765.84/4737: Telegram
The Minister Resident in Ethiopia (Engert) to the Secretary of State
443. The following observations are based on recent conversations with diplomatic colleagues.
The British Minister86 came to see me several times before his departure and said he was thoroughly discouraged by the turn affairs had taken. Mussolini had not only scored a great victory over Ethiopia, but an even greater one over Geneva and London. Great Britain [apparent omission] with a good deal of patience and generosity been carrying the chief burden of responsibility throughout the recent unprecedented crisis and had failed dismally. When I asked to what causes he attributed this failure he [apparent omission] France was probably chiefly to blame because she proved the staunchest friend Italy had in the sanctionist camp. Her whole aim was to gain time and she therefore seized on every chance of delay to prevent the imposing of an oil embargo or the further extension of any other sanctions. But he also blamed Downing Street for sharing with France the fiasco of the [Page 167] December peace proposals87 which shattered British moral authority and prestige, not only in Europe, but apparently also in the United States. Although Eden’s appointment was intended to restore confidence he had not done much better than Hoare, the contradictions in British foreign policy continued and England ceased to offer a definite lead.
Sir Sidney was very anxious about the future. The guiding rules of British foreign policy had for 16 years been founded on loyalty to the ideals of the League and the Paris Pact and this winter had made great efforts to vindicate the system of collective security. This policy had received the fullest indorsement of public opinion both in England and in the Dominions. But what was the use of standing by the League when the other principal powers had either deserted it or were not prepared to fight for it? The risks were too great and might prove fatal to the Empire.
I then asked what he thought Great Britain’s policy would be, and he replied that he doubted whether it had yet taken shape. British public opinion would undoubtedly like to see the Foreign Office take a firm line vis-à-vis Mussolini and to preserve and strengthen if possible a system of collective security. The Empire is quite united in support of the rule of law as opposed to force and probably feels that merely because article 16 of the Covenant did not work the whole League need not be scrapped.
To a further question Sir Sidney replied that in conservative circles there was a surplus of desire to limit Great Britain’s commitments abroad to a minimum, for example the defense of France and Belgium, for at heart the average Englishman hates and dreads European entanglements almost as much as the American. But England’s proximity to the Continent made it impossible for her to keep entirely aloof and the only substitute for the League of Nations were regional agreements for mutual protection. Whether Great Britain would like France orientate her policy further away from the League and rely more upon a system of alliances, would, of course depend on what happened to the League.
I gathered from the British Minister’s remarks that he and his Government felt humiliated by the complete defeat of British demand in the Italo-Ethiopian conflict. The international situation has been immensely aggravated by Mussolini’s triumphant treaty-breaking and has changed its diplomatic and strategic aspects to Great Britain’s disadvantage. British opinion is perplexed by the host of irksome problems arising out of this new situation. Italy’s occupation of the [Page 168] Lake Tsana region does not seem to worry them much but they are genuinely alarmed at the threat to their Mediterranean interests. They have been watching with growing uneasiness Italy’s naval and air preparations which they believe are intended to menace British communications with India and East Africa, her oil supplies from the Middle East, and her naval supremacy in general. Mussolini’s insensate and bombastic desire to demonstrate the present day superiority of Italian arms may lead Italy farther and farther afield and finally tempt her to look for expansion at the expense of the British Empire.
In order to be prepared for a veritable struggle for the mastery of the Mediterranean, the British Government is obliged to revise its entire policy toward the maintenance of peace in Europe—either by reorganizing the League so as to make it more formidable or by virtually ceasing to count upon its effective functioning. In either event the British now realize that they must be strong enough to defend peace and to enforce international obligations. Hence the present British preparedness campaign which is to rearm the Empire to such an extent that irresponsible dictators will be obliged to pause before they yield to the temptation of upsetting the existing world order.
The French Minister, Monsieur Bodard, has been placed in a peculiar position by the results of the Socialist victory in France. The French Legation, though not so much the Minister personally, had been notoriously pro-Italian throughout the conflict and seemed pleased with the failure of sanctions and the collapse of Ethiopian military resistance. Italy’s aggression was always glossed over and the necessity emphasized of localizing the African war and preventing its spreading to Europe and perhaps becoming another world threat. But since the French elections and the Italian annexation a complete volte face has been noticeable, all members of the Legation professing with amusing unanimity to be very suspicious of Italian aims and expressing great anxiety regarding the future of Djibouti and the French railway.
In discussing the European situation with the Minister the other day I inquired whether the Blum Government would be inclined to maintain sanctions against Italy. Bodard replied he doubted it very much because the Covenant did not seem to provide for punitive sanctions when the state of war for which they were imposed had come to an end. At least he thought it would require a fresh decision by the Council of the League. The French Left Wing—like the British Labor Party or the Soviets—hates Fascism more than it loves Ethiopia and is too conversant with the realities to embark upon any quixotic adventures for the purpose of saving either the League or Italy’s victim. And as between Mussolini and Hitler the French [Page 169] people were far more afraid of the latter’s next move. Defense against Germany would always be their paramount consideration and that is why they would necessarily put loyalty to the League after concern for Stresa.
