Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1936, The Near East and Africa, Volume III

765.84/4093: Telegram

The Minister Resident in Ethiopia (Engert) to the Secretary of State

Addis Ababa, April 12, 1936—10 p.m.
[Received April 16—4:15 p.m.²⁸]

210. Department’s 126, April 8, 8 p.m.²⁷ Apart from the communiqués which have been forwarded to the Department by telegraph and mail practically no information regarding the situation in the north is available from official Ethiopian sources. What follows is a composite picture obtained from a multitude of unofficial sources both native and foreign with such comment and interpretation of my own as seems reasonably safe. In order to avoid reiteration of certain fundamental aspects the Department is respectfully referred to paragraphs 6 to 10 of my 208, December 5, 10 p.m.,³⁰ paragraph 13 of my 14, January 7, noon, and paragraphs 9 and 10 of my 87, February 12, 9 a.m. [p.m.] Please note also that approximate figures for troops given in paragraph 11 of my 208, although very conservative compared to reports current at that time, should in the light of events since then be reduced by at least 30 per cent. In other words it seems unlikely that the total effective Abyssinian fighting force on both fronts ever exceeded 350,000 armed men.

1. Abyssinian tactics during the first 4½ months of the war had dampened Italian hopes of an early and decisive victory and the slow and hesitant operations must have caused disillusionment in Rome. And considering that the diminishing prospects of forcing the decision before the beginning of the heavy rains caused Mussolini’s very fate to hang in the balance because of the steady deterioration of Italy’s economic and financial situation it is hardly surprising that the Italian High Command [apparent omission] to make some spectacular advances even at the risk of sacrificing sound strategy. The all-important consideration was to impress an impatient public at home and a hostile or at least sceptical public opinion abroad.

2. Events of the past 6 weeks have proved that the decision to force the pace was fully justified for even without taking Italian claims too literally there can no longer be any doubt that the fortunes of war have turned definitely in favor of the Italians. After hammering the Ethiopians continuously since the middle of February, Marshal Badoglio evidently succeeded in striking a series of crushing blows which put the bulk of the Ethiopian armies in the north out of the field.

3. It will be recalled that by the beginning of February the Italian position at Makalle had become precarious and although the Abyssinians had not succeeded in cutting Makalle entirely off from Adigrat they were preparing to besiege it or endeavoring to take it by a frontal attack as evidenced by some sharp skirmishes which took place in its immediate vicinity. In trying to meet this threat from Ethiopian columns converging on Makalle, the Italian commander in chief decided to lengthen his unduly short base line by ordering a general [apparent omission] in three main columns.

4. The Italian left wing consisted of the First and Third Army Corps (both mostly white troops) and to them was assigned the task of clearing the main road leading south from Makalle. They were opposed by Ras Mulugeta, the Minister of War, who is understood to have commanded Ethiopia’s largest and best-equipped army including the Imperial Guard. After some fierce engagements which lasted 3 or 4 days, the Italians succeeded in storming of Amba Aradam massif in the Enderta region on February 15. Mulugeta’s army fled and although I understand that some 15,000 men under Dejazmatch Mashesha withdrew in good order, no attempt appears to have been made to make a stand. Aderat is said to dominate the region between Antalo and Amba Kasi.

5. It is said that a false report of the Emperor’s death which had been spread by the Italians among the Abyssinian soldiers during the attack on Amba Aradam caused several minor leaders to retreat even before an Italian success seemed certain. However that may be, no serious resistance was encountered by the invaders and on February 28 they even took Amba Kasi some 25 miles south of Amba Aradam with practically no opposition. Considering that Kasi was Ethiopia’s strongest natural bulwark in the north and had many prepared gun emplacements and entrenchments, it had been expected that the relatively well-equipped forces of Ras Mulugeta and Dejazmatch Wodaju would make a determined stand there. Why this was not done is not clear for the surrender without argument of such an important stronghold could hardly be called a strategic retreat. It may be that hostile Azebu Galla tribesmen chose that moment to attack the Ethiopians in the rear. Also about that time Mulugeta died of pneumonia or some say was killed in a fight with these tribesmen.

6. The Emperor arrived at Quoram from Dessie on March 4 and took personal command of operations. By the end of March he had apparently rallied enough troops not only to stop the Italian advance but to counterattack. This he did on March 31 at Maichio (ceo [Mai Cio] on Italian maps) some 20 miles south of Kasi. But although the Ethiopian army is reported to have fought very well, it was beaten off with heavy losses. The attack failed and the Emperor was obliged to withdraw south with the remnants of his forces. Since then the Italians, reinforced by the Fourth Army Corps, have occupied Quoram April 5 and are now believed to be at Cobbo about 125 miles north of Dessie.

