765.84/4936
Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Murray) to the Secretary of State
Mr. Secretary: The attached document45 is a copy of the final report of Captain John Meade, for several months our Military Attaché at Addis Ababa. You will not, of course, wish to take the time to read this report in full, but the following points may be of interest:
One. Captain Meade states that the size of the Ethiopian forces has been greatly exaggerated. He estimates the total number of Ethiopians in the field at 118,000. This is a mere fraction of the estimates which have been received from other sources. In view of the small number of troops available it is perhaps not surprising that the Italian forces, which consisted of half a million men, were able to reach Addis Ababa at such an early date.
Two. Captain Meade gives a graphic picture of the complete lack of training of the Ethiopian forces and the woeful absence of equipment and supplies.
Three. Captain Meade in more than one place in his report definitely establishes the use of poison gas by the Italians. Thus, on pages 24–25 he writes as follows:
“The Ethiopians themselves used no chemical agents, not even the simplest, such as smoke or poisons. The effect of gas from Italian bombs was very marked, largely due to the ignorance of the native soldiers. As far as I know, mustard gas was the only type used, and although it was effective, it was not so persistent as might be expected. This may be attributed to the rare atmosphere, and the very hot sun of the Ethiopian climate. All gas observed was dropped in bombs, although there were uncorroborated stories of it being sprayed from airplanes.”
Again on page 32 he states:
“Mustard gas was used with increasing frequency during the last three months of the war, but only in areas less than a day’s march from where the ground troops were in contact.”
Again on page 33, in referring to the various kinds
of Italian bombs observed, Captain Meade writes:
Captain Meade points out that since the Ethiopians lacked the ability to drive enemy planes away they soon learned the necessity of dispersion as a means of preventing heavy casualties. He goes on to say:
“… This is the principal reason why up to the time Italy began to use gas, very few Ethiopian casualties were caused by bombs. The rate of casualties by gas bombs was at first a good deal higher than it became later. This was caused by the ignorant desire of the Ethiopians to examine the hole made by a gas bomb where it had detonated. They afterward learned of the persistent effect of mustard gas around such a crater. It seems that the effectiveness of mustard gas in this war was less than might be expected in America or in Europe. There are two possible explanations for this. In the high altitude near the Equator, where the sun is very hot and the atmosphere very dry, the rate of evaporation is so high that effective concentrations are not maintained for a sufficiently long time. The Italians got no advantage from the foggy days in the mountain valleys, because they did not fly in such weather, and did not use artillery to produce gas concentrations. Another reason for what I consider to be the comparatively few casualties is the extraordinary physical resistance of the Abyssinian soldier to vesicants. I have seen men still carrying on with burns or wounds that would certainly incapacitate if not kill a white man. I believe they are also excessively resistant to lung and eye irritants as the result of their habitual life in smokefilled dirty tuculs whose only ventilation is the door opening.”
His final comments with respect to the use of gas read as follows:
“It is my opinion that of all the superior weapons possessed by the Italians, mustard gas was the most effective. It caused very few deaths that I observed, but it temporarily incapacitated very large numbers and so frightened the rest that the Ethiopian resistance broke completely. It is possible that the Ethiopians could have lasted for at least two years had they pursued the delaying tactics recommended to them but they were sure to have lost in the end. They certainly did not help themselves by their refusal to listen to the advice and [Page 80] take the services of the Belgian and Swiss officers whom they had employed. Before the end of the war all these men had either been dismissed from the country or were virtual prisoners in Dessie or Addis Ababa. They were given no command and had no contact with any of the military activities in the country.”
Four. Captain Meade’s conclusions regarding the future of Ethiopia, as stated below, are also of interest:
“The future of Ethiopia cannot accurately be predicted. The first task the Italians have if they honestly intend to make a productive colony is the creation of a serviceable road net. Until this is done the country will remain savage and tied to pack transportation and it will also be necessary for the Italians to maintain a very large police garrison. After completing this road net success will depend on the method of administration adopted. If the success of a government may be measured by the contentment of the people governed, the Italians have so far failed to produce good colonial administration either in Eritrea or Tripoli. Tigre is full of people who have fled there from Eritrea because they were dispossessed of their property, or for other reasons. There, one hears many stories of the methods used by the Italian governors in running their districts which can only be described as atrocity tales. Regardless of the percentage of truth in these stories their existence indicates a social condition which is disturbing and unsatisfactory. General Graziani, now Viceroy of Ethiopia, has a well established reputation for excessively cruel administration of the natives of Tripoli.
“It is my belief that future success in Italian administration of Ethiopia as a colony or possession must be based on a fundamental change in their methods. The Ethiopian is by nature too proud to accept an iron-handed government without objection, and he is sufficiently intelligent that contact with white men will instruct him in the more successful methods of revolt.”