767.68119/908
The Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State
No. 22
Ankara, April 23, 1936.
[Received May
15.]
Sir: I have the honor to enclose herewith, in
reference to the Turkish request for revision of the Straits Convention
of 1923 (as reported in my despatch No. 20 of April 14), a memorandum of
a conversation on that subject which I had yesterday with Dr. Tevfik
Rüstü Aras, Minister for Foreign Affairs. I also enclose copies14 of memoranda of recent
conversations with the Japanese Ambassador,15 the Counselor
[Page 513]
of the German Embassy,16 and the British
Ambassador,17
touching on various aspects of the same question.
The Government of the United States has, as I understand the matter, no
treaty right, direct or indirect, with respect to the Straits
Convention; nor has it any concern with the military and political
aspects of that Convention; its sole practical interest in the matter is
the maintenance (or perhaps the amelioration) of the régime of freedom
of commercial navigation through the Straits. There is every reason to
believe that it is the intention of the Turkish Government to maintain
that régime satisfactorily and without discrimination for the benefit of
maritime traffic, even in the event of the termination of Turkey’s
present conventional obligations in that regard. And in view
particularly of the disposition of the Turkish Government, because of
the “favorable balance of trade” with the United States, to give
American commerce the most favorable treatment, I am confident that we
need feel no anxiety about the continued enjoyment by our shipping of
the benefits of the régime.
There are, indeed, certain minor points in which improvements might be
suggested. On the basis of its contacts with the American Export Line
(the sole American shipping company affected) the Consulate-General
informs me that this line, in common with the British and other shipping
interests concerned, considers that the quarantine charge of four
piastres (say $0,032) per net registered ton on vessels navigating these
waters in either direction (and even when not stopping in transit), and
the same charge for the maintenance of life-saving service, levied upon
each voyage into the Black Sea, are unduly high and, in the case of
vessels merely passing through the Straits, unwarranted. Although it
does not appear that, even under the existing Convention, there is any
basis for demanding as of right that these charges be abated, there may
possibly develop, in connection with the proposed reconsideration of the
Convention, some favorable opportunity to suggest to the Turkish
Government the reduction of these charges. The Embassy would of course
take advantage of any such occasion, either acting alone or cooperating
with the representatives of other maritime nations.
Inasmuch as our interest in the question of the Straits is confined to
matters in which we can in any case expect the most favorable treatment
of our shipping, I venture to suggest that no useful purpose would be
served by our being represented by observers in any conference which may
be held for the reconsideration of the Convention. On the contrary, in
view of the fact that the Turks are even yet manifestly somewhat
sensitive about the fact that “as a matter of historical
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survival” (to quote Dr. Aras) the régime
of commercial navigation in these Turkish waters has been treated as a
question for regulation by international agreement rather than by
domestic action, I am sure they would feel it to be the more friendly
and gracious on our part, and would predispose them to entertain the
more sympathetically any ameliorative suggestions which we might find
occasion to offer, if we were to refrain from any assertion of interest
in the Convention such as would be implied in our sending observers to
the prospective conference on the subject. I have accordingly to request
that, if the Department shares this view, I may be authorized to let the
Turkish authorities know, in whatever manner may seem most appropriate,
that our Government, while fully appreciative of the importance of the
question of the Straits and interested in keeping informed as to the
progress of the negotiations, particularly as they affect the commercial
navigation of the Straits, has no intention of participating in that
conference.
Respectfully yours,
[Enclosure]
Memorandum by the American Ambassador (MacMurray) of a
Conversation With the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs
(Aras)
Not having previously had the opportunity of meeting Dr. Aras, I
called on him at his house, by appointment, at 4:00 o’clock this
afternoon.
The conversation shortly turned to the present troubled state of
Europe; and in response to a question, he avowed himself optimist
enough to believe that war is not actually imminent, but pessimist
enough to feel sure that the present gâchis
will go on indefinitely—that things are likely to get worse before
they get better—and that, meanwhile, none of the problems now vexing
Europe will be solved. I asked whether an exception might not be
expected in the case of Turkey’s démarche
with regard to the problem of the Straits. He assented with obvious
satisfaction; and he then proceeded to observe that, whereas most of
Europe is troubled and alarmed, the situation is quite different in
two of its extremities, the Scandinavian and the Balkan areas, which
have relatively no international problems or apprehensions, and no
external entanglements or commitments other than those derived from
the League Covenant. For his own part (and throughout the
conversation he used the first-person pronoun in referring to the
activities or the views of the Turkish Government) he had for
fifteen years done his utmost to bring about appeasement
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and understanding among
the Balkan countries, and could now affirm that there are no
appreciable difficulties among them.
Reverting then to the particular question of the Straits, he said
that although he had not yet received formal replies from all the
Governments concerned, he nevertheless had reason to believe that
within a few days all the interested Powers would have given
favorable responses: as for the guaranteeing Powers, Great Britain
had already consented to negotiate in the sense requested; France
would probably do so shortly; Italy might be expected to make only
the same reservation that she has hitherto made as to entering into
agreements with countries applying sanctions against her; and he
anticipated that Japan would only stipulate that the negotiations
must take place outside the League of Nations. Of the nations of the
Balkan Entente, Yugoslavia and Greece had already indicated a
favorable disposition—Greece the more readily, of course, because
two of her islands would by the same act be freed from the present
restrictions upon their fortification. Upon my inquiring as to
Bulgaria, he first remarked that she had no reason to object, and
that she had been the beneficiary of a very friendly and helpful
policy on the part of Turkey; and that if Bulgaria were to take an
unsympathetic attitude, there was no reason why he should continue
to befriend her. Having made these comments with some appearance of
asperity, he went on to say that Bulgaria had in fact indicated that
she would not oppose the Turkish démarche.
