793.94/7766
Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hornbeck)
Reference, memorandum to the Secretary of February 12 hereunder attached.87
The Chinese Ambassador called me on the ’phone this morning and said that he had been checking his telegrams and had found a mistake in reading: in connection with his request for an interview with the Secretary, he found that it was not necessary that he see the Secretary, but his instruction was to “keep in touch with the Department of State”; he thought that it would be preferable that he talk the matter over at this stage with me rather than with the Secretary.
The appointment for the Ambassador to see the Secretary at twelve o’clock this day was therefore canceled, and the Ambassador called on me.
The Ambassador repeated substantially what he had said to me as recorded in the memorandum of February 12 under reference. He then added that his Government had reason to believe that the Japanese Government had approached or would approach the American, the British, and the Russian Governments with the objective of keeping those Governments apart and causing them to stand aside while Japan proceeded with Japan’s China policy. The Chinese Government wished to know whether the American Government had been thus approached. I said in reply that the Japanese Government had made no approach to us. The Ambassador wished to know what would be our attitude if we were so approached. I replied that I thought the Ambassador could formulate for himself an adequate reply to [Page 61] that question and could give his Government a reply of his own making: that it is perfectly clear to anyone in this country that the American people and the American Government are at present disinclined toward “foreign entanglements”, especially anything in the nature of political commitments which would tie this country to other countries or involve us in conflicts between other countries; and that it is also clear that this country remains, as it always has been, well disposed toward China—whence it would be unlikely that we would commit ourselves to or pursue a policy obviously prejudicial to China’s interests and in the nature of taking sides with another or other countries against China.
The Ambassador said that he was glad to have what I had said and that he hoped and trusted that the American Government would be on guard. He then inquired whether we had any news of new Japanese activities in China, and I replied that we had not. He made the observation that things appeared comparatively quiet in China and that the Japanese were not pressing expressly upon any one demand.