal statement” of March 9, Mr. Hirota implied that the “present unfortunate incident” was fundamentally connected with past laxity in administration and lack of a positive and independent foreign policy. Finally, many of the ideals of the defeated younger officers, later endorsed by the loyal Army, are embodied in the statement of policy issued by the new Government on March 17.^‡ A parallel can be drawn between these developments and the actions since September, 1931, of the more intemperate Army officers in Manchuria and North China which, as “faits accomplis”, received the endorsement of the Japanese Government.

Before analyzing the aims of the insurgent officers in connection with the success or failure of these aims, it is pertinent to remark that a large section of the Army and of the civilian population were and are in sympathy with the ideals that prompted the February 26 affair, though opposed to the violent and undisciplined methods adopted. This fact helps to explain the fundamental success of the insurgent movement.

The motives and plans of the “direct action” group in and outside the Army are revealed by the actions and statements of this group since the Incident of May 15, 1932, by the mimeographed statement left by the insurgent soldiers at newspaper offices on the morning of February 26 last, and by the official document issued by the War Office on the evening of February 26. According to the statement of the insurrectionists, they desired the fall of the Okada Government because it had “been drifting away from the true spirit of Japan and had usurped the prerogatives of the Emperor.” The Okada Government fell owing to its responsibility for the Incident. Evidences given for the above charge against the Okada Cabinet were the signing of the London Naval Treaty,⁴⁶ for which Viscount Admiral Saito was alleged to have been largely responsible,^§ and the dismissal of General Masaki as Inspector General of Military Education on July 16, 1935, for which Saito was also blamed. Saito was one of the victims of the recent outbreak. The insurrectionaries also desired the abolition of the system whereby the senior statesmen offered counsel to the Emperor and to the Government without being responsible for their actions. In this connection it is interesting to note that the Hirota Cabinet is reported to be seriously considering abolishment of the Cabinet Deliberative Body, which since its organization on May 10, 1935,^║ had been largely under the influence of such senior statesmen as Admiral Saito, its President, and Mr. Takahashi, its Vice President. The official statement of the War Office issued on the evening of February 26,^¶ gave among the purposes of the uprising the elimination of statesmen close to the Throne (Saito was killed, Admiral Suzuki, Court Chamberlain, was seriously wounded and at any rate deprived of political influence, and Baron Ikki resigned from his post of President of the Privy Council on March 11). Also listed for “elimination”, according to the War Office announcement, were the military clique (General Watanabe, Inspector General of Military Education of the War Office, was killed), and bureaucrats (Mr. Takahashi, Finance Minister, was killed). A partial motive for the assassination of these men was the need felt by the younger officers to “clarify great principles and to protect and make manifest the national polity.” Clarification of the national polity and the extinction of ideas incompatible with national principles (such as the Minobe theory) are set forth as the first principles of the new Government’s policy in the official statement issued on March 17.

Also among the known aims of the radical army element and of a great part of the Army as well was the establishment of a kind of state socialism, with the imposition of higher taxes on capitalists, the reduction of taxes on the poorer people, and general administrative measures for the welfare of the masses, particularly in the rural communities. These objectives were touched on in the Army pamphlet of October 1, 1934, which contained such phrases as: “So long as economic profits, and especially unearned incomes, are enjoyed by one section of the nation alone the majority of the people will be left in utmost misery and distress.…”^** A program of state reform resembling that desired by the Army is now under consideration by the Hirota Cabinet as evidenced in general terms in the Hirota Cabinet’s policy statement of March 17.^††

After the assassinations of February 26, according to information received by the Embassy, the insurgents demanded of the provisional Government the appointment of either Baron Hiranuma or Admiral Kanji Kato as Premier.^‡‡ While Baron Hiranuma was not made Premier, he was appointed to the post of President of the Privy Council on March 13 and formally installed in office on that day. It will be recalled that Hiranuma has long been known as a chauvinist, an anti-liberal, and a favorite of the radical group in the Army; that the appointment of Baron Ikki as President of the Privy Council on May 3, 1934, was made in violation of the precedent that the Vice President of the Council be promoted to the Presidency upon the resignation of the former incumbent; and that the supporters of Baron Hiranuma were greatly annoyed because, although Vice President of the Council, he had not been appointed to the Presidency.^§§

