765.84/3708: Telegram
The Minister Resident in Ethiopia (Engert)14 to the Secretary of State
87. My 14, January 7, noon and telegrams regarding military operations since then.
1. Difficulties of preparing analysis of military situation continue as my attempts to secure promptly and regularly information of events at the front have not proved successful. Reliable reports literally only trickle through even when favorable to the Ethiopians, while news of reverses can hardly be obtained at all. The following estimate of the situation is therefore subject to correction in the light of more accurate information which may be in the possession of the Military Attaché at Dessie.
2. The torrential rains, which have now been falling for 6 weeks and apparently all over the country with the exception of the Ogaden, have proved far more useful to the Ethiopians than the efforts of the League of Nations. It is said that not since 1907 have such unseasonal rains occurred at this time of year. Ordinarily, January is the driest month of all and the Legation’s records show for example that not a drop of rain fell in January of the years 1929, 32, 33, 34, and 35. But last month 105 millimeters fell which would be normal for June and might be exceeded only in July, August or September. In fact we have had cloudbursts in January and early this month which exceeded in intensity anything experienced in the preponderant rain season.
[Page 43]3. The effect of these untimely rains on Italian transport can only be imagined when the physical difficulties confronting an invading army even in the dry season are remembered. See e. g. paragraph 3, my 208, December 5, 10 p.m.16 With the mountainous part of the country deluged, the hastily constructed emergency roads must have been washed away in many places and become unfit for long sustained traffic of heavy trucks, armored cars, and tanks. For even light motor transport is difficult to handle in the rainy season over Abyssinia’s precipitous rolling and rocky uplands. Morale and health of the troops must also have been affected by the hardships of marching, drenched to the skin, with heavy packs at high altitudes, and after vitality of many had probably been lowered by a long stay in Eritrea. Rains and constantly overcast skies also caused low visibility and interfered considerably with air reconnaissance.
4. But the adverse factors of climate and altitude alone can hardly account for the fact that the Italian expeditionary forces have not been making much headway. The middle of the fifth month of war finds the main Abyssinian armies almost entirely intact and the military prospects for the Italians not very bright. As it must be assumed that Badoglio was given a free hand when Italy realized last December that nothing could be gained diplomatically by holding back in the field, his failure to improve upon the performance of de Bono has elated the Ethiopian Government and must be particularly discouraging to Borne. Considering the powerful and carefully prepared war machine he has at his disposal, the unimportant successes so far obtained would seem to point to either faulty staff work in the plans of attack, or incompetence, or low morale in their execution.
5. By keeping careful count of Suez Canal traffic figures it can be ascertained that Italy has by now nearly 350,000 men in East Africa including laborers and native levies. And yet Badoglio is understood to have asked for more because he considers his fronts dangerously over-extended and vulnerable. Among the reinforcements he has recently received and which Ethiopians report as having gone into action on the northern front is an Alpine division especially trained and equipped for mountain warfare but its arrival has been followed by rumors that it is not considered loyal to the Fascist regime. What is certain is that more and more white troops are being used in addition to the Eritrean Askaris, and Somali Dubats who have hitherto borne the brunt of the fighting.
6. While the accumulation of large Italian reserves indicates that a new and vigorous push forward is in preparation, one cannot help but wonder whether in the light of the experience of the past 4 months larger armies will not find the difficulties of maintaining themselves [Page 44] far from their bases almost insuperable. According to Italian sources, 7 tons of foodstuffs are required per day for every thousand men, not counting ammunitions which may run to 10 tons for each day in action. To have all this has already proved the formidable task for the Italian supply transport and is bound to increase as the lines of communications lengthen. Fortunately for the Italians they have no Ethiopian air force to contend with or they could not have achieved even the insignificant gains they have. For, as pointed out in previous reports, a highly mechanized army is distinctly handicapped under conditions prevailing in Abyssinia where heavy tanks, armored cars, and cumbersome artillery become increasingly useless as they penetrate into the interior.
7. Not even the admittedly high engineering skill of the Italians has been able to cope with the amount of dangerous road making in front and behind their main positions required in this campaign. And despite the fact that large numbers of troops are engaged in protecting these roads, they have failed to prevent infiltrations [of] Ethiopian forces behind the Italian lines where they harass the supply services. Situation is aggravated by the impossibility of disarming hostile inhabitants in occupied areas who help the Abyssinian armies whenever they have a chance. One of the most baffling problems the Italians have on their hands is precisely the adequate protection of their flanks against surprise attacks in view of the impracticability of maintaining contact between the advancing columns by lateral communications. What they seem to lack most are fairly large self-contained flying columns unhampered by tanks or armored cars which could adopt the guerrilla tactics of their enemies.
