811.04418/97: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Straus) to the Secretary of State
3. Department’s 507, December 28, 4 p.m.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
I interpret our policy as outlined by the President and the Secretary of State to be that of remaining out of controversy and retaining as neutral a position as possible and certainly avoiding any action that might drag us into hostilities.
Therefore, it is my personal judgment that our legislation should be framed in most general terms, expressing unwillingness to make any sales to belligerents based on credits. By implication we might permit or at any event not prohibit sales for cash to any nation that sends ships to our ports, makes purchases for cash, and carries these purchases, irrespective of purpose or destination, in its own or foreign chartered bottoms.
In view of the divergence of views on this subject among my secretaries now on duty, whom I have consulted, I summarize their opinions as follows.
Cochran3 thinks it highly desirable to limit permanent neutrality legislation to the lines of the temporary legislation which was passed4 before the present state of conflict between Italy and Ethiopia was recognized.5 To avoid necessity of administrative interpretation, he recommends an added provision that arms, ammunition and implements of war shall be the only articles the export whereof to belligerents shall be prohibited or curtailed.
[Page 170]For us to change legislation during the conflict in such manner as to embarrass or to in fact discriminate against the belligerent, designated by the League as the aggressor, would seem to Cochran to involve us in the controversy as much as would actual participation in the League. Instead of merely cooperating as a League member, we would really be taking the lead for which the most powerful League nation is too apparently waiting. Some of the League nations may desire to see us act positively, but Cochran’s impression is that France will probably be by no means the only one of them desirous that the League should serve as an instrument for conciliation rather than coercion, and that they would be happier to see us maintain the strict position of neutrality called for by the letter of existing law rather than set the precedent of a raw material embargo in the present tense situation.
From the practical standpoint no matter how far we go in restricting trade with belligerents, there always remain other factors which might so involve us that we could not escape war. In the present instance it is still entirely doubtful whether sanctions including petroleum and the other war materials mentioned would be effective in stopping the war in Africa. There is, on the other hand, the possibility that extreme sanctions plus a complete embargo on petroleum, et cetera by non-League states might extend the war area. If the number of belligerents should increase, it is to be presumed that our neutrality laws or regulations would of necessity be made applicable to all.
By partially waiving claims to freedom of the seas and by other provisions of our present neutrality legislation, Cochran thinks we are already far in advance of the antiwar legislation of any individual nation. Since our legislation is still so recent, he asks would it not be preferable to continue it in its present form with the one additional clarification above mentioned until its virtues and defects can better be judged rather than experiment with new policy which would surely augment the Government’s international political worries and diminish our foreign trade? This would give respite for League of Nations to demonstrate independently their sincerity and unity and opportunity for further steps of conciliation.
Clark6 agrees with Cochran’s reasoning but not his recommendation. Clark thinks the purpose of our Government would best be served by making permanent the present legislation with the following modifications: (1) making it mandatory upon the President to prohibit the exportation to such belligerent of any article whatsoever in excess of the quantity exported to that belligerent during some characteristic period, (2) prohibiting any sales to a belligerent for [Page 171] other than cash, and (3) prohibiting the flotation within the United States of the bonds or other securities of a belligerent during the continuance of hostilities.
It might also be announced that all trade with a belligerent would be at the risk of the merchant.
Williamson7 feels that a clear distinction must be drawn in any regulations adopted according to whether the purpose in which they are conceived is merely to minimize the possibility of the United States being drawn into war or is, in addition, to exert pressure on the belligerents to come to peace. If the first premise is that in mind, the measures adopted should impose as little hardship as possible on American commerce and the embargo on sales of American goods should be limited to those categories already defined as war materials. However, authorization might be given to the President in his discretion to extend said list to include such indirect war materials as oil, steel, et cetera, exports thereof to be regulated in accordance with the quota provision foreseen in the Department’s paragraph 3, an opportunity thus being afforded for the Chief Executive to assure himself that we are not quixotically the only nation to sacrifice our trade, since in a future war the other governments may not resort to strict embargoes.
On the other hand, if the premise is that our neutrality regulations should likewise be employed to exert pressure on belligerents, Williamson feels that a total embargo on the imports from warring nations would be more efficacious and less costly than extending the embargo to further commodities of our own export trade.
English8 believes that some modification of the present temporary neutrality legislation is probably desirable but that the scope of these modifications should not extend greatly beyond the present limits. English feels that the likelihood of the United States becoming involved in war is not dependent entirely upon trade relations, financial relations, or shipping incidents; that there are other and potent forces which under given circumstances might inflame the American people and precipitate conflict. The present neutrality legislation would appear to go a long way to eliminate the likelihood of war from the causes dealt with and to some extent, but this is probably limited, may be helpful in preventing the spread of the present conflict. The new legislation might well be drafted with a view to smoothing out a few deficiencies which may have become apparent in the brief time this legislation has been in effect, the general spirit of and the scope of the present legislation appearing to be adequate.
- Telegram in seven sections.↩
- H. Merle Cochran, First Secretary of Embassy in France.↩
- Joint Resolution approved August 31, 1935; 49 Stat. 1081.↩
- Proclamation No. 2141, October 5, 1935, by the President; Department of State, Press Releases, October 5, 1935, p. 251.↩
- Lewis Clark, Second Secretary of Embassy in France.↩
- Harold L. Williamson, Second Secretary of Embassy in France.↩
- Robert English, Third Secretary of Embassy in France.↩