611.4131/195
Memorandum by the Secretary of State
The British Ambassador came in to pay his respects on his return from two and one-half months’ absence in Great Britain. In some manner the European economic, military, and peace questions came up for comment. I repeated what a noted Britisher had recently said to me, to the effect that Great Britain had no particular objective in foreign policy just now except to arm heavily for defensive purposes and await a possible military explosion in central Europe within another year or two. I then inquired whether the British statesmen had any alternative in mind for this unthinkable military possibility [Page 689] ahead? He definitely indicated that they did not have, deeply in mind at least, any alternative. I replied that this country for some time has had a very definite alternative policy and program in mind and of course has most earnestly sought to impress its merits upon the statesmen of every important nation; that it comprises our program for world economic and peace rehabilitation as a substitute for the one alternative course in the direction of militarism and predatory movements up and down the earth by militaristic rulers and governments, supported by their respective armies and navies, for purposes of territorial aggression; that two things are as inevitable as fate within another two or three years, and one is that if a great trading country like Great Britain and another great trading country like the United States should become static and inert and undertake further self-containment alone, such countries as Japan, Germany and Italy, with their armies and navies, would, within two or three years as stated, dominate nearly every square foot of trade territory other than that under the immediate ownership or control of Great Britain and the United States, and that that would leave our two countries in an amazingly disadvantageous situation,—and, secondly, that under this same course of further isolation of our two countries nothing in the future can be more certain than that food and raw-material producing countries would be driven to the establishment of their own crude manufacturing plants as a permanent policy and the production at several prices of their manufacturing necessities,—while the industrial countries, especially of Europe, would be desperately attempting to do their own farming at five to ten prices of cost of production, with the inevitable result that the world would find itself in the most uneconomic condition it has been in within two hundred years. The unthinkable effects in the way of reduced production, lower living standards and national decadence generally, would manifest themselves everywhere, while a few desperado nations, including the so-called “have nots”, would be meandering up and down the earth taking by force what the necessities of their own nationals would require. I said, “What rational person anywhere imagines that the 65 million German population, without enough food or enough clothing or enough materials to work with, will sit there in that state of distress and deterioration indefinitely?” I stated that this was a fair illustration of the two big points I was seeking to drive home. I made it very clear that I consider our Anglo-Saxon people of both countries in the same boat as far as the dangerous future is concerned and that we cannot avoid leadership with a program that will encourage and induce other countries to awaken and again revitalize the spirit of peace and of fair dealing with each other along peaceful lines, instead [Page 690] of pursuing further the opposite road of militarism and military aggression.
The Ambassador had already spoken of the improved state of public sentiment in this country in support of our joint peace and trade restoration program, and I replied that the opposition sentiment in this country has been far greater than it could possibly be in Great Britain; that we have an immeasurably more difficult undertaking than they have over there and that in these circumstances I am still hoping that the statesmen of Great Britain will realize that the Anglo-Saxon people can and must offer to the world an alternative program and course other than the course of militarism with inevitable war as a strong possibility within the not indefinite future. The Ambassador indicated at various times that he was wholeheartedly in agreement with my views and objectives. He then said that only four or five persons among the high officials of his Government were really factors in this matter. He mentioned first Foreign Minister Eden, whom he said was more or less sympathetic and friendly to this program, but he added that Eden had been so completely engrossed with European emergency problems he has not gotten down into the full merits of this program, he having been more or less of a specialist before coming to the Foreign Office as Foreign Minister. He said that Prime Minister Baldwin is not recovering as rapidly as had been expected, but, in response to my inquiry, he added that he was not seriously afflicted. I expressed my admiration for Baldwin and my great satisfaction at the prospect of his certain recovery. The Ambassador then definitely indicated that Baldwin would go out at no distant date and that Neville Chamberlain would be his successor. In all the conversation, the Ambassador said that he was speaking solely as man to man and not as government to government, and I assured him that I would so treat the conversation.
He then brought up Neville Chamberlain and first referred to a luncheon which Chamberlain said was given to him by Bingham and Phillips, and that he was expecting Phillips to say something about the economic situation, but that nothing was said until about the end of the luncheon, when Phillips suddenly inquired whether they would be disposed to enter into a trade agreement with this country and Chamberlain promptly indicated a generally favorable attitude, at which Phillips seemed to be surprised. I suspected that the Ambassador made this reference more to lessen my opinion of Chamberlain’s reactionaryism and embargo tariff proclivities than for any other reason. At any rate, while he offered a few statements tending to indicate that Chamberlain was not wholly indifferent to the importance of economic restoration in a broad way, he did leave the impression that at present Chamberlain is more or less wedded to a [Page 691] static policy of high tariffs and armaments for self-defense without an immediate disposition to move at once in concert with other countries to the attack on excessive trade barriers and obstructions.
I expressed my keen disappointment that the dominant statesmanship of Britain is only disposed to pursue the one course which contemplates a military explosion, with no purpose to offer an alternative program the chief object of which would be to deal effectively with the economic difficulties of such countries as Germany and, if humanly possible, to avoid further military objectives. I said that this same static and inert attitude of statesmen in Europe had existed while Japanese militaristic officials moved deeper into eastern Asia, and Mussolini marched his armies into Ethiopia, and Germany marched her armies into the Rhineland. I then emphasized that still worse experiences are ahead for static and inert governments like that of Great Britain and others, and that therefore I, with great deference and respect, desired strongly to urge a further consideration by those statesmen of all the factors in the present grave period through which our countries and the world is passing. I repeated that there is no alternative to this program to promote the joint objectives of peace and economic well-being, except, as some of our British statesmen say, the possibility of a military explosion in Europe along with increasingly heavy armaments by each country.
These various points were elaborated upon and illustrated by other physical conditions and actual occurrences. I said that naturally if British statesmen decline to move forward at all in support of an alternative program of peace and trade restoration that fact will inevitably be made known to every other country within the early future, for the reason that this movement must either go forward or perish, and, in either event, the definite attitude of each important country will be made known to the world.