740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/698: Telegram
The Chargé in Germany (Mayer) to the Secretary of State
[Received May 28—3:30 p.m.]
161. My 155, May 22, 1 p.m.63 Have recently had long and interesting conversations with the British and French Ambassadors. During his recent enjoyable visit Ambassador Cudahy64 had a similar conversation with the Polish Ambassador and was present also at the above discussions.
Phipps who was most frank and apparently willing to acquaint us with his views discussed the Italo-German situation in some detail. He felt that the German and Italian interests in the Danube in particular with regard to Austria were in direct opposition. He saw no possibility of compromise unless Germany and Italy were forced together through mistakes on the part of the other powers. He prayed that this would not occur since a united front of Germany and Italy would be disastrous. Regarding the German situation generally Phipps deplored the French attitude which prevented an opportunity fully to explore Hitler’s ideas and “sincerity”. The only thing to do was to have an opportunity to evaluate this matter which to date had been rendered impossible. The French wished neither to fight nor to negotiate which left matters in a pretty difficult state. Phipps felt that a breathing spell, if only for a decade or less, was something worth having in the hope that during the period something positively beneficial might occur. Concerning the prevalent rumors here in regard to the possible announcement by Hitler of a plan for economic, monetary and financial stabilization pursuant to his speech on March 7, Phipps did not seem to think there was much likelihood of this taking place. Its possibility, however, could not be ruled out as Hitler might wish to make such a move for various reasons with reference to British and American public opinion, although not believing [Page 312] greatly in its immediate efficacy. On the whole Phipps was pessimistic concerning conditions in Europe.
François-Poncet seemed to have recovered from his bitter attitude after March 7. There was nothing especially novel in the detailed sketch he gave us of the European situation and especially Germany. Several points, however, seem worthy of comment. First, a general impression of his deep pessimism if not indeed resignation. This was in contrast with his rather bellicose attitude of some weeks ago and with the idea which he frankly expressed then that the Rhineland matter was not over and France must not [now?] take advantage of this last opportunity. Secondly, and correlated to the above, the French Ambassador seemed to be dominated by the tremendous military development of Germany present and potential speaking in terms of hundreds of divisions of such a power that resistance would be useless and German international policy would have its way without the necessity of hostilities. Thirdly, the impossibility of the French policy being anti-Italian. Italy must be kept friendly, presumably anti-German.
Further regarding Italo-German relations, Ambassador Cudahy was told by Lipski that the latter would stake his whole diplomatic reputation that Mussolini and Hitler could not and would not work together. There seemed every reason to think that the Polish Ambassador really believed this. I must say that what we hear confirms this despite what may appear to be the contrary from time to time. Each may play off to the other for this or other immediate advantage in the present poker game. I am inclined to think, however, as Lipski seems to feel that this could only be temporary, although possibly spectacular.
According to Dieckhoff, whom I also have seen lately, the German replies to the British questions are being prepared by the Foreign Office but in the absence of Hitler and Neurath there is no immediate likelihood of their being put into final form. Dieckhoff said that some of the questions could be answered quite simply, for example, Germany would not agree to a nonaggression pact with Russia.
Repeated to the Embassy at Rome, Paris, Geneva, London.