740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/371: Telegram
The Ambassador in Italy (Long) to the Secretary of State
[Received March 7—7:30 p.m.]
76. In a conversation with Mr. Suvich this afternoon he said that the action of Germany confronted Europe with a situation out of which would come peace during a period of years or war in the immediate future. He felt England to be the deciding factor and was inclined to be optimistic. He thought England would act in a conciliatory capacity, endeavoring to induce France not to march and trying to induce Germany not to send more soldiers into the zone at this time. He thought the act of Germany in actually sending soldiers into the zone was a tactical and psychological error for the same purpose could have been achieved by simply announcing the right to do so and later, little by little, sending soldiers in straggling units. However, Italy would not consider the action taken by Germany as if it had been a weak Locarno. Germany assumes Locarno to have been violated by France by virtue of the Franco-Soviet pact and, consequently, not binding longer upon Germany. Italy accepts this argument of Germany. Italy, accordingly, does not consider Germany’s action to be a flagrant violation or to constitute an unprovoked act of aggression under Locarno such as to involve Italy’s obligations under that treaty.
I asked whether Italy would consider it a violation of article 42 and 43 of the Treaty of Versailles. He replied that, technically speaking, it probably was and could be so considered but that it was not an abrupt or flagrant violation because it was one of the various steps which Germany had been taking to free herself from the restrictive clauses of the treaty and that this policy on the part of Germany had been condoned by each of the big European powers, Italy included; that Germany was not punished for her assumption of the right to arm; that England had almost immediately approved of her naval building program; that this new step was simply one in the procession and while it constituted a violation of the treaty, the great powers in Western Europe had by their own past acts assumed positions in regard to infractions of the Treaty of Versailles which would seem to make it difficult for them to adopt an aggressive policy in regard to this. He said that the offers by Germany (a) to establish a new militarized zone and (b) to sign 25-year nonaggression pacts with both its eastern and western neighbors (and he mentioned Lithuania and Czechoslovakia as the neighbors intended and excluded Russia) were so important that the western powers ought to consider them seriously in connection with the German move in the Rhine territory. [Page 211] He emphasized the fact that these conditions were precedent in character to Germany’s return to the League but that her actual return to membership would be absolutely unconditional. This he thought should be a great inducement to consider leniently the German aggression and he felt that the pacts proposed by Germany could have a very great influence upon the maintenance of peace for years to come.
However, he felt that in the last analysis the future course lay in the policy which Great Britain would follow. He, personally, believed that England would like to avoid war even though some of her actions had indicated the contrary and that while Mussolini is convinced England really wants a war, Suvich, personally, believes England would desire to align herself with either Germany or France from time to time to preserve an equilibrium and maintain peace. He felt, however, that if England should condone the present German movement in spite of the fact that it was a violation of the Treaty of Versailles, England could not follow the same course in the future vis-à-vis Italy which she had pursued in the past because it would be inconsistent to placate Germany on one ground and to oppose Italy on an alleged identical ground.
He declared the policy of Italy to be to refrain from making any commitments of any kind vis-à-vis Germany and to wait and see what the developments would be, but he admitted that Italy would not ally herself with France and England in opposition to Germany under the present circumstances—these including sanctions; and further admitted that the positions of Germany and Italy would have many elements in common if England and France assumed an uncompromising attitude toward Germany now.
I call your attention to one other effect of this German move. It makes membership in the League of Nations of two of the strongest military powers of Europe—Germany and Italy—contingent upon certain factors. Germany will join if certain conditions precedent are arranged. Italy will withdraw if any additional punitive steps are taken. If Italy goes Switzerland will go and the withdrawal of the latter would be a worse blow to the prestige of the League than most any other. The conditions are in being which make it possible to wreck the League or to continue its existence. If the powers concerned really wish collective security they will have to accept some changes in the situation. If they do not desire to continue collective security it is only necessary for them to be obdurate under the present circumstances. The former course would probably reestablish the basis for peace in Europe for some years to come. The latter will bring on a war.
Repeated to London, Paris, Berlin, Geneva.