However, France was sincerely desirous of seeing the collective security system survive and men like Herriot, Pietri, Manus and Bastid had always advocated close cooperation with them and the League. If only they had made it clear at Stresa in the spring of 1935 when Italy was already pouring troops into East Africa, that if war resulted she would insist on the application of sanctions, Mussolini would not have dared to ignore the warning. Another mistake the British made was their hesitation and lack of precision in giving assurances to France regarding cooperation if Germany, whose military power was rapidly being restored should, for example, attack Austria or Poland. Considering that the League had done nothing when Italy bombarded Corfu in 1923 and when Japan seized Manchuria in 1931, British promises in the event of unprovoked aggression in Central Europe did not carry as much weight as they should. On the contrary France gave the impression that England was constantly condoning German breaches of the military clauses of the Versailles Treaty and was evidently reconciling herself to Hitler’s diplomatic shock tactics.
If the British Government has decided not to intervene when Versailles engagements are overturned by force it can hardly be surprised if France hesitates to shoulder responsibilities which are not of immediate concern to her. There seemed to be a certain amount of elastic opportunism in British policy (as seen for example in the naval accord with Germany) which is not easily understood in France. Nevertheless France was today more than ever ready to collaborate with Great Britain in a spirit of compromise and realism and to try and achieve some concrete results. By the imminent collapse of the sanctionist front and with it the collapse of the collective security system both France and England had lost much moral standing especially among the small nations but perhaps by remoulding the League it might still be possible to salvage something of the collective ideal.
My German colleague Dr. Strohm is, unlike his predecessor, (see my 125, March 1 [3])88 a confirmed cynic—presumably because he spent most of his career in his own Foreign Office. In recent chats with me he did not conceal his satisfaction at the outcome of the Abyssinian war not because of the defeat of Ethiopia, towards whom the Germans were friendly disposed, but because of Italy’s victory over the League of Nations and all of the sham it stood for. And if Mussolini gained a great deal more kudos than he expected, the League [Page 170] powers have only their sanctions to thank for it. He had called their bluff of collective action and had won. As far as Germany was concerned the old Versailles League with all its vindictiveness was now bankrupt and dead and it was doubtful whether even France would succeed in reviving it for the sole purpose of creating an anti-German front. Germany had always distrusted the aims of collective security and sanctions and feared until the last that England might succeed in inducing France to join in military sanctions against Italy in return for similar support against Germany. The League’s failure to curb Italy proved the futility of high sounding phrases [apparent omission] even illegalize treaties if they run counter to national ambitions and interests.
I asked whether there was a possibility of a genuine rapprochement between Great Britain and Germany. He replied very emphatically that there was, in the first place because the Germans really admired the British Government very much and had always regretted that the Kaiser did not take British overtures more seriously, and in the second place because England could usually be depended on to act with a kind of enlightened self-interest. Now that Eden had come down from the clouds of moral indignation it would be much easier to talk business with him. British opinion was really not unfriendly toward the German people and the British Government had shown itself responsive to the aspirations of the “have nots” by trying to remove fundamental causes of aggression. Although Great Britain had been the principal champion of the League few British conservatives believed in it or had a good word to say for it. Like Germany the British nation was beginning to realize that there was no greater humiliation than that of impotence and like Germany they now want to rearm as quickly as possible in order to be prepared for the collapse of the League. Of course, Hitler was not blind to the fact that British rearmament might under given circumstances be aimed fully as much at Germany as at Italy but the fact remained that Germany was in sympathy with the present British policy of bigger armaments as a positive contribution towards the maintenance of world peace.
In reply to my query whether Germany now expected to get her colonies back, he said that the question of colonies was much exaggerated both in Germany and abroad. There was a regular press campaign going on in Germany for the recovery of colonies but it was important chiefly as an indication that the German people were determined to insist on being in no way inferior to other great powers. In other words, they were far more interested in the legal right to possess colonies or administer mandates if and when they wanted them than in forcing the issue at the present time. Their self-respect will not let them admit that they are less fit for colonial administration [Page 171] than other nations. In that respect Germany was in entire agreement with Italy and would—at least in the abstract—support the justice of the latter’s claims to colonies and expansion.
Otherwise there was really not much popular sympathy for Italy. Mussolini’s diplomatic game was not quite clear but Germany suspects that he has been using Hitler to bring political pressure to bear on France and that the moment sanctions are lifted he will resume his flirtations with France and perhaps even join a combination against Germany. In any event Berlin expected no thanks for accidentally helping Italy last March by moving into the Rhineland. The next step would be the fortification of the Rhineland and it remained to be seen whether France’s system of military alliances and regional pacts would prove more successful than England’s scheme for collective security.
- Telegram in seven sections.↩
- Sir Sidney Barton.↩
- Hoare–Laval proposals; see Foreign Relations, 1935, vol. i, pp. 699 ff.↩
- Not printed.↩