8. That these tactics have so far proved surprisingly effective must be admitted. Even such European drill as the regular army may have had does not seem to have spoilt the natural cunning of the individual warrior. Most of them are expert guerrilla fighters—fleet-footed, tireless, and brave—accustomed to making the best use of the difficult ground which so admirably suits their nature. Although quite capable of taking the initiative in night raids and similar surprise attacks, they proved themselves sufficiently disciplined to avoid pitched battles before the main armies were ready. They have learned to dig trenches and construct primitive forts and although there is still a dearth of capable leadership, reconnaissance work has improved, and the various chiefs seem now to inform one another of their movements. Arms and munitions have recently been arriving in considerable quantities including antitank guns, automatic rifles, and portable batteries. But most important of all, the morale of the Abyssinians has held up remarkably well and in the many fierce hand-to-hand fights that have taken place, they have shown great tenacity in holding their ground even against superior numbers.
[Page 45]9. However, the very fact that it can truthfully be said of the Abyssinians that they are no longer afraid of the Italians harbors serious dangers for them. Being impatient and impetuous by temperament, they are apt to underestimate the risks and to commit grave tactical and strategic blunders. For example, several times during the recent fighting machine gun nests were attacked by hordes of men armed with nothing but swords and spears and their losses were terrific. Or they would storm Italian positions only to be driven out again because they did not realize the range of artillery fire. And making a night attack failed because they disregarded the fact that the enemy possessed searchlights. But probably most serious of all is their pathetically poor supply system which greatly reduces and hampers the radius of their activities. Some months ago the rases at the front even had to request the Emperor not to send them any more men as they were unable to feed them and although this has been remedied to some extent, the concentration of large forces is still extremely difficult just for that reason.
10. The Italian air forces have not, on the whole, proved very effective as an offensive weapon chiefly because of the inability of infantry to exploit results of bombing by attacking and occupying objectives. As stated in paragraph 3 above, visibility has been bad due to the cloudy weather. There are practically no landing places in northern Abyssinia and the mountains and treacherous air currents make flying unusually hazardous. Although thousands of high explosive bombs have been dropped, especially on villages between Makale and Dessie, and there is hardly any anti-aircraft defense, they never had the demoralizing effect the Italians expected, and the natives have even stood gas bombing very well although they have no gas masks. Nevertheless, Italian scouting planes must have done much useful reconnaissance work and prevented surprise attacks, and by bombing cattle and important wells they intensified the scarcity of food and water among the defenders.
11. Reference should perhaps be made here to constant accusations of violations of rules and customs of war by both belligerents. Ethiopian Government and people are thoroughly aroused by what seems deliberate bombing of Bed Cross units, of defenseless villages and towns as if the extermination of the civilian population were intended, bombing and burning of churches, use of poison gas, and ill-treatment of women. Reprisals have been threatened by confiscating all Italian property in the country. The Italians on the other hand accuse Abyssinians of using dumdum and explosive bullets and of all kinds of inhuman practices such as killing prisoners and mutilating the dead. As usual in warfare both sides have probably been guilty of excesses but it seems easier to explain them when committed by primitive tribesmen who have been exasperated and infuriated by a cold [Page 46] blooded attempt to seize their country than on the part of a nation which pretends to have the civilizing missions and might therefore have reasonably been expected to set an example.
12. From information available here, it is impossible to determine exact line of the present fronts either in the north or in the south but the general situation seems to be as follows:
Northern front. During 10-day battle at the end of January the Italian offensive was successfully stopped in the Tembien region by Ras Seyoum’s army. Without necessarily accepting Ethiopian figure, it is said that Italian losses were exceedingly heavy, especially in killed who in all engagements so far seems to have been far more numerous than either wounded or prisoners. Fierce aggressiveness of the Abyssinians in this battle showed not only determination to hold Tembien Massif at all costs but to take the offensive whenever conditions were favorable. Much credit for the victory is given to Dejazmatch Hailukabada who had served under both Ras Seyoum and Ras Kassthe[?].
