500.A15A5/719: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis)

72. Your 137, March 13, 6 p.m., and 138, March 14, 1 a.m. In view of the lateness of the session of Congress, the President considers it extremely inadvisable to commit himself to the presentation of the treaty for ratification at this session. It may be that either the French or the British, or both, will be reluctant to sign a treaty at this time, in which case the resort to the memorandum method of leaving on record the type of treaty we would be willing to accept [Page 93] would serve our purpose and obviate the question of ratification at this session arising. Such a contingency would of course require that the date on which the treaty would become effective be changed from January 1, 1937, until either the 1st of April or the 1st of May, 1937, (thus leaving a gap between the expiration of the old treaties and the beginning of the new) or, if the constitutional requirements of any of the signatory or adhering powers make necessary a ratification by a legislative body, 8 weeks after the treaty has been presented in such legislative body with a view to ratification, such date in no case to be later than April 1st or May 1st, 1937. The same condition should also apply to such agreements as that on 14-inch guns or similar provisos. This gap could very well be taken care of by a declaration of intention on the part of each of the conference powers and others who might signify their adherence to the treaty to inform the other parties or adherents of any or all construction which might be undertaken in the interval between the treaties. We do not believe that if the treaties are acceptable to the signatory powers or adherents there would be any building by them during the interval between the treaties which would not come within the restrictions provided for in the new treaty.

If you find no reluctance or hesitancy on the part of the remaining conference powers to sign or initial a treaty at this time, you should explain that in order not to jeopardize the ratification of this Government’s signature to the treaty it would be distinctly preferable so to arrange the time of signing that it will not be necessary for the President to submit the treaty for ratification at this advanced stage of the session when the Executive legislative program has been completed.

Your 138 seems to indicate that the British and French might themselves consider it advisable to avoid signing now, in which case there would appear to be no difficulty in arranging for signature at a later date in view of the existing European situation. I would suggest that at a convenient time you canvass the situation in order that the positions may be clarified with regard to signing or initialing the treaty. It is also possible that you would find there would be no objection on the part of the French and the British to our initialing or signing the treaty on the understanding that as this Government may not consider it advisable to add the treaty to its legislative program at this stage, the President would not be under any obligation to do so if he thought it best to withhold it.

Phillips