500.A15A5/617: Telegram
The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State
[Received January 14—3:47 p.m.]
47. At the meeting between the British and American delegates at the Foreign Office this morning the British told us of their talk with the Japanese, the substance of which was covered in my 46, January 14, 1 a.m. The Japanese had also said that while they could not reach any naval agreement after the rejection of the common upper limit, they would like beforehand to discuss rules of submarine warfare with a view to perpetuating the terms of part IV of the London Naval Treaty.23 The British said they would be very glad to dp so after disposing of the common upper limit. The Japanese repeated that under the circumstances they would be unable to remain for any negotiations and again suggested that part IV be taken up first. The British replied that they had done everything possible to meet the Japanese wishes but that they were not willing to depart from the procedure to that extent.
The British then told us the Japanese had questioned the legality of continuing the Conference once Japan withdraws24 since the Conference [Page 34] was called under the Washington Treaty25 and since the treaty envisages only a conference of the five powers and not a four-power meeting. The British disagreed with this and told them there was no reason why the other powers should not remain to negotiate a naval agreement since such agreement could not become effective until after the expiration of the Washington and London Treaties when without some sort of new agreement there would be chaos. Furthermore, they told the Japanese that in negotiating an agreement, the other powers would have in mind the possibility and hope that Japan might ultimately become a party to it. The British definitely considered that the obligation of article 23 of the Washington Treaty was fulfilled by the convocation of the Conference in December.
The British told the Japanese they would have no objection to two or three Japanese observers. After some discussion this morning we agreed that the Japanese should have observers but that they would have no right to sit with expert committees for technical discussions. They could, however, be kept informed of the results.
We inquired what the British views were with regard to later invitations to Germany and Russia. They replied that they were keeping both informed of what is taking place but that France and Italy wished to include Turkey, Greece and Yugoslavia in which case Sweden, Holland and Spain and perhaps the South American countries would also have to be invited. The British said they were of the opinion that if once you go beyond the major naval powers it would be better to include all naval states and that after all this might from a practical and psychological viewpoint be of considerable advantage. If all the other naval powers, with the exception of Japan, were to enter into an agreement the effect would be so overwhelming they believed that Japan would in a short time wish to join. The British recognize, of course, that with Japan out many difficulties would arise but that we should proceed in general on the theory that Japan would ultimately want to come in. In the meantime an adequate escape clause should be provided as a counterpoise to Japan’s freedom.
The British who want above all qualitative limitation now state that without Japan the last hope of achieving quantitative limitation has gone except perhaps in so far as it might result from operation of agreed building programs. The British desire for qualitative limitation without quantitative is no doubt partly determined by their [Page 35] wish to bring France and Italy into agreement and their realization that a quantitative agreement between these two countries is now impossible and also by the fact that qualitative limitation would leave the way open for later adherence of other powers.
- Signed April 22, 1930, Foreign Relations, 1930, vol. i, p. 107.↩
- For announcement of withdrawal of the Japanese delegation, January 15, see Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i, p. 297, and Report of the Delegates of the United States …, p. 240.↩
- Treaty for the Limitation of Naval Armaments, signed February 6, 1922, Foreign Relations, 1922, vol. i, p. 247.↩