Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1936, General, British Commonwealth, Volume I

500.A4B/695a

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Robert T. Pell of the Division of Western European Affairs

[Washington,] September 16, 1936.

There were present:	Mr. Norman H. Davis.
For the State Department:	Mr. Dunn,
	Mr. Hickerson,
	Mr. Dooman,
	Mr. Pell.
For the War Department:	Major General Stanley Embick,
	Brig. General Walter Krueger.
For the Navy Department:	Admiral W. H. Standley,
	Captain Ingersoll,
	Commander Schuirmann.

Mr. Davis said that the meeting was called to discuss the reply which should be made to the British oral proposal to renew Article 19 of the Washington Naval Treaty, 1922, as a separate instrument. He asked for comment.

Admiral Standley observed that before replying we must have it clear in our own minds what our position is with regard to fortifications in the Pacific. Fortifications are of very little value without a base. We certainly are not going to fortify Manila and Corregidor and there is nothing else.

General Embick said that in the opinion of the Army the Philippines are indefensible.

Mr. Davis remarked that the first question to consider was whether or not it is in our interest to fortify. If we propose to fortify we had better let the Treaty go by the board and free our hands. By renewing the Treaty we would not have the freedom to do what we might wish to do. Mr. Davis recalled his first two meetings with Sir Robert Craigie⁴ last winter. After the Admiralty had given a hint that they were indifferent to the renewal of Article 19 but thought that it might serve as a trading point, Craigie had pointed out to him that it seemed important to his Government to renew the Article since, if it were not renewed, there would be great pressure in England to fortify Hongkong. This would be a red flag to Japan and would serve as a pretext for the Japanese to fortify Formosa. Mr. Davis replied on that occasion that when Japan left the Naval Conference⁵ the question of Article 19 went off the agenda because the fortifications provision was merely a link in a chain. Japan had broken the chain in three or four places. To take an isolated link on the morrow of Japan’s departure from the Conference and keep it was illogical. If we should decide to keep it, it would have to be related to something else. In any event, Mr. Davis refused to be drawn into a discussion of this Article at that time. Craigie, at a second meeting, said that his Government would take the matter under consideration and perhaps discuss it with the other Governments involved later on. Looking at the present situation Mr. Davis said that it was his belief that if we allow ourselves to be drawn into a negotiation we will soon have presented for our consideration a pact of non-aggression including the United States, Great Britain and Japan. The purpose of such a pact would be to tie the hands of Britain and the United States, leaving Japan a free rein in dealings with the U.S.S.R. The British might go into a pact of this nature in return for concessions in respect of China.

Admiral Standley said that he agreed with the observations just made by Mr. Davis. The United States had held the Philippines for 38 years and had failed to fortify them. It was absurd to talk of fortifying them now.

General Embick said that in the event of war with Japan the Philippines would be a detriment from the military standpoint.

Admiral Standley here inquired as to exactly what the British might mean by “modernization” of existing fortifications. Would it not enable us to send our guns out to the Philippines?

General Embick said that this would serve no purpose. Corregidor was merely a refuge, a place where the flag might be kept flying. Moreover, General Embick questioned the good faith of the Statement made by the British that their purpose in renewing Article 19 with the proposed amendments was to enable them to fortify Hongkong. It looked more like an effort on their part to draw us into a negotiation and leave us holding the bag. Hongkong was of questionable military value. It would be a hostage in Japanese hands. Its defense from a military standpoint would require tremendous preparation. Hongkong was exposed to attack from the mainland and to hold it the defending force would have to control an enormous stretch of the mainland.

Mr. Davis remarked that what worried him was the inconsistency of the two statements by the British. Craigie, in February, said that his Government wished to renew Article 19 in order to resist pressure to fortify Hongkong. Now his Government wished to renew Article 19 with an amendment in order to be able to fortify Hongkong. Mr. Davis said that in his opinion the first question to settle was, Should we go into this negotiation at all. What could the possible advantages be? It might be advantageous for us to encourage the British to strengthen their position in the Far East by fortifying Hongkong. Mr. Davis did not believe that the British were going to give in to Japan any more and for reasons of general policy we might wish to go along with the British to this extent. Looking at the problem from the other angle, if we should refuse to agree to a renewal of Article 19 the Japanese might interpret it as evidence of hostility on our part. On the other hand, Article 19 was accepted by us as part of a general settlement. There would be no rhyme or reason for us to enter into an agreement on this specific point with Japan immediately after Japan had refused to enter into a naval agