Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1936, General, British Commonwealth, Volume I

863.01/398

The Minister in Austria (Messersmith) to the Secretary of State

[Extracts]

No. 825

Vienna, July 11, 1936.
[Received July 22.]

Sir: I have the honor to inform you that on the afternoon of July 10, 1936, the Foreign Office indicated that the Secretary General, Mr. Peter, would be glad to receive me that evening. I called at the Foreign Office, and Secretary General Peter informed me that the conversations which had been going on between Chancellor Schuschnigg and the German Minister for the bettering of the relations between Austria and Germany now gave hope of leading to a favorable positive result. He said that the conversations had reached the point where the German Government had given its agreement to the fundamental conditions laid down by Austria, and that it was, therefore, probable that the agreement might be completed any day.

He stated that the Austrian Government had already during the course of the day brought to the attention of the representatives of Italy, France, and England the contents of the document which he was about to read to me and which the Chancellor had requested him to communicate also to me and to the Swiss Minister. He requested me to keep the contents of the document and what he would say to me in the strictest confidence, and said that the same request had been made to the other missions to whom this communication was made, as the definite agreement had not yet been signed.

The Secretary General then read to me a document, of which he afterward gave me a copy, a translation of which is transmitted herewith. He requested that this be not given any publicity and that if I transmitted it to my Government that it should be considered as strictly confidential. It will be noted that the document is not an aide-mémoire, but is designated a “Sketch”.

After reading this document to me, the Secretary General stated that, familiar as I was with the circumstances which had surrounded these conversations with Mr. von Papen and which had been initiated by him over a year ago, I must realize the difficulties there had been in the way. The Austrian Government had always been prepared to negotiate with the German Government for the improvement of the relations between the two states, but that the negotiations had always shattered through the failure of Germany to observe certain conditions and complete failure to recognize the fundamental conditions which the Austrian Chancellor had always insisted upon. These fundamental conditions, which I have from time to time brought to your attention, the Secretary General said had now been recognized by Germany. The German Minister, he added, had informed the Austrian Chancellor that the German Chancellor and the German Government were now prepared to accept these conditions and that therefore an agreement for the improvement of relations was possible.

He added that while it was the Chancellor’s wish that he communicate to me the information in the appended document, he must add that the agreement was not yet completed but that he was now in a position to say that it was ninety per cent certain that the German Government would agree to the Austrian conditions. The final word of the German Government, he indicated, was expected the following morning. With the recognition of the Austrian conditions, the Secretary General expressed the hope that a real relieving of the tension in the relations between the two states might be arrived at, but he added that, unfortunately, such an agreement must be viewed in the light of past experience. Germany had an agreement with the Vatican concerning which there had been much difficulty and which agreement was again in the foreground on account of the failure of the present German Government to meet the agreement which it itself had made. This might be the experience with the present agreement which would probably come into effect between Austria and Germany. Austria, on her side, would loyally observe any engagements which she undertook, but there must always remain the question as to whether the German Government would meet its engagements.

The Secretary General while reading the accompanying document to me frequently interrupted the reading to emphasize certain points therein. He made it clear that Austria had not given up any of the conditions upon which she has been insisting and that the recognition of Austria’s independence and separate existence was demanded by the Chancellor and secured as an indispensable preliminary. The principle of non-immixtion by Germany in Austria’s internal affairs was also clearly recognized by Germany. He particularly emphasized that the agreement did not involve any recognition of National Socialism.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

I expressed my appreciation to the Secretary General for having shown me the great courtesy and consideration to read me this document and to give me a copy thereof. I said that I knew how steadfastly the Austrian Government had striven to improve its relations with all neighbors and that I could only hope that such an understanding with Germany, if it became effective, would have the results which I was sure the Austrian Government so ardently desired and which would be in the interest of economic and political peace in Europe and in the world. I did not ask him why, aside from the Italian, French, and English chiefs of mission, the intentions of the Austrian Government were being made known in this confidential way only to the American and Swiss Ministers. The only explanation that the Secretary General made in this connection was that the Chancellor had expressed the desire that the Swiss Minister and myself should be informed as having always shown an understanding appreciation of the Austrian position.

Before leaving the Secretary General I said that one could not but be surprised that the German Government was prepared to make this recognition of Austria’s independence and of the principle of non-immixtion, when, for over a year, it had steadfastly refused to make such recognition. I asked the Secretary General whether he could offer any indications which had influenced the German Government to this change of attitude. He replied that it was undoubtedly the relations of Germany vis-à-vis England and the British memorandum⁶⁷ which had forced the German Government to take this action with regard to Austria. Now, he said, the German Government could say to England and France, “Why all this fuss over Austria when we have arranged the matter between ourselves?”

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Respectfully yours,

George S. Messersmith

[Enclosure]

Sketch by the Secretary General of the Austrian Foreign Office (Peter) of the Austro-German Agreement, Signed July 11, 1936⁶⁸

[Vienna, July 10, 1936.]

The conversations which have been taking place for some time on the initiative of the Minister of the German Reich, von Papen, with the Federal Chancellor, Dr. Schuschnigg, in order to bring about more normal relations between Germany and Austria are on the best way toward leading to a positive result.

That which Austria has been endeavoring to bring about in these conversations is the natural normalization of the relations between two neighboring states, which, in addition, also speak the same language.

The preliminary conditions which Austria has set up for the normalizing of these relations are as follows:

1. The unequivocal and unmistakable recognition of the independence and separate existence of Austria.

2. The recognition of the fundamental principle of non-interference in Austria’s internal affairs.

3. The unequivocal establishment of the fact that for Austria National Socialism is neither a political factor nor can it come into question as a negotiating partner.

4. The expressed statement that the Rome Protocols of 1934⁶⁹ and the Supplementary Protocols of 1936⁷⁰ lay down the fundamental principles of Austrian policy, and that in this respect also in the future nothing will be changed.

As Mr. von Papen, in the name of his Government, has recognized these principles, there now exist adequate prospects that a gentleman’s agreement between Austrian Federal Government and the German Reich can be concluded that will settle a number of special questions covering the many sided relations between the two states.

The above mentioned principles were already in previous years set up on the Austrian side as the unconditional and necessary preliminaries for the relieving of the tension in Austro-German relations and in the return to normal and friendly neighborly relations between the two German neighbor states. If these principles, always maintained by Austria, had been recognized by Germany in the years 1933 and 1934—it is known that the efforts which Austria made repeatedly in this direction shattered on German demands which could only be considered as an interference in Austrian inner political matters—then this normalizing of the relations could have been reached then, and Austria, as well as those European states interested in the independence and separate existence of Austria, would have been spared much unrest and cares.

From the point of view of the inner political development of Austria the normalizing of relations with Germany which is being striven for would have the following effect:

The principle that on the Austrian side no negotiating with National Socialism comes into question establishes for the inner political Austrian possibilities very clearly defined limits. The frequent widely spread rumors which have appeared in this connection in foreign countries over the bringing into the Austrian Government of representatives of National Socialism and placing them in responsible public positions belong therefore in the realm of fable. There can only be a question that the basis of the government in Austria might be strengthened in the sense that the so-called “national circles” be brought to share in the responsibility of government, in so far as these have not compromised themselves in a National Socialist sense and have declared themselves unequivocally in principle for the law concerning the Vaterländische Front as set up with respect to the Austrian State. In no sense, however, is a reorganization of the individual government organizations in Austria being considered, and there could only be at the most a question that one or more personalities belonging to these circles could come into the present Cabinet, without, however, being given any special position or responsibility. As a further consequence also the Federal Chancellor has considered a political amnesty for those persons who through their activities for the in Austria forbidden National Socialism have come in conflict with the law, but it is expressly understood that from this amnesty would remain excluded all those who have committed common criminal acts.

In connection with such an action tending to bring about inner political peace, it must, at the outset, be made clear without any equivocation that any attitude unfriendly to the state or any propaganda unfriendly to the state, from whatever side it may come, will be prosecuted as sharply as before. For the clearest expression of this decision the Federal Government will enact a law for the protection of the state—just as such laws already exist in most of the neighboring states to Austria. This law will make punishable every offense directed against the state. It is self-understood that, for example, also the Anschluss propaganda would fall in the category, as it is contrary to the principle of the independence of Austria and the Constitution of May 1, 1934.

Special attention was given during the course of the conversations between Federal Chancellor Schuschnigg and Minister von Papen that the commercial relations between the two states, which through the last years had been considerably damaged, and from the German side influenced through party political considerations, must be brought into a form representing the natural needs of the two commercial areas.

In the outer political connection the Federal Chancellor allows himself to express the certain hope that the removal of the poison from the already strained relations during the past three and a half years between Austria and the German Reich will contribute in a material way toward lightening the general unrest and nervousness on the European Continent, under which Austria, as a small state, has particularly suffered. It must, however, with all emphasis be pointed out that this action, which may happily lead for Austria and for a good part of the European Continent to a relieving of tension, will be secured without giving up a single one of the fundamental principles of the Austria of today. It would therefore be completely wrong and contrary to the facts if one wished to find in this—as certainly it may be foreseen voices unfriendly to Austria will assert—that there is any giving up of the fundamental principles of an independent Austria or any deviation from the complete policy of Austria laid down in the “Dollfuss Line”.⁷¹ The result will indicate much more the complete putting through of the recognition and ratification of these principles on the side of the neighboring great power to the North. The reciprocal respecting of the entire freedom of action and procedure in both countries will also offer the guarantee that Austria, uninfluenced by other “ideologien”, will be able to follow out and pursue its own political, cultural, social, and commercial policies.

67. i. e., the “questionnaire” of May 6, 1936, British Cmd. 5175, Miscellaneous No. 6 (1936), p. 12.
68. For text, see Department of State, Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918–1945, series D, vol. i, p. 278.
69. Signed March 17, 1934, League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. cliv, p. 281.
70. Signed March 23, 1936, British and Foreign State Papers, vol. cxl, p. 333.
71. Policy followed by Engelbert Dollfuss, Austrian Premier, May 20, 1932–July 25, 1934.