765.84/4075: Telegram
The Consul at Geneva (Gilbert) to the Secretary of State
114.…
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In a “preliminary” conversation between Madariaga and Aloisi,14 the latter stated bluntly any settlement must be on the basis of the Italian victories and that Rome was no longer interested in the Hoare-Laval plan or any other plan. It was intended to establish complete Italian control in Ethiopia. Aloisi was extremely arrogant and told Madariaga that “small power functionaries” had better keep out of it.
Aloisi told Flandin that Italy would do nothing for France in Europe unless Paris supported Rome in the Ethiopian affair. Flandin asserted to Aloisi that there would be no sanctions against Italy as long as he remained Minister and further that regardless of what anyone else might do France will lift sanctions as soon as hostilities cease. Aloisi then stated that Mussolini desired only a delay of 15 days which is all that he estimates is necessary to occupy Addis Ababa and he frankly described Italian strategy, following such occupation, to be to set up their “own emperor”. He stated that at that juncture their army would be proclaimed as the “army of liberation.” Rome did not know what form British opposition might take but if Great Britain wanted war Italy was ready.
A member of the British delegation, in discussing the situation with me, stated that the delegation and the British Cabinet realized that the “League battle” with Mussolini over Ethiopia is lost. They estimate now that for Italy in effect to have all of Ethiopia is just a question of time. He stated, however, that Eden had been given instructions which, although allowing him greater flexibility than in the Locarno affair, were to the effect that he was to keep up the pressure in Geneva for sanctions of any type. He said that an Italian victory would naturally be a blow to the League and a great blow to British prestige in the Near and Far East. In answer to my inquiry [Page 120] as to why the British would insist on bringing up the matter of sanctions through the Committee of Eighteen in the face of the belief (which he admitted) that the Committee would not adopt further sanctions, he said frankly that the British would prefer a “League failure” to a “British failure”. He added that in the dilemma this policy was in line with the British-Tory view that the failure of the League would at least permit British public opinion to support rearmament (Consulate’s despatch No. 1537, Political, dated December 23, 193518). In reply to a further inquiry as to what Great Britain would do with their acquired “liberty of action” against Italy, he stated that there remains the matter of credits which might prove to be a formidable weapon.