765.84/4151: Telegram
The Minister in Switzerland (Wilson) to the Secretary of State
[Received 8:48 p.m.]
367. 1. Insofar as the leading delegations are concerned the session just completed23 has been dominated by two efforts: (1) to bring about peace between Italy and Abyssinia24 and (2) to take no steps which would exacerbate the already inflamed feeling between the British and French public. The first effort failed, the second was successful, and tempers are much abated both in delegations and press. This does not mean that the fundamental divergencies of their points of view are eradicated, but merely that they are less apparent due to conciliatory attitude on both sides in not pressing for their maxima in respect to the Italo-Abyssinian question. It is more than possible that the divergencies will again become acutely apparent after the French elections. Indeed, Madariaga believes that one of the first steps of the new French Government will be to initiate futher peace efforts under the instigation of the Italians.
[Page 128]2. While I am assured both by the British and French that the French made no effort to lift existing sanctions, nevertheless, it is apparent that the current has changed. Where previously the general desire was to increase severity of sanctions under British lead and against French restraint, now the ebb has set in and the British realize that they must maneuver carefully if existing sanctions are not to be swept away. The British tell me that they were urged by those hitherto most convinced of the necessity of sanctions not to risk calling the Committee of Eighteen lest the whole thing break down.
3. Several factors induced the British to modify their attitude to meet the French: A. Tardy recognition of the importance of the Italian military effort and Italian successes in Abyssinia; B. The demands of Paul-Boncour not to be pressed to make an unpopular decision on the eve of elections; C. Apprehension as to the instability of European conditions particularly in respect to Germany’s intentions; D. The French plea that the Italian alignment with France is urgently necessary in the immediate European situation. They feel so strongly this necessity that if its achievement results in disaster for the League, so much the worse for the League.
Both Eden and Madariaga paid tribute to the conciliatory efforts of Paul-Boncour.
4. The British realize that they are gambling on a time factor. If before the rains in Abyssinia set in towards the end of May Abyssinia’s resistance is fully crushed, it will mean a disastrous defeat to British policy. The moment then comes for the realization by the British public that nothing but force will stop Mussolini from full achievement of his objective. I quote responsible authority which states that however much the Labor and Liberal parties assailed the use of force arising in the application of sanctions, the Government of Great Britain refuses to entertain this idea. On the other hand, if Abyssinia’s resistance still continues after the period of rains, thus permitting the full effects of the sanctions to be felt by Italy, the British hope, Mussolini may be more ready to negotiate reasonably.
5. Aloisi talks with all the bitterness of the Italian press. He says they want peace but they will not negotiate it through the Committee of Thirteen or through the League since this organization has become a “creature of England.” Italy will not submit that every step of negotiation be scrutinized by hostile eyes to see whether it is in the “spirit of the Covenant.” He claims that the military resistance has been crushed but the Abyssinians, and to some extent the British, take a contrary view.
6. A manifest was drafted before the public session of the Council. At the close of that session I encountered Eden who, obviously deeply [Page 129] moved and referring to the collective effort against Italy, said to me “It is slipping badly. We have done our best but I fear it is going to crumble.”
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