740.00/47
Memorandum by the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Bullitt)58
In the course of a conversation with Mr. Dave Hennen Morris, American Ambassador to Belgium, and myself, Mr. Van Zeeland, Prime Minister of Belgium expressed the following views with regard to the present situation in Europe:
He said that he regarded the future most pessimistically. He explained that in his opinion, when Europe was on its way to war, there came a moment when forces and events became stronger than statesmen and human will. He felt that that moment was arriving rapidly. He did not feel that it had yet arrived, however, and he believed that during this summer before the meeting of the League in September, a great effort must be made to bring Europe together in a system which might assure peace.
He said that he felt the gravest element in the present situation was the immense decrease in the prestige of France. Whatever one might think about certain French policies, France did stand for the maintenance of the status quo in Europe. At the moment, France was paralyzed by internal political difficulties, by financial difficulties, by the almost complete pacifism of the French people, who were unwilling to fight except if France or Belgium should be invaded. Even more important was the fact that the completion of the fortifications which Germany was building on the French and Belgian frontiers would bar France from further effective interference in Central and Eastern Europe. An additional dangerous element was the military weakness of England. Van Zeeland then alluded to the facts that the British Government could put only one division on the continent of Europe today and that the British air force was small in numbers. He then said that he felt Great Britain today feared Italy far more than she [Page 307] feared Germany, and that she would find it intensely difficult, if not impossible, to collaborate with Italy for the maintenance of peace in Europe. He said that nevertheless he felt certain, and indicated that he had reasons for his statement, that the sanctions on Italy would be lifted at the next meeting in Geneva and said that he hoped this removal of sanctions might be the beginning of a détente between Great Britain and Italy which might make it possible for them to collaborate for the preservation of European peace.
Mr. Van Zeeland then expressed at some length his ideas as to the changes which should be made in the Covenant of the League and as to the mechanism to preserve peace which might be developed. He said that in his opinion the great defect of the Covenant had been that it bound all nations to equal obligations in all parts of the world. To do this was to base peace on a pleasant illusion. For example: If France or the Netherlands should be attacked by Germany, Belgium at once would go to war to assist either France or the Netherlands because her vital interests would be involved. But if Brazil should attack Paraguay, Belgium would certainly not go to war with Brazil because she would have no interests whatever involved. In his opinion, the obligations under the Covenant must be made to conform with the real interests of the nations involved. He believed that the house of peace should be one which should have the League of Nations as a roof but should have several stories. All nations in the world should undertake the obligation to impose economic sanctions on a nation declared to be an aggressor by the League. The inefficacy of economic sanctions had been shown by the Italo-Abyssinian war. But in spite of the fact that economic sanctions were not sufficient aid to a nation attacked by another nation, they nevertheless were of some assistance. They made the task of the aggressor nation harder. Economic sanctions should, therefore, be the first floor of the house of the League and all members of the League should undertake the obligation to impose them against the aggressor nation. The next floor, in his opinion, should be one which had never been suggested. Each nation should agree with regard to certain other specific countries in which it had a special interest to assist those nations in time of war actively by the supplying of loans and munitions on long-term credits and all other forms of aid short of actual military assistance. For example, Belgium would be glad to take such an engagement with regard to Switzerland, because the positions of Switzerland and Belgium vis-à-vis Germany was similar. Belgium would not, however, take such obligations vis-à-vis Austria. The final floor of the house of peace should be the floor of full military and economic assistance to the state attacked by the aggressor.
Van Zeeland went on to say that he had begun to feel his way toward a realization of these ideas and had found in many countries of Europe [Page 308] considerable response. He said that he believed that under a system of this kind all sorts of regional agreements should be possible. He asked if the contemplated Pan American Conference in Buenos Aires59 might not establish a pact of mutual assistance for all American countries. I replied that I had no information on this subject.
Mr. Van Zeeland then said that he would like to mention a question involving relations between the United States and Belgium which disturbed him. He said that I must be aware that both Mr. Morris and Mr. Wiley60 believed that he had not done everything that he could to stop the smuggling of alcohol to the United States.61 He wished me to assure the President that he was doing everything that he could. He could not perform impossible things but he was confident that in the end he would master the difficulties. He said that, contrary to the information of our Embassy in Brussels and our Legation in The Hague, his private information from his “services” was that the Government of the Netherlands had no intention of passing the bill to prevent smuggling from Holland to the United States. He said that he would be criticized severely if he should stop this smuggling traffic from Antwerp merely to transfer it to Rotterdam.
In accordance with a previous request from Mr. Morris I said to Mr. Van Zeeland that I hoped he realized this matter was one which the Government of the United States took most seriously, that the President himself had spoken to me about it with intense interest, that the question was not merely one of preventing alcohol smuggling, but of cutting the tap root which nourished the entire criminal world—which was a unit—and was engaged not only in the illegal introduction of alcohol but also in the peddling of dope and in kidnaping.