As to the procedure by which effect would be given to Turkey’s
request for a revision of the Straits Convention, Dr. Aras did not
seem yet to be clear. He said that he would discuss the matter with
the representatives of the interested Powers on the occasion of the
meeting of the League Council in May. He added, in that connection,
that he would of course keep Mr. Hugh Wilson18 informed of
the progress of such discussions, as well as any Japanese official
in Geneva whom the Japanese Ambassador may designate to him for that
purpose. He contemplated that the interested Governments would wish
to consider the question of the Straits at a conference called for
the purpose. He trusted that there would be no demand to have the
question considered by the League, both because it is not properly a
League question, and because such treatment of it would raise an
unnecessary difficulty as regards Japan. There was something to be
said, however, for holding the conference at Geneva, outside the
League, but with the advantage of the facilities the League affords.
On the other hand, the Turkish Government would be very glad to have
the conference meet on its own territory—either at Ankara or at
Istanbul.
[Page 516]
He said it was not yet evident just what form the revision of the
Straits Convention should take; there would doubtless be a
multilateral convention, but it might also prove necessary to
conclude one or more bilateral conventions dealing with the
particular interests of, say, the Black Sea States, and specially of
Russia (which has never ratified the Straits Convention).
In its substantive aspect, the revision would deal with three general
subjects—1) the commercial navigation of the Straits, 2) the
remilitarization of the zone, and 3) the passage of naval vessels.
The first two of these subjects could be disposed of in half an
hour, as they present no issue at all.
As to the first, Turkey is ready to agree out-of-hand to continue the
present régime of free commercial navigation, and to consider any
improvements which may be suggested in that regime, for the
impartial benefit of all nations, whether or not they are
signatories of the Convention (and he added that the fact of certain
nations being signatory to provisions of that sort was a mere
historical survival, and that the only differentiation between
signatories and non-signatories would prove to be that the former
would now be put to the necessity of negotiating on the subject).
Turkey was prepared to assume the appropriate obligations as a
matter of voluntary declaration. I understood him to imply (although
I missed the opportunity to get him to clear up the point) that he
contemplates Turkey’s substituting such a unilateral declaration for
the existing multilateral provisions of the Convention.
With regard to the remilitarization of the Straits, he said that the
indications already received warranted the assumption that the
interested Powers are prepared to recognize the abolition of the
demilitarized zone.
The sole subject as to which the negotiations may be expected to
involve any difficulties is that of the terms on which naval vessels
and aircraft (other than Turkish) shall be allowed to pass through
the Straits. Great Britain and Italy may be expected to insist upon
a minimum of restriction, and Russia upon a maximum, on the
movements of naval vessels or airships. Between these two extremes
of political viewpoint, Turkey considers that it should be possible
to find a technically sound system of controlling the transit of
such craft through the Straits so as to obviate dangers and
surprises, either to Turkey herself or to other Powers in the Black
Sea or in the Mediterranean. For the protection of Turkey, it might
perhaps be provided that such craft would be allowed to pass through
only one by one: and to avoid possible surprises to others, there
might be provision for
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advance notification to the Turkish Government, which would
thereupon publish or notify the fact to all other Governments
concerned. He remarked, however, that these were merely suggestions
which might be considered in the course of efforts to find a system
of control satisfactory to all the nations affected.
Dr. Aras took occasion to say, early in the course of his comments on
the revision of the Convention, and to elaborate at a later point in
the conversation, that if there were to be any great delay in
effecting the revision as regards the demilitarized zone along the
Straits, Turkey would request the approval of the signatory Powers
for her taking necessary provisional measures, subject to eventual
agreement on a permanent basis. He pointed out that there is at
least a theoretical danger of Turkey’s becoming involved in
hostilities: for one thing, she is among the countries applying the
League sanctions which Italy regards as an abnormality in
international relations, and resents as unfriendly; and another
aspect of the same fundamental situation is that Italy’s especial
animosity towards Great Britain might lead to war between Italy and
Germany on the one side, and England, France, and Russia on the
other—a situation in which either group, while having no intrinsic
quarrel with Turkey, might feel impelled for military reasons to
attempt control of the Straits. While hoping and even believing that
such contingencies were merely hypothetical, Turkey could not ignore
possibilities so vitally endangering her security, and would feel
justified, even under the terms of the existing Convention, in
taking necessary measures of precaution; but she preferred to act
with the acquiescence of the other signatories rather than to
proceed solely upon her own construction of her obligations. He
further gave me to understand that he had no reason to apprehend
that the negotiations for revision would be protracted, save for the
possibility that the procedural requirements might take some time in
the case of Great Britain (primarily because of the necessity of
consulting the Dominions) and possibly of France and Italy.
The impressions I derived from the rather discursive comments made by
Dr. Aras may be roughly summarized as follows:—
Turkey is reasonably confident that through negotiations with the
Powers party to the Straits Convention she can arrive at a complete
abrogation of that instrument, and has somewhat vaguely in mind
substituting for it:
- 1)
- A declaration, ex proprio motu,
assuring equally to all nations unimpeded commercial
navigation of the Straits, in terms substantially identical
with those set up by the Convention, although perhaps taking
account of ameliorative suggestions from the maritime
nations; and
- 2)
- A treaty or convention, among those Powers having naval
interests in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea,
establishing some system of control over the transit through
Turkish territory of warships and
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aircraft—this multilateral treaty
possibly being supplemented by bilateral agreements between
Turkey and certain of the Powers more particularly
concerned:
and that, in the event that the negotiations for the
abolition of the demilitarized zone along the Straits are unduly
protracted, Turkey will request (or in effect demand) the right to
refortify the zone pending the result of the negotiations.
