500.A15A5/687: Telegram
The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State
[Received February 26—8 p.m.]
109. Grandi, who came to see me this afternoon, said that he expected to see Eden tomorrow or Friday and inform him of the Italian position, but that he felt he should tell me in confidence that Italy would be unable to commit itself now to a naval agreement. The difficulties are both political and technical and his instructions received last Friday are to refuse to sign now on political or technical grounds, or both, as he sees fit His desire is to refuse in the least harmful way, having in mind an ultimate agreement. He said that Mussolini had been most desirous of joining in a naval treaty, but as long as Italy was at war and sanctions are being applied against her with the threat of military measures, it was not possible to find any way to do so which would not have a harmful effect on public opinion.
From a technical standpoint, the navy would like a reduction in battleship unit tonnage, but that [sic] its chief objection to the proposed agreement is the zone of no construction between 10,000 and 20,000 tons particularly as long as there is no assurance that Italy is going to be at peace with England. If it were not for the political hurdle he said that Mussolini could concede on the technical questions.
I asked Grandi whether Italy could initial a four-power agreement without a definite commitment to sign but with the understanding that she may subsequently sign at a given date if conditions then justify it. He said that to initial a treaty would be construed in Italy as a definite commitment. He then asked if it would not be possible for England, France and the United States to make an agreement now which would be left open for subsequent Italian adherence. He advanced this for transmission without authority, but he felt that if we should decide to take this course he could persuade his Government to approve.
[Page 76]I told him I did not know how France would feel about that since France is still making difficulties even to a four-power agreement. Insofar as concerns us, I would think the matter over, but my present impression was that it might be the best thing to do under the circumstances particularly if Germany is also a party to such a treaty.
He then told me that Eden’s recent speech had been very helpful. He was hopeful it would now be possible for England and Italy to begin direct discussion looking to a settlement of the Abyssinian war to be worked out by and through the League. He said Italy was particularly anxious to maintain its traditional friendly relationship with England and indicated that Rome was becoming more disposed now to seek a settlement than heretofore.