7. While these operations were in progress, equally important developments took place in the center. The victory at Amba Aradam having given the Italians control of the main passes to the Tembien region, Badoglio left the First Army Corps to form the extreme eastern flank of his army along the edge of the plateau and sent most of the Third Army Corps and the native Eritrean Corps into the Tembien where Ras Kassa and Ras Seyoum evidently intended to give battle, although Kassa had always recommended resistance further south. Kassa’s strongest position was near Mount Amba Warkamba just north of Abbi Addi and about 50 miles northwest of Makalle, while Seyoum’s forces are believed to have been somewhere near there. With the Italian occupation of Antalo and Mulugeta’s defeat, both Ethiopian leaders were in great danger of being cut off. They apparently realized this a little too late and suddenly found themselves caught on two flanks. The difficult Warkamba stronghold was successfully stormed by an Alpini division about March 1, and the remainder of the Abyssinian forces were almost surrounded in the Andino region. Although Kassa and Seyoum managed to escape, it is not known how many of their troops succeeded in extricating themselves. It is feared that many of them were destroyed by intense artillery fire and aerial bombing.

8. After the defeat of Kassa and Seyoum which coincided with the occupation of Amba Kasi mentioned in paragraph 5 above—the Third and Eritrean Corps divided. The former is believed to have marched south, i. e., parallel to the Third Army Corps and occupied Fenaroa March 15 and some time later Sokota [Socota]; the native army corps moved further west and occupied the heights and passes dominating the Gheva River. This move forced Ras Imru to retire from Shire where he had been threatening the Italian right flank by commanding the principal fords over the Takkaze River. These he was now obliged to abandon but he proved an excellent leader even in defeat and is believed to have saved most of his army intact.

9. The same is probably true of Dejazmatch Ayalu who had [held?] the Setit River in the extreme northwest of the country. Upon learning of the Ethiopian reverses further east, he withdrew his army before the Italian Second Army Corps got properly started. The latter advanced in two columns: one along the Sudan frontier via Nogara [Noggara] and the other through Wokait and via Adiramoz [Adi Remoz?]. Both were practically unopposed, and as the country is not very difficult, they made amazingly rapid progress. A Black Shirt Division entered Gondar about March 31 and a few days later Tsana was reached.

10. Nothing is known here of an Italian advance reported to have been made towards the end of March from Assab across the Danakil desert to Sardo in the Aussa country. Even if true, not much importance need be attached to it from a military point of view, although politically it may indicate that the Sultan of Aussa has been or is about to be bought by the Italians.

11. The situation in the south has not changed much since the Legation’s 87, February 12, 9 a.m. [p.m.], although Graziani’s much talked of offensive against Jigjiga and Harrar is almost hourly expected. Motor road of about 300 miles from Mogadisho [Mogadiscio] to Gorahai including concrete bridge over Webishebeli has been completed and a vast supply depot established at Gorahai which has great strategic importance and commands principal wells in Ogaden. Although both Jigjiga and Harrar have several times been heavily bombed and are practically evacuated, the Italians never once seriously threatened Ethiopian communication with Djibouti or Berbera. Graziani has been reinforced by a division from Italy and a mixed division from Libya and should have over 100,000 men at his disposal. After the monsoons begin on the Indian Ocean late in May the landing of troops and supplies at the open roadstead of the Somali coast becomes very dangerous.

12. Referring again to the situation in the north, I am summarizing below my own views regarding principal reasons for the rapid deterioration of Abyssinian resistance in the face of a determined Italian offensive:

A. The greatest mistake was not to adhere rigidly to earlier guerrilla type of warfare of avoiding battle, constantly retreating and making war chiefly on enemy communications. By only fighting rear guard actions as they withdrew, they would of course have yielded ground, but their armies would have remained intact, and, with their remarkable physical endurance and by means of quick night marches, they could have inflicted heavy losses without risking serious reverses themselves.

B. The Italians have proved that scientific warfare with well trained troops can after all overcome formidable obstacles and that modern armaments and mechanical transport must in the long run be of decisive importance when used against primitive and practically untrained hordes with pathetically poor equipment and hardly any supply service.

C. The offensive power of aircraft, when in as undisputed control of the air as in this war, has now been demonstrated. Attacks from the air on a large scale, i. e., with hundreds of planes dropping hundreds of tons of high explosives, were to a great extent able to take the place of artillery preparation where the terrain forbade the use of anything heavier than mountain batteries. Besides planes were always within easy range of Ethiopian troop concentrations, prevented large reinforcements from reaching the fighting line except by night, bombed cattle and pack animals and thus deprived enemy of food as well as of supply trains, while themselves carrying supplies to isolated Italian units. (This was done on a particularly large scale in provisioning the Fourth Army Corps while on the move.) Low flying planes also poured much machine gun fire into every column of Abyssinian troops they could reach without too great risk.

