Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1936, The Near East and Africa, Volume III

765.84/4860: Telegram

The Minister Resident in Ethiopia (Engert) to the Secretary of State

Addis Ababa, July 16, 1936—9 a.m.
[Received July 18—1:45 p.m.³⁵]

476. Your 308, July 14. The Department’s thoughtfulness is much appreciated. I had naturally already made a close study of the situation but found it so obscure that definite conclusions seemed difficult. However, the following is my considered opinion in the light of the information available to me at the present moment:

(1) About 2 or 3 weeks ago the Italians felt decidedly alarmed lest their comparatively small garrison in Addis Ababa be completely invested. Had an Ethiopian force of say 10,000 men been then within striking distance it is extremely likely that the city would have had to be abandoned and with the railway cut it might well have ended in disaster. Not much protection could under such circumstances have been expected from the Italians.

(2) The realization of the danger has had a salutary effect upon the Italian rulers. They are now believed to have a whole division guarding the railway between here and Diredawa and the first train since July first left yesterday heavily guarded. Severe punitive measures by the air force against villages within 50 miles of the section which had been cut are expected to have a deterrent effect. Local garrison is gradually to be increased to a full division and artillery has been placed on neighboring hills. Several relatively clear days have permitted aerial reconnaissance which is said to have reported absence of any large bodies of natives.

(3) Clandestine infiltration of small bands into the city and their combining with certain resolute elements in the city to start a general uprising is not impossible but it would require a considerable amount of organizing in great secrecy. I believe the Italians could now successfully cope with such an eventuality unless they are utterly demoralized by the events reported in my recent telegrams and not necessarily events of which I have not been able to obtain sufficient confirmation.

(4) Whenever in my opinion a local uprising threatens I shall of course at once demand as a matter of right that at least 50 men with machine guns be detailed to guard this Legation. This should be adequate except in the event of a complete rout which I do not anticipate.

(5) While the Italians would doubtless be willing to lend me some arms and ammunition these would be useful only if we increased the number of our own native guards. That I am not prepared to do at this time as it would be dangerous to introduce into our compound men of unknown courage and loyalty. The few men we now have in our employ have at least proved dependable.

(6) Incredible though it may seem the six rifles and pistols and ammunition which the Department sent out last March are still at Djibouti. As they were not accompanied by export license the French authorities made difficulties and the Italians considered the importation of arms for legations no longer necessary. However, everything is about to be straightened out and the arms should be here before the end of the month.

(7) Inasmuch as the British have definitely informed me that in the event of renewed disorders they would not be able to send out any of the squadron either as guards or even as convoys to any but British nationals, we could not count on them if this Legation should again have to be evacuated. But as both the British and French Legations—the latter now also has a guard of 60 French soldiers—would be quite willing to receive and protect any Americans who can get there unaided, this particular problem would now be largely one of transportation. The Department will recall that the British not only brought several trucks every time they came to this Legation during the last troubles but even left one for us to use independently. I, therefore, beg to suggest that I be authorized to hire a truck for the duration of the present emergency or even to purchase an inexpensive second hand one should none be available for hire. I consider this more important than additional guards or arms.

(8) As a further emergency measure, it might perhaps be advisable to try to obtain an option on renting the Belgian Legation which now stands empty. We only have a month to month lease on our present premises and as the owners are a semi-governmental institution, the Italians may bring pressure on them to terminate it. Belgian Legation is very desirable property and, being next on the border to the British Legation, forms part of the British defense system and could thus afford protection to the entire American colony. Belgian Chargé des Affaires lives in town and tells me his Government would probably have no objection to subletting to us temporarily but he does not know precisely what arrangements it has with the Russian Government which is the owner. I feel it would be worthwhile making informal inquiries through our Embassy in Brussels and we could, of course, assure the Belgian Government that in an emergency we should be glad to give shelter to the few Belgian subjects who are here.

(9) Our radio station can be used for transmission at a moment’s notice and in a critical situation I shall not hesitate to do so and inform the Italians afterwards.

(10) Although I and family have sufficient imported food supplies, my staff and radio personnel would appreciate another shipment from the Navy Department. Details will be furnished in a separate telegram.

(11) For the present I do not think it necessary or desirable that the Italian Government be approached with a view to obtaining protection for this Legation, because Rome would immediately conclude that I had sent in alarming reports which in turn would render my relations with Graziani more difficult. Should local authorities seem reluctant to comply with reasonable requests for protection I shall not fail to avail myself of the Department’s offer.

(12) In conclusion, I venture to suggest that the Department place a sum not to exceed $500 at my disposal, in addition to approximately not more than an equal amount that may be required under paragraph 7 above, to be used in the most practical manner for the protection of the Legation and American colony should a fresh crisis arise.

Engert

35. Telegram in three sections.