Immediate result of the battle has been to endanger the Italian salient at Makale, fighting as close as 15 miles west of Makale being reported where the Italian right flank was weakly held. Gheralta region north of Makale had never been really completely occupied by the Italians and they are now being forced to withdraw all their exposed outposts in order to save at least the road to Adigrat. Ras Seyoum is already reported to be astride the Adowa–Makale road and to be in touch with Kassa Sebhat who has been severely harassing the Italian left flank. Makale may thus already be encircled, for the road south is blocked by Ras Mulugeta and the Italians never advanced beyond Shelikot some 15 miles south of Makale. It is now apparent that the Italian base line Aksum-Adigrat became much too short when Makale was taken and that so long as Dejazmatch Ayaleu is not dislodged from the right bank of the Takkaze further Italian advances will always be in danger of having their retreat cut off.
If it be true that Badoglio has now four army corps of about 250,000 men on the northern front it is firmly believed in local circles that at least 100,000 of them are held in readiness for a possible invasion of the Sudan.
(a) Southern front. Fortunately for Ethiopia the spectacular Italian successes on the Ganaledoria River in the second half of January have so far not had any decisive consequences, although at one time the situation looked critical. As Graziani had been clamoring for reinforcements he was apparently given two more divisions in December and should now have about 75,000 men. He, therefore, decided to take the offensive and chose Borana [Boran] because it offered relatively easy chances of success, would stop Ras Desta’s advance on Dolo and remove his threat to the Italian center column. The latter [Page 47] had been concentrating near the junction of the Webi Shebeli and Fafan Rivers which led to the belief that the fresh push on Sassabaneh was in preparation. But this was evidently a feint and the real attack came from Dolo. First Ras Desta’s advance guard was driven from its entire positions some 40 miles northeast of Dolo and on or about January 12 the Italian offensive in force began in the area between the Ganale Doria and Dawa Rivers. Armored cars and light tanks overcame resistance of Abyssinians and by January 16th road to Ras Desta’s headquarters at Negghelli was cleared by using hundreds of trucks. Italian infantry was moved swiftly the 230 miles from Dolo to Negghelli, the latter was occupied January 22nd and 4 or 5 days later some motorized units appear to have reached Wadara.
Principal aim was evidently to reach road from Moyale on the Kenya border to Addis Ababa which in the dry season is practicable for motor traffic. That would have meant direct threat to the capital as no large Ethiopian forces were concentrated there. But the country beyond Negghelli is very broken and thickly wooded, and although Ras Desta’s army had been dispersed, it had not been destroyed. The Italians, therefore, were not only unable to reach the main road, but had to withdraw from Wadara. In the meantime Ethiopian reinforcements concentrated in the lake district this side of the Sidaamo Mountains under Dejazmatch Makonnen, Governor of Wolamo, and the scattered forces of Desta are being reassembled after obtaining fresh food supplies from northern Sidaamo. Incidentally the Ethiopian Government claim that lack of provisions had been the main cause of withdrawal.
13. In connection with the fighting on the southeastern front the Ethiopian Government and British Legation deny most emphatically that assistance of any kind had reached the Abyssinians from Kenya. See Department’s telegrams numbers 16, January 24, 6 p.m. and 18, January 25, 1 p.m.17 On the contrary, I learn on good authority that British planes patrolling border are often taken for Italian and fired upon by Abyssinian forces and over 300 of Desta’s men who crossed into Kenya were immediately disarmed and interned.
14. Latest reports from the south seem to indicate that Graziani is now preparing thrusts up the Ganaledoria and Webishebeli to Conrad on Joshualo headquarters of Dejazmatch Bay ana Merid who recently defeated an Italian force near Imi capturing 6 tanks and 9 machine guns.
15. Summarizing in conclusion my own impressions since last October, I should say that the limited extent of Italian achievements so far must have greatly lessened Rome’s hopes of forcing a decision before the real rainy season begins in May. The prospects of the long obstinate struggle which might require further tremendous sacrifices in [Page 48] money and human lives and end after all in a stalemate stares the Italian Government in the face. Unless its armies can win a smashing victory and occupy Addis Ababa, it will have to prepare for another year’s campaign which would imply keeping the huge Italian army under tents during 5 months of tropical rains, immobilized in a sea of mud and between unfordable mountain torrents. Considering that the cost of campaigning in Abyssinia is reported to amount to about 50,000,000 American dollars a month, the strain on Italian economic and financial resources, not to mention their morale, is likely to become unbearable. There are persistent rumors here that Mussolini would be more favorably disposed to consider compromise suggestions but I am perfectly certain that the only peace proposals the Emperor would today be willing to consider seriously would spell the end of the whole Fascist regime in Italy.
- Engert was appointed Minister Resident on February 7, but he did not present his letters of credence until April 30.↩
- Telegram in four sections.↩
- Foreign Relations, 1935, vol. i, p. 689.↩
- Neither printed.↩