500.A15A5/665: Telegram
The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State
97. Captain Deleuze who returned from Paris last night showed me this morning a copy of an instruction which the French Government sent yesterday to de Laboulaye52 requesting him to approach you and if possible the President to ascertain whether the position we have taken as to battleships is the last word and also to explain how important the French consider it to get a reduction which they suggest should lie between 35,000 and 28,000 in tonnage.
I repeated to Deleuze our position with regard to the battleship.
First, that we are just as desirous as any one to save money by reduction as long as we can do so without a sacrifice of efficiency and need.
Second, that not having built any battleships for so many years we could not determine to what extent if any it will be possible to get any reduction until we have actually constructed two or three or [Page 62] four battleships; that with Japan out of the treaty it was unreasonable for France to expect us to make our needs conform to theirs but that after we have gained some experience through construction we would be prepared to consider the possibility and desirability of any reduction thereafter in tonnage but that the promise to exchange views should not be construed as any commitment for a reduction.
I told him, however, that after all it was somewhat unrealistic to lay so much stress on the question of battleships when that is not the chief obstacle as yet in the way of French agreement. I asked him point-blank whether if he got a solution on the capital ship France would sign at once. Deleuze replied that they would be willing to sign tomorrow but it would be subject to general reserves. He stated that Massigli was now working on a formula under which the states here present would initial the treaty with the proviso that when certain “general political questions” were solved the treaty would go into effect.
I told Deleuze we could not sign any naval agreement that was conditional upon a European political settlement, that from a purely practical standpoint I thought France had always made the mistake of trying to get an all-embracing settlement of every question with the result that they had destroyed the possibility again and again of making any progress towards agreement with Germany and with the result of constant German rearmament. I said I also thought it was a mistake even if we were disposed to do so to try to inject European political questions into this naval conference.
Deleuze then inquired how I envisaged the signing of an agreement. I told him that my idea was that a real obligation as to signature should be taken by the four powers here and now. In the event that these powers considered the American ratification to this agreement necessary before January next the signature could only be delayed a very short time. If, however, they did not consider such immediate ratification essential we had no objections to delaying some months the putting into effect of the treaty or its actual signature. They might feel that an undertaking by the President to abide by the term of the treaty until the Senate could consider it would be sufficient for their needs. Deleuze indicated that the French would consider this sufficient and gave the impression that he was favorably disposed toward a solution such as I envisaged. We further discussed how such an undertaking should be made in respect to signature and agreed that it was advantageous for Japan, Germany, and Russia to be “original signatories” to the treaty and that other naval powers might be invited subsequently to adhere.