500.A15A5/718: Telegram
The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State
[Received March 13—3:43 p.m.]
137. For the President and Secretary. Your 68, March 11, 7 p.m. We appreciate that in the present international situation as well as the legislative situation at home it may be undesirable to sign a treaty that would have to be presented now for ratification.
[Page 90]The idea of initialing a treaty to be signed at a later date to be fixed originated in an effort to overcome certain political difficulties the details and sequence of which have all been reported in our previous despatches. We have stated our willingness to go along with this or any other plan which would result in a satisfactory accord but have in every case persistently insisted upon some positive action which would result in something definite, always visualizing a treaty which would come into effect on January 1, 1937, thus leaving no interim between the termination of the Washington and London Treaties and the new treaty. It was realized that if there were much delay in signing the treaty there would be less probability that it would be signed and ratified before the end of this year.
In compliance with our instructions we have pressed for a treaty to be signed by Great Britain, France and ourselves which would be left open for the signature of the other two Washington powers. We have also taken the position that it is immaterial to us whether Great Britain signs a supplementary bilateral naval treaty with Germany except insofar as it may affect the attitude of Great Britain and France in entering into a satisfactory naval agreement with us. If at this late date we should have to take the initiative in proposing a delay in the signing of such a treaty the reasons for our sudden reversal of attitude would be somewhat difficult to explain.
However, it is very possible that on account of recent developments Great Britain and perhaps France may decide that it is inadvisable to sign a treaty now. At present there is a difference of opinion among the British with regard to this. One point of view is that it would be inadvisable for the British Government to sign a new naval treaty in the present disturbed situation. The other point of view is that if advantage is not taken of this opportunity to complete a general naval agreement the chances are that there will be no treaty at all. It is nevertheless impossible in the present tense situation to forecast developments and we must be prepared for the contingency that we may have to propose a delay and if so we should like the reasons on which you think it best to base such a proposal.
The fundamental question is not whether we shall sign or whether we shall initial a treaty now but whether the treaty whether signed or initialed now is to be presented to the Senate for ratification before the end of this year.
The drafting committee is now drawing up the treaty on the assumption that it will come into effect on January 1, 1937. If it is not our intention to have it ratified by that date the treaty must be [Page 91] considerably redrafted. For example the reduction to 14-inch guns is contingent on Japan’s entering into an agreement before [January] 1, 1937, to such reduction. Numerous other alterations would have to be made including provision for the interval between the expiration of present treaties and the coming into force of the new treaty and there is danger that in redrafting the balance between the various provisions may be upset.
Whether we sign or whether we initial the other powers who subscribe to this [draft] will do so in the belief that every effort will be made to put it into effect by January 1, 1937, and if we make no attempt to obtain ratification by that date we will be open to a charge of bad faith.
The initialing of a treaty by Great Britain and France would as we understand constitute for them an engagement which would be practically equivalent to our signing a treaty.
If it is not possible to submit a treaty at the present session we wonder whether it might not be possible to do so at a special session called in November.
While we cannot, of course, judge from here we have thought that the new treaty would not encounter in the Senate so much opposition as did the London Treaty because the Naval General Board is in accord with the present treaty whereas it was opposed to the London Treaty. Admiral Standley is of the opinion that there will be no serious opposition from any naval source.
We must have definite information as to whether it is proposed to obtain ratification before the end of this year as the drafting committee is working on the assumption that the treaty will come into effect on January 1, 1937.