The younger officers who engineered the insurrection wanted larger defense appropriations and a stronger policy against Soviet Russia. Judging from current reports and the present Cabinet’s statement of policy, an increase in defense appropriations seems assured. As stated above, on March 9 Mr. Hirota mentioned the necessity of positive and independent readjustment of international relations. Four days later, in a conversation with me, Mr. Hirota stated that the “positive diplomacy” frequently mentioned in the press applied exclusively to Soviet Russia and China and simply meant the expediting of his former policy as Minister for Foreign Affairs.^║║

II. Aims of the Insurgents Which Failed

Prince Saionji, the Genro, escaped assassination and in fact subsequently recommended to the Emperor the appointment of Mr. Hirota as Premier. However, in choosing a candidate for Premier, the Genro avoided consulting the other elder statesmen near the Throne, a custom which had been established by him immediately after the May 15 Incident and which was distasteful to the radical element in the Army. On February 27 the leaders of the rebellion were reported to have demanded a military dictatorship for Japan. This demand was immediately rejected by the Government.^¶¶ However, the establishment of a military dictatorship was not among the objectives of the insurgents as disclosed by their mimeographed statement of February 26 and by the official statement of the War Office on that day. The probable reason for the issuance of this demand was to enable the insurgents to make a better bargain with the Government in accordance with the well-known Japanese habit of demanding more than can be obtained for the purpose of striking a future compromise. Seven Army members of the Supreme War Council resigned on March 3, assuming responsibility for the incident. Among those who resigned were Generals Masaki and Araki, who had been an inspiration to the plotters and whose ideas undoubtedly influenced the latter. However, General Hayashi, a member of the military clique which the insurgents wanted to get rid of, also resigned from the Supreme War Council.

In return for certain concessions mentioned elsewhere in this despatch, General Terauchi is reported to have agreed with Mr. Hirota to establish stricter control in the Army. The disciplinary measures thus far taken by the Army have already been mentioned. In addition, more than one hundred civilians are said to have been arrested by the Tokyo gendarmerie and the Metropolitan Police for alleged complicity in the February 26 Incident. If the Army and the Home Office continue to take vigorous steps against the “direct actionists” and if the Government supplements these steps by carrying out the reforms desired by the Army, the danger of another uprising in the near future will probably be greatly lessened.

III. Conclusion

From an examination of the foregoing considerations it would appear that the aims of the insurgents which failed are outweighed by those that succeeded. In general, the insurgents wanted a liquidation of the status quo. The Okada Cabinet, which had been upheld at the polls on February 20, gave no indication of any intention to alter its policy or to adopt a reform program similar to the one announced by the Hirota Cabinet on March 17. While the changes desired by the insurgents have not all come about, measures toward effecting them gradually are under definite consideration. It is probably true that the reforms desired would have had to be adopted in the course of time owing to widespread popular sympathy for the Army’s ideas. Nevertheless, it can be safely said that the insurrection of February 26 hastened that break-up of the status quo.

Respectfully yours,

Joseph C. Grew

1. Embassy’s telegram No. 63, March 7, 1936. [Footnote in the original.]
2. Embassy’s despatch No. 1721 of March 6, 1936. [Footnote in the original; despatch not printed.]
3. Embassy’s despatch No. 1733 of March 19, 1936. [Footnote in the original; despatch not printed.]
46. Signed April 22, 1930, Foreign Relations, 1930, vol. i, p. 107.
47. Embassy’s despatch No. 1707, March 5, 1936. [Footnote in the original.]
48. Embassy’s despatch No. 1332, May 31, 1935. [Footnote in the original; for despatch see Foreign Relations, 1935, vol. iii, p. 858.]
49. Embassy’s despatch No. 1721, March 6, 1935 [1936], [Footnote in the original; despatch not printed.]
50. Embassy’s despatch No. 1031, November 1, 1934. [Footnote in the original; despatch not printed.]
51. Embassy’s despatch No. 1733, March 19, 1936. [Footnote in the original; despatch not printed.]
52. Embassy’s telegram No. 41, February 27, 1936. [Footnote in the original.]
53. Embassy’s despatch No. 776, May 5, 1934. [Footnote in the original; despatch not printed.]
54. Embassy’s telegram No. 74, March 13, 1936. [Footnote in the original.]
55. Embassy’s telegram No. 41, February 27, 1936. [Footnote in the original.]