894.00/623
The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State
[Received March 23.]
Sir: I have the honor to submit the following report on the basic and immediate causes leading to the outbreak of the junior officers of the Japanese Army on February 26, 1936, in which Admiral Viscount Saito, Finance Minister Takahashi and General Watanabe were killed and various other prominent statesmen were attacked. The precise causes impelling the young officers will not be known until they are disclosed at the trials of the officers (if they are made public even then), but in the meantime the Embassy will attempt to describe such of the factors leading to the outbreak as are known to the staff of the Embassy.
In any attempt to analyze the causes leading to the insurrection of February 26, 1936, it is necessary to take into consideration the fact that Japan, despite its well-known national unity in times of emergency, is in fact composed of many different and oftentimes warring factions. Moreover, the fact must be taken into consideration that, in order to understand the motives of modern Japan, one must examine the customs and procedure of ancient Japan, especially the Japan of the Tokugawa Shogunate, when Japanese conventions and modes of thought were largely crystallized.
1. Basic Causes
a. Mental Unrest.
The mental unrest in Japan, according to a high Japanese official, dates back to the time of the World War which, in Japan as in other countries, disturbed the usual ordered processes of thought and substituted therefor vague questionings and ill-formed ideas. In Japan the disturbance of thought was especially intensified by the industrialization of the country which resulted from the War. The mode of life [Page 749] of the Japanese was to a considerable extent altered by industrialization; a wealthy and influential class came into being; and new influences and abuses appeared in governmental circles. The Japanese nation was not entirely prepared for the transition from a predominantly agricultural state to a modern industrial and commercial nation, with the natural result that certain factions of the nation found difficulty in adjusting themselves to altered conditions. This difficulty was particularly apparent in the military and reactionary factions, which, accustomed as they were to government by military oligarchies, could not understand or appreciate the new and powerful elements in the Japanese Government. The mental unrest was intensified by the results of the Washington Conference of 1921–22,35 which appeared to the Japanese to relegate Japan to a position as a second-rate Power, and later was further intensified by the American Immigration Act of 1924,36 which, the Japanese believe, stigmatized the Japanese as an inferior race. A large part of the Japanese nation has been able to adapt itself to changed conditions and to interpret truly the meaning behind the seeming slights to Japan, but the remaining part is bewildered and resentful and, perhaps, to some extent desirous of a return to the old and more understandable days of feudalism. This disturbance of thought, caused by the breakdown of the old standards and the non-assimilation of the new standards, is believed by many observers to account in part, not only for the recent incident, but also for the incident of May 15, 1932, and for the more recent murder of Lieutenant-General Nagata.
b. Economic Mai-Adjustment.
Another basic cause of the incident of February 26 (as well as that of May 15, 1932) lies in the economic situation. It appears undeniable that a considerable section of the Japanese Army is distinctly opposed to capitalism as a system of economics. To understand this one must again remember the Tokugawa and previous eras, when wealth was considered largely in terms of returns from agriculture and when capitalism, as it is known today, did not exist. A considerable part of the Japanese nation (consisting largely of the military and un-propertied classes) does not understand the part played by the capitalists in the world of today and resents the growth of the financial and industrial interests, which they believe are battening on the common people. As an indication that the resentment is directed only against the modern capitalists, it might be pointed out that the resentment does not extend to the great landowners of the old aristocracy, who acquired their lands and wealth in the feudal days. The feeling only applies to the modern capitalists, and principally against the [Page 750] Mitsuis, Iwasakis, Sumitomos, Yasudas and Okuras. The Army officers feel this resentment especially keenly (according to a Japanese official) because, during the Hamaguchi Cabinet, at the start of the world depression, the salaries of Government officials, including Army officers, were drastically reduced, for purposes of retrenchment. The reductions did not create trouble at the time, because all the Japanese were poor together. Then the industrialists took advantage of the Governmental action to reduce the wages of their employees, while the continued depression reduced the earnings of the farming class. Later the yen was devaluated, export trade increased tremendously, and the industrialists became very wealthy. But this prosperity was not passed on to the poorer classes, and the farmers and the military officers remain poor today. As a result of their resentment of this condition some of the Army officers have evolved a curious conception of state economy, consisting, as far as the Embassy can ascertain, in a sort of state socialism or collectivism, with the Emperor as absolute owner of all property and with the people as administrators. There is also a unique admixture of what might be called “samurai-ism”, whereby all are to work together with loyalty to the Emperor for the good of the state. Naturally, capitalism is opposed to any such conception of state economy, and therefore the radical group in the Army is opposed to the capitalists. As will be explained later, this opposition extends to the “senior statesmen bloc”, which the radical military group believes to be the tool of the capitalists.
c. The Emperor’s Prerogatives.
Probably the most powerful factor in the situation is the political factor bound up with the so-called “Minobe Theory” dispute, which, in brief, is a dispute as to whether the Emperor is simply an administrator of the law or is The Law itself. The young officers who engineered the insurrection believed, and undoubtedly most sincerely, that the group of senior statesmen surrounding the Throne were relegating the Emperor to the position of being simply an administrator of the law and that they were usurping his prerogatives. This is indicated in the written statement which, according to the War Office announcement, the insurgents distributed on February 26 and which has been translated as follows:
“The purpose of the uprising was to eliminate those destroying the national polity, such as the Genro, statesmen close to the Throne, financial magnates, the military clique, bureaucrats and political parties, at the present crisis at home and abroad, in order to clarify great principles and to protect the national polity.”
The “national polity” in this case is understood to mean the theory that the Emperor is The Law. The inference is that the Genro (Prince Saionji), the statesmen close to the Throne (Count Makino, [Page 751] Admiral Suzuki, Admiral Saito, Admiral Okada, Baron Ikki37 and others), the financial magnates (the Mitsuis, Iwasakis, Sumitomos, Okuras, Yasudas and others), the military clique then in power (General Kawashima, General Watanabe, General Hayashi and others), the bureaucrats (Mr. Takahashi, Mr. Goto, Mr. Machida and others) and the political parties were usurping the authority of the Emperor and thereby destroying the national polity. The reactionary element in the Army and outside believe not only that these groups are usurping the authority of the Emperor, but also that they are using the Emperor and even the Army itself to further their own selfish interests. They believe that the Genro, the senior statesmen surrounding the Throne and the moderate element in the Army are in league with the great financial interests, and that they are using their power in the Government to further those interests at the expense of the great mass of the people. This point of view is well brought out in an interview which Captain Weckerling,38 Assistant Military Attaché and Mr. J. G. Parsons,39 of the Embassy, had with Dr. James A. B. Scherer, a friend of General Jinzaburo Mazaki, whose opinions Dr. Scherer is presumed to have expressed during the interview. A memorandum of this conversation is enclosed.40 The Embassy can by no means agree with all of Dr. Scherer’s statements, some of which seem almost fantastic. For example, Dr. Scherer implied that Finance Minister Takahashi was the tool of the capitalists, who fattened off the profits made on munitions. But it is undeniable that Mr. Takahashi tried by every means in his power to reduce the military budgets. Again, Dr. Scherer implied that the campaigns on the Asiatic continent were sponsored or instigated by the capitalists, whose tools the senior statesmen are. But again it is undeniable that the campaigns into North China by the Kwantung Army were stopped by command of the Emperor, presumably on the advice of the same senior statesmen. Despite these obviously illogical implications, however, it is believed that Dr. Scherer’s statements contain a germ of truth and undoubtedly represent the opinions of a section of the Japanese Army.
It will be noted that the insurgent officers, on February 26, attacked principally the senior statesmen surrounding the Throne. Viscount Saito, Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, was killed; Admiral Suzuki, Grand Chamberlain, was wounded; Premier Admiral Okada was attacked but escaped; Count Makino, now not in high office but probably the most disliked (by the chauvinistic element) of any statesmen in Japan, was attacked but escaped; and an attack was planned on Prince Saionji, the Genro, according to reports, but the insurgents were arrested on the train en route to the resort where the Prince [Page 752] was spending the winter. The assumption therefore is that the insurgent officers considered the senior statesmen surrounding the Throne to be the most destructive element in the Japanese Government and decided to eliminate them first. They apparently did not attempt to assassinate any of the great financial magnates. According to a Japanese official, however, the insurgents had a second program, which was designed to eliminate some of the more prominent financiers, but lack of support from the people and the prompt measures taken for the suppression of the insurgents prevented them from carrying out the second program.
d. Dissatisfaction with the External Political Situation.
The military believe that the treaties concluded as a result of the Washington Conference of 1921–22 were well-intentioned, but in the end did more harm than good. In effect, they say that the treaties gave China a “blank check” which China believed could be used at any time to obtain help from Great Britain and the United States. The Chinese therefore not only did not help themselves out of the morass into which they had fallen, but became arrogant toward Japan. According to a Japanese official, they refused to recognize Japan’s interests in Manchuria, which brought on the Manchurian Incident of 1931. The same factor applies to China proper. China has diligent and intelligent people, like the Japanese, but whereas the Japanese have made a great deal out of little, the Chinese have made nothing out of much, due primarily to poor government. The Chinese are using their “blank check” of the Washington treaties to keep the Japanese from developing China, and the Japanese themselves are more or less estopped by those same treaties. The military are resentful of this fact and the resentment leads to direct action against those considered responsible for the treaties.
e. Indiscipline in the Japanese Army.
Another very serious basic factor in the situation lies in the fault in the training of the officers of the Japanese Army which impels them to take direct action whenever they feel that they should correct some real or fancied abuse. To understand this peculiar tendency to take direct and violent action, one must again go back to feudal days in Japan. Then the samurai, the soldiers, were loyal only to their feudal lords. When attempts were made to organize an Imperial Army after the Meiji Restoration, it was found that the soldiers, accustomed as they had been to giving loyalty only to their clan chiefs, tended to transfer this loyalty to their immediate superior officers, with the result that insurrections occurred and there was little loyalty to the Empire. To correct this defect, the Emperor Meiji, in 1882, issued an Imperial Rescript to the Army and Navy, emphasizing the [Page 753] necessity of complete loyalty to the Emperor. The following passages from the Rescript will serve to illustrate the emphasis placed upon this point:
“The supreme command of Our forces is in Our hands, and although We may entrust subordinate commands to Our subjects, yet the ultimate authority We Ourself shall hold and never delegate to any subject.”
“Soldiers and Sailors, We are your supreme Commander-in-Chief. Our relations with you will be most intimate when We rely upon you as Our limbs and you look up to Us as your head.”
The Rescript accomplished its purpose of transferring the loyalty of the soldiers from their immediate chiefs to the Emperor, but the trouble today arises from the fact that the Rescript was not allowed to sink into obscurity after it had accomplished its purpose but remains today, in a modern state, as the Bible of the Army. The Japanese Army places great importance upon the “spiritual training” of its soldiers, and uses the Imperial Rescript for the purpose of such training. The result has been to over-emphasize the officer’s direct connection with the Emperor and his loyalty to the Emperor, and to under-emphasize the necessity of absolute obedience to his superior officers. Consequently the young officers feel that, if their conception of their duty to the Emperor conflicts with orders received from their superior officers, they can, with a clear conscience, disregard the orders and act according to their lights. This fact was well illustrated by the advance upon North China by the Kwantung Army in 1935. It will be remembered that the units of the Kwantung Army could only be stopped at the Great Wall by the issuance of an Imperial order to the effect that the Army should not move south of the Wall without Imperial sanction. In any other country, a simple order from the general commanding the army would have been sufficient to stop the advance, but in the case of the units of the Kwantung Army, an Imperial command was required to stop the young officers in command of the units. This tendency toward direct and individual action lay behind the recent incident of February 26, 1936, as well as behind the previous one of May 15, 1932, and behind the murder of General Nagata in 1935. In the recent incident, the young insurgent officers refused to obey the repeated commands of their superior officers that they return to their barracks, and eventually an Imperial command was issued. The privates obeyed the Imperial command and surrendered, but the officers held out for some time longer, refusing to surrender until their demands had been met. The inconsistency of refusing unquestioning obedience to the Emperor, while professing to be fighting to restore the Emperor’s authority, does not seem to have occurred to the insurgent officers.
[Page 754]2. Immediate Causes
There were several minor causes which impelled the insurgent officers to take direct action at this particular time, but, as was expressed by a Japanese official, they constituted only the fuse which touched off the powder, the powder (the basic unrest) being already there.
a. The Transfer of the 1st Division to Manchuria.
The 1st Division, stationed in and near Tokyo, was recently ordered to Manchuria as replacements for another division which has served its time in the Kwantung Army. Some of the regiments of the 1st Division were scheduled to start for Manchuria within a few days, and the dissatisfied young officers felt that they were compelled to act quickly, before their departure, if they hoped to attempt to correct the abuses which they believed existed in the Government. Moreover, having been equipped with ammunition and other supplies for active duty in Manchuria, they were in a position to make an effective attack on the Government.
b. The Aizawa Trial.
The hearings in the trial of Lieutenant-Colonel Aizawa, who murdered Lieutenant-General Nagata last year, have been proceeding for the past month and have served to excite the group of younger officers in sympathy with Aizawa. It developed at the trial that Aizawa held much the same ideas in regard to the national polity and abuses in the Government as did the insurgent officers, and that he had killed General Nagata because he believed him opposed to the best interests of the State. The rumor became current that Aizawa was not being given a fair trial, the court martial being composed of officers not in sympathy with Aizawa’s views, and on February 25, General Mazaki, who had been called as a witness, is reported to have walked out of the courtroom in indignation at the methods used in the trial. It is possible that this precipitated the revolt of the troops, as it is rumored that one of the demands of the insurgent officers was that Aizawa be freed. The Aizawa trial has now been indefinitely postponed, undoubtedly in order to avoid further exciting the Army. This trial is discussed more fully in despatch No. 1707 of March 5, 1936.
c. The Results of the Recent Diet Election.
As was reported in despatch No. 1706, of March 5, 1936, the recent election of Diet members resulted in the return of an unexpectedly large number of Minseito and Shakai Taishuto members and the defeat of the Seiyukai, the party opposed to the Okada Government. The Okada Cabinet was thus assured of support during the coming special session of the Diet. The young, radical officers of the Army were bitterly opposed to the Okada Cabinet, which they believed to [Page 755] be corrupt and weak, and apparently decided to overthrow it by force if it could not be overthrown by orderly constitutional methods.
3. Conclusions
While it is yet too early to venture any definite predictions in regard to the effects of the recent uprising in the Army, it seems fairly certain, according to the observations of this Embassy, that certain specific results will flow therefrom. The first, and perhaps the most important, will be definite attempts to instil a better sense of discipline into the Army. It is not known how this will be done, but it is possible that less emphasis will in the future be placed upon the high-flown “spiritual” teachings of men such as General Araki and General Mazaki, and more upon the soldier’s practical duty to the State.
There will almost undoubtedly be attempts to organize a “Japanese New Deal” and to correct the economic maladjustments which lie at the root of much of the present unrest. In Japan there is, in the opinion of many students of the situation, too great a spread between the very rich and the very poor. The distribution of wealth is too unequal, and as long as this condition lasts the nation will be in danger of further outbreaks similar to those of May 15, 1932, and February 26, 1936. There is a limited public sympathy and support for the young officers who engineered the recent uprising, but one frequently hears it said that there is a considerable amount of truth in the accusations of the young officers and their clique in the Army in regard to maldistribution of wealth and corruption in high places. It is believed that most of the farming class and a considerable section of the Army are in sympathy with the ideals of the insurgents, and it is freely predicted that there will be other and perhaps more serious outbreaks unless something is done to remedy the conditions giving rise to the unrest. There is therefore little doubt that the new Government, whatever its complexion may be, will strive to evolve concrete policies which will tend to accomplish the same purposes as the New Deal in the United States has as its aims.
It is also possible that the recent incident will cause a swing in popular feeling toward the left. It will be remembered that at the time of the great earthquake of 1923, Osugi and other persons with socialistic tendencies were murdered in cold blood by police officers. The brutality of the murders shocked the public and caused a swing to leftist sentiments in Japan. Later several communist plots were discovered by the authorities, and there was a revulsion of feeling in Japan, resulting in the popularity during recent years of the reactionary elements. The public is now becoming fatigued with the numerous plots and uprisings of the extreme right elements, culminating in the recent incident, and it is predicted that there will be [Page 756] a decided swing toward the left in public feeling, although the swing will not reach to socialism or communism.
Respectfully yours,