740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/501: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Straus) to the Secretary of State
251. Marriner called by appointment to introduce Wilson22 to Monsieur Léger23 last evening who was apparently most desirous of talking on the present situation beginning with the German occupation of the demilitarized Rhineland provinces.
His general attitude was one of intense gloom. He seemed to regret that France had not mobilized on the day of the German occupation thus facing England with an accomplished fact which would have prevented any of the shilly shallying that has gone on in London since that time.
Up to the time of the conversation Léger had not received any text of the German reply to the proposals for submission of the question to the World Court but was certain that it would be a refusal accompanied by some suggestions for delay.
In his opinion France could not make any modification in its attitude since the time had come when for the sake of the future a firm stand against encroachments on contractual obligations would have to be taken. According to French opinion the present Council meeting in London had only one purpose under the terms of the Locarno treaty, namely, to decide that there had been a violation of that treaty after which the problem of action returned to the signatories other than the guilty party. It was the French contention that under no circumstances did the Council have anything further to do with the case until such time as it might be so requested by the signatories after they had themselves decided on steps against the guilty party for which they might properly require the aid and cooperation of the whole membership of the League. Therefore Léger analyzed the situation as standing thus: The Council has given its decision that a violation of Locarno treaties exists. It has adjourned. It is now squarely up to England to cooperate with France, Belgium, and Italy in whatever measures may be decided upon by them in face of this German action or utterly to dishonor her signature.
He did not think that France would under any circumstances ask for military sanctions as she did not wish to appear to be waging a preventive war. In fact he said they would request economic ones of a rather mild character not destined in any way to affect the nourishment or health of the German population. He thought that by beginning with a cancellation of all clearing arrangements between [Page 268] Germany and other powers the German economic structure would be so weakened that it could not long stand. He said that he knew that the City in London was opposed to these measures and that was where the center of the opposition probably lay but that if England should refuse to come along on such mild measures as these despite her signature she would have to propose an extremely firm guarantee for France with the appropriate General and Admiralty Staff arrangements. If it came to this latter contingency it would mean an entirely new line-up in Europe since it would mean that all ideas of collective security had been abandoned; that Central and Eastern Europe must look after themselves while the Little Entente would most necessarily turn to Germany as the great power in its region and that future trouble was delayed but not eliminated with a bloc in Western Europe strong enough to resist Germany for some time to come but with all the rest of the Continent delivered to German domination.
It seems to be this latter state of affairs that Léger fears very much will be the outcome of the difficulties. All the more he feels that a stiff tone with Germany at this time would be justified and wise since he says that they have the best of information to the effect that both [sic] the army, economic interests and the Foreign Office in Germany all opposed Hitler’s decision to take the step of Rhineland occupation at this time. He said that the French had also heard that Hitler did not deny the reasonings on which these three elements based their opposition but merely stated that he had the mystic feeling in which he had not thus far been wrong that there was a complete lack of courage and of union in the foreign opposition to him and that he could probably take advantage of it.
Léger said that if Hitler succeeds this time it is “definitely the last, not the next to the last, test” and means giving to the Hitler régime an almost unparalleled position in the European scene and that the Hitlerian dreams of some mystic Carlovingian Empire would have a better chance of coming to pass.
Repeated to London, Rome, Brussels, Berlin, The Hague.