D. Badoglio is said to have great faith in artillery, and concentrated artillery fire was used with telling effect wherever possible, notably in dislodging Kassa and Seyoum (see paragraph 7 above). In February, the Italians started using all kinds of gas—asphyxiating, mustard, and corrosive—in large quantities which had a demoralizing effect on the Abyssinians who had no means whatever of protecting themselves against its ravages.

E. By using road building battalions on unprecedented scale, the Italians were able to move up artillery and supply columns much more swiftly than was expected and thus bring their overwhelming superiority of armament to bear. It is reported that in preparation for the big rains, the Italians are even macadamizing some of the main line roads. Incidentally, it now appears that the unusual rains in January, February, and March have been much less heavy further north and did not interfere with Italian road construction as much as had been hoped.

F. Minor successes had given Abyssinians false confidence forgetting that the Italians had not yet made full use of their best troops. Alpine regiments (see paragraph 5, my 87, February 12, 9 a.m. [p.m.]) used to fighting in difficult terrain and acclimatized to high altitudes, appear to have impressed even the natives with their agility and courage. Ethiopians have also been severely handicapped by a lack of capable leaders. Most of the chieftains are quite unconscious of their own limitations, while the feudal type of army permits too little control from the center to organize and coordinate large scale troop movements. Insufficient food and ammunition and the combined effects of high explosive shells, gas, and constant aerial bombings must also have badly shaken their morale. Their losses have been very heavy while the Italians, thanks to artillery and aircraft, were apparently able to avoid large casualties. Both armies complain of abnormal ratio of killed to wounded said to be over 10 to 1—indicating that neither side has shown any mercy.

13. The question naturally arises whether the Ethiopians will find it possible to reorganize their scattered forces in the north and offer any further effective resistance. With the exception of the battle of Maichio (see paragraph 6 above), there is no evidence that the Italian drive has been seriously impeded since the beginning of March. Much depends on whether all main bodies of Abyssinians have actually been destroyed as fighting units or whether they have merely been dispersed. It is reported the Emperor has issued orders that all forces are to be broken up into small units of not more than [a] thousand men which are to operate independently as guerrilla bands against small enemy forces and convoys. If such an order can still be carried out without degenerating into pure banditry, Italy’s task of subduing northern Ethiopia may after all not be any easy one. It is obvious that the difficulties of the invaders increased the further they get from their bases and that even if unopposed the mountainous and almost entirely roadless country is bound to retard their progress more and more.

Besides, the approach of the big rains must be a matter of great concern to the Italian high command, for unless all organized resistance is completely destroyed before the weather breaks no decisive victory will have been won by the time the rains put an end to most military operations. Perhaps the most hopeful factor of all is that not even Italian reports claim that any of the important military leaders have betrayed [the] Emperor and gone over to the enemy.

14. On the other hand, if, as seems likely, the morale of the Abyssinian fighting man has gone to pieces under the recent strain the Italians may be left undisturbed sufficiently long to readjust and improve their communications to the rear and to entrench themselves so thoroughly behind barbed wire, pill boxes and redoubts that it will be impossible to dislodge them after the rainy season. And in the meantime, they will have succeeded in cleansing the occupied areas of any guerrilla bands that may be hiding there and will have intimidated or coaxed the civilian population into submission.

It remains to be seen whether the rapid development and relatively easy Italian successes in the north will make a dictated peace. That Mussolini will exploit his military position to the very limit for political and diplomatic bargaining purposes is certain. He will have the support of the Italian natives in trying to impose the terms of the victor upon the vanquished. The humiliation of Italian defeats of 1896 have now been definitely wiped out and his next aim is the removal of the humiliation of sanctions. Both he and Hitler and Japan before them have demonstrated conclusively that bold moves which puzzled an embarrassed world were a fait accompli seem to pay attention.³¹ The unequal struggle which is being waged with machine guns and gas bombs in Abyssinia and endless arguments and tactics in Geneva has bared the real issue with dramatic emphasis: Will the nations of the world sitting in judgment have the perspicacity and courage to uphold the pledged word? If the conquest of Ethiopia can be consummated despite sanctions and the moral condemnation of public opinion the Covenant of the League and the Paris Pact will be robbed of any reality they may have ever had and the relations between nations will continue to flounder in futile and helpless confusion.

Engert

28. Telegram in eight sections.
27. Not printed.
30. Foreign Relations, 1935, vol. i, p. 689.
31. This sentence apparently garbled in transmission.