500.A15A5/677: Telegram
The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State
[Received February 25—11:35 a.m.]
105. Monsell and Craigie told me last evening of their talk with the Italians yesterday and with the French Friday and Saturday. In substance the Italians indicated that they would find it difficult to justify signing a naval agreement so long as sanctions are being applied against Italy unless they could at least show that something has been gained by such agreement such as even a slight reduction in the tonnage of capital ships. They did not, however, definitely refuse to do so and it is believed they are trying to use this as a means of bringing pressure to bear for initiating a move for the future peaceful settlement of the Abyssinian question.
The French said that as far as capital ships were concerned they wished to defer their decision until they received a reply from Washington. (Apparently Corbin had not been informed of your reply of last Thursday60). As regards a general agreement the French took the position that they would either sign a protocol providing for Germany’s participation as an original party to the initialed treaty conditional upon the settlement prior to the date of signature of other questions such as an air agreement or sign at a fixed date a four-power treaty which would not be conditional upon German adherence but which would permit the subsequent adherence of other powers including Germany. The British rejected the first alternative but stated that they would take up the second alternative with Germany in order to ascertain whether Germany would later join in an agreement without specific provision being made beforehand since the British are unwilling to conclude a four-power treaty without the assurance that Germany will come in. Monsell doubts if Germany would come along on these conditions but Craigie felt confident they would.
Monsell then asked whether if France and Italy continue to impose so many conditions and to put an impossible price on their adherence we would be disposed to enter into a naval agreement with Great Britain and Germany to which the other powers would be invited to adhere and which he believed would bring the others in very quickly. I told him this was a matter we would have to consider very carefully but I was inclined to think there might be serious objections to this.
[Page 72]The British suggested that if we objected to entering into an American-Anglo-German treaty to which other powers would be invited to adhere we might sign an Anglo-American agreement and then England could enter into a bilateral agreement with Germany if feasible [in conformity with] this and likewise with France. Then the two of us might be able to bring Japan into such an agreement later. I told them that while I realized it might be possible to work this out through a series of bilateral agreements my first thought on the matter was that it would be better to have one treaty to which every one would be invited to adhere instead of a series of bilateral agreements. I suggest that we might consider the possibility of going ahead and drafting a naval treaty as contemplated to be initialed by Great Britain and ourselves and then by an exchange of notes agree that we would invite the other naval powers to adhere. We might also agree to exchange information as between ourselves and to adhere to the principles of the treaty so much as the other powers did not depart therefrom. I told them I was not prepared to commit us in any way to such ends but that if it appealed to them we would think it over further and consult Washington.
The British replied that the idea appealed to them very much as it would have the advantage of avoiding complications because of the susceptibilities of the French and the Germans and would perhaps be the most practical and likely way of bringing them and all the other naval powers into line during the course of the year.
For our guidance I should very much appreciate the views of the President and yourself as to these various suggestions.