500.A15A5/631
Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hornbeck)
Reference, press item attached, from today’s New York Times,27 and Mr. Davis’ telegram from London, 55, January 16, 2 p.m., copy attached. Of course the Japanese do not intend “to institute a naval race”. But it may be regarded as certain that they intend that the Japanese Navy shall be brought as rapidly as they can make it so to a position, in proportion to the American and the British Navies, which will render Japan invulnerable—and unrestrainable—in the western Pacific. The proposals which they have made at London indicate that they would be willing to see that objective attained by a general reduction of naval armament; but, having failed in that, they will exert themselves to the utmost to attain that objective by adding to the Navy which they already possess. Whether this will mean a “naval race” will depend on the action taken by the United States and Great Britain in response to increases in Japan’s building program. If, as the Japanese build, we increase our building, there will begin a “race”. What the Japanese are hoping is that we will not build. They are already ahead of us on the basis of the 5–5–3 ratio. We are engaged in bringing our naval forces up to the 5–3 point. They are hoping that, as they build above the 3 point, we will not go beyond the 5 point and there will thus come about an altering of the ratio in their favor. That in a real race they could not keep up is of course obvious. But, they can afford to go beyond the present 3 point, and there is every reason for expecting that they will do so.
Mr. Davis states “It also seems clear that they had not envisaged the possibility of the other powers continuing without them and that this is disturbing them very much.” I have doubt with regard to the accuracy of this estimate. If and as the other powers continue, and if the other powers make an agreement, the agreement will be for naval limitation. The Japanese desire that there be naval limitation. The fact of there being limitation and of their knowing the limitation to which the other powers agree will be, if and when, of definite value to the Japanese. True, they do not like to be left out of anything that the major powers are doing. But being outside has its compensations: in this case it will enable them to know to what the others are committed without their being themselves committed. Whether they will thereafter “seek some means for getting in again” will depend entirely on their own estimate, at the time, of their interest. [Page 37] An escape clause may or may not “solve any contingency”. The question of national honesty and of national ability to conceal and/or to discover will have a bearing on that question.
Mr. Davis concludes with the statement, “I am convinced that this [a conference among the other powers]28 is the best way to deal with the Japanese situation and certainly there is no risk or disadvantage to us in attempting to do so.” There is room for doubt with regard to the soundness of a part at least of this view. The contemplated conference of the other powers may or may not be “the best way to deal with the Japanese situation”; but the idea that it involves “no risk” is surely open to question. First of all, it is notorious that the United States is more sincerely committed to the concept of limitation of armament than are the other countries which will participate in the conference (with the possible exception of Great Britain); and when the process of bargaining begins, we have the reputation of being more given than are the others to the making of concessions. Second, it may with reason be doubted whether, in the world as it is, multilateral agreements with regard to armament can, unless preceded and connected with agreements with regard to political matters, rest on any sound foundation, and whether, even if associated with political agreements, their net effect is not that of deceiving the peacefully inclined nations into a false sense of security without in any way really placing effective obstacles in the way of aggressively disposed nations. In other words, it may be asked: Should nations rich in resources and desirous of peace limit their right to arm and thereby make easier for nations less rich but aggressively disposed to prepare for and engage in predatory activities?
It also may well be asked: Might it not be well to permit the nations to enter upon a period of unrestricted naval competition; might not such a course bring about an approach on Japan’s part asking for naval limitation at a date earlier than such an approach may be expected if the other powers enter into an agreement for reasonable limitation, the terms of which will be immediately and fully known to Japan.
There is “risk”.
On the one hand, we have the statement of opinion that is attributed to Senator Pittman; on the other hand, the statement of opinion which Mr. Davis makes.
It may be well to show Senator Pittman, as suggested by Mr. Davis, Mr. Davis’ telegram. It might be well at the same time to say to Senator Pittman that it is felt in the Department that there is considerable room for middle ground as between the two views.