500.A15A5/647: Telegram
The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State
[Received February 3—7:05 p.m.]
83. Referring to your 29, January 29, 7 p.m. and my 81, February 1, 7 p.m. The British are unable to give any definite assurance as to the ultimate tonnage of the light surface category for the reasons outlined below:
France refuses now to commit herself as to the ratio she intends to maintain relative to Germany. Italy’s construction will depend on that of France. British building will in turn be influenced by French and Italian as well as by Japanese building. Under the Anglo-German agreement giving Germany a 35 per cent ratio with the British fleet, any increase in the latter would permit an increase in the German fleet and thus again affect French and Italian construction. This vicious circle makes it impossible for the British to bind themselves in advance with respect to their cruiser building especially as the French and Italians refuse to announce their programs for a period of more than 1 year. Again, the present Government can no more bind Parliament for a period of years without its consenting in some way, such as by ratification of a treaty, than our Government can bind Congress without its consent. Also, a Cabinet Committee is now sitting on the question of land, sea, and air defense of the Empire and no decision has been reached even as to what naval construction will be included in the budget for the financial year commencing next April.
Even if definite information and assurance could be obtained as to the amount of British construction, we believe it would be unwise to base a decision on such assurance unless it were in contractual form as this undoubtedly would lead to difficulties when the treaty was presented to the Senate and might cause future misunderstanding if the British found it necessary to exceed whatever program they may now contemplate.
However, it is apparent that, unless emergency measures are resorted to, the expansion of naval forces which can take place by January 1942 is naturally limited by available building facilities, the problem of personnel increase, et cetera, and finance.
[Page 56]Chatfield stated today that although he could not commit the British Government, the present intention of the Admiralty is to have 60 underage cruisers as soon as possible after 1942. The last of the cruisers necessary to attain 60 underage would be laid down in 1940 and completed in 1943. In addition they intend to retain 10 overage cruisers so that in 1943 they would have 60 underage and 10 overage cruisers. The majority but not all of the cruisers laid down would be of 8,000 tons, the remainder would be somewhere around 5,000 tons displacement. We estimate that the resultant increase in British underage cruiser tonnage will be between 125,000 and 150,000 tons and in addition 10 overage cruisers of about 50,000 tons will be retained, so that the total increase over the cruiser tonnage allowed by present treaties will be between 175,000 and 200,000 tons. The British intend to maintain 150,000 tons of underage and 40,000 tons of overage destroyers, a total of 190,000 tons. (See my 82, February 3, 8 p.m.)
In this connection, it should be borne in mind that even on the basis of the 50 cruisers which the British were able to retain under the London Naval Treaty they would have to increase their total tonnage beyond the 339,000 provided by that treaty, because the replacement of their small wartime cruisers by larger units would add approximately 70,000 tons to their present treaty strength. (See Craigie memorandum of July 25, 1934.)45 The large increase in underage tonnage now forecast by the British is, therefore, not entirely due to an increase in numbers but is in part accounted for by the replacement of small cruisers built for special service in World War.
The question at issue is whether or not a treaty for qualitative limitation is of sufficient value to the United States for it to accept a building holiday in category A and 10,000-ton category B cruisers for a period of years. A decision on this question must be reached without definite assurance from the British either as to the ultimate tonnage of the light surface vessel category or as to the ultimate tonnage of any other category.
Admiral Standley and I agree that in view of the fact that we have eighteen category A and nine 10,000-ton category B cruisers built or building, we can afford to forego further construction of those two types for a period of 5 or 6 years with the treaty reservations of course that there is no agreement expressed or implied either to abolish these types or to continue the holiday beyond 5 or 6 years—and we have been proceeding upon the assumption that a qualitative agreement upon these terms is advantageous.