740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/561
Memorandum by the Chargé in Belgium (Sussdorff)17
[Brussels,] March 23, 1936.
Viscount de Lantsheere18 who was with Mr. van Zeeland throughout the Paris and London conversations of the four Locarno Powers, furnished the following information in the course of our conversation today:
- 1.
- When Germany denounced the Locarno Pact on March 7, 1936, the French Government wanted to take the necessary military measures to redress the situation. With this object in view, they immediately called on the British, Belgian and Italian Governments to furnish military assistance. French insistence on this point was maintained throughout the discussions at Paris and in the London discussions until about Saturday, March 14.
- 2.
- The Belgian Government’s policy was that the violation of the Locarno Pact by Germany should be condemned but that there should be no brusque gesture that would close the door to negotiations with Germany on terms later to be agreed upon by the Locarno Powers. The Belgian Government was not willing to resort to military measures or to economic or financial sanctions. The Belgian delegation pointed out to the French representatives that a resort to military measures to redress the situation would mean war with all its attendant consequences, including the bombardment by the German air force of Brussels, Paris, and other Belgian and French towns. The Belgian delegation also pointed out all the juridical and practical difficulties in the matter of the application of sanctions and stated emphatically that in its opinion it was very unlikely that the “neutral” countries which have common frontiers with Germany (such as Poland, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Holland and Switzerland) would be willing to cooperate in the matter of sanctions.
- 3.
- The points of view of the Belgian and British Governments from the outset were practically the same. But the position of the British Government was more difficult owing to the fact that British public opinion reacted apathetically to Germany’s action. The average Englishman, being at least as well (if not better) disposed toward Germany as toward France, picked up his morning paper and found nothing strange about the Germans moving troops into their own territory. In fact, he rather sympathized with Germany and would have been strongly averse to any military measures devised to prevent what he considered a perfectly justifiable action. In view of this attitude by the British public, it required great courage for the British Government to take the firm stand it took.
- 4.
- The Belgian delegation played a strong rôle of mediation between the British and the French delegations. The British and the French, with their usual inability to comprehend each other’s mentality, were finding it impossible to get together. Mr. van Zeeland exerted a maximum effort to bridge over the British and French points of view and really accomplished remarkable results in a task that required great patience and delicacy.
- 5.
- The German delegation was astounded at the firm stand taken by the British delegation. The Germans had thought that the British would be fairly complacent and would take an easy-going stand with regard to Germany. Their disillusionment was, therefore, correspondingly great when confronted with the final decision of the four Locarno Powers. The Belgian Government has had no indication as to when the German reply will be given or as to what its tenor will be.
- 6.
- Belgium did not ask that an international force should occupy a strip of German territory 20 kilometers in width along the Franco-German and Belgo-German frontier. The insistence on this point came entirely from France.
- 7.
- The Italian delegates recognized Italy’s obligations under the Locarno Pact, but with regard to the ways and means in which they would give military or other aid they made full reservations pending reference of the matter to their Government.