765.84/4305: Telegram
The Chargé in Italy (Kirk) to the Secretary of State
134. The statement by Mussolini last night that “Ethiopia is Italian” has concentrated attention on the juridical procedure which the Italian Government may eventually adopt in order to consolidate its occupation of Abyssinian territory.
During the past few days of the advance on Addis Ababa various conjectures along this line have been circulating. Prior to the departure of the Negus and the disappearance of the Abyssinian Government the solution generally predicted was the negotiation of a peace with some Abyssinian authority which would give Italy practical control of the country. Following the latest development, however, the attitude has been reflected even in the press that Ethiopia as a state has now ceased to exist; that therefore there can be no negotiations and that Italy’s military occupation amounts to political possession subject only to the specific appeasing of other nations. On this assumption it has been suggested that the flight of the Negus might be considered as tantamount to abdication and that the organization of Abyssinia on the model of British India might be contemplated with the King of Italy assuming the title of Emperor of Abyssinia and the local government in the hands of the various rases. Another procedure suggested has been that of actual annexation with the colonies of Eritrea and Somaliland extended to embrace the entire Ethiopian [Page 220] territory. In some circles the Duce’s speech74 of last night is regarded on first analysis as leaning toward this plan although his general reference might cover other procedures. The suggestion has also been made that Mussolini might propose the establishment of a system of government similar to that maintained by the French in Morocco and in this connection it might be recalled that in the initial stages of the conflict the Duce drew an analogy between the Italian enterprise in Abyssinia and the French occupation of Morocco.
The question immediately arises as to the relation to League action of any plan that may be adopted. The theory has been advanced as the League can only function at the request of a member state and as Ethiopia is no longer a state the League can drop the matter without any decision by the Council, Assembly or Secretariat.
This simple solution appears to be confined to Italian unofficial circles.
The French Ambassador on the other hand told me yesterday morning that he considered that a solution of the Abyssinian conflict from the international standpoint was more difficult now than at any time since the commencement of hostilities, that terms which might have been agreed to in the latter part of last year, or even in March of this year when direct negotiations between Italy and Abyssinia failed, no longer seemed possible and that it was clear that Italian aims had grown with the conquest of territory. The Ambassador said that from the League standpoint a negotiated peace even with a puppet native government in Abyssinia would be more acceptable but there appeared now to be no material out of which such a government could be formed. Any other plan would offer serious difficulties although strenuous efforts were being made by France to aid in arriving at some solution which would terminate the conflict. According to the French view some form of cooperation between England and Italy was essential to confront the problems of reorganization in Europe and to that end France was urging moderation on the part of the Duce and a more favorable attitude toward Italy on the part of the British Government and it was hoped that these efforts would result in some favorable results in Geneva. The British Ambassador in a conversation today did not give the impression that he considered that the events of the last few days had in themselves rendered a solution appreciably more difficult. He agreed that some form of negotiated peace would have rendered easier the work of the League but that there now seemed no possibility of such a development and said that some proposal whereby the welfare of the native population might be safeguarded on the basis of the principles laid down in article 22 of the Covenant [Page 221] would go far toward relieving British public opinion. British interests in Abyssinia, he added, aside from the objection to the recruiting of a black Italian army there, were confined to the Lake Tana region and certain grazing rights and those interests were amply provided for in existing treaties and agreements. As to the formula through which these considerations would be given effect in Geneva, the British, as well as the French Ambassador, offered no concrete suggestions and they as well as others are inclined to the idea that events have moved with such rapidity that the Italians themselves may not yet have reached a concrete plan. It is felt, however, that some declaration will have to be made by the Italian representatives in Geneva on May 11, and from certain indications it does not appear improbable that a definition by the Italian Government of the juridical aspects of the future status of Abyssinia might be forthcoming before that date.
As regards possible developments relating to sanctions a thesis has been advanced in Italian unofficial circles that on the assumption that the measures were adopted by individual states on their own responsibility each country may determine on its own initiative the future of those measures and that consequently this particular matter may be handled outside the League. The British Ambassador in discussing this question said that it would be impossible to extend the sanctions at Geneva as the French Government whose days were numbered, could not go beyond the measures already taken, and the British Ambassador likewise did not foresee any such move.
In conversations with members of the Foreign Office the usual reserve is encountered as to the actual course of the Duce’s policy in the near future. They reiterate the view that the war is over and that the emphasis must now be on peace. Suvich75 in a brief conversation today reflected a certain optimism as regards future developments although in answer minor officials showed that they were mindful of the difficulties ahead. I detected a preoccupation among the latter as to the attitude of France not only in connection with the policy of the future government there but especially in regard to a possible conflict of Italian and French interests in Abyssinia itself. This preoccupation seems to be overshadowing in their minds the Italo-British tension and to indicate a recrudescence of the anti-French attitude which colored Italian-French relations before the Laval76 visit and the beginning of an approach to the pro-British attitude adopted by the Italian Government prior to the Abyssinian conflict. This possible change of attitude, however, is detected only in limited official circles and is not reflected in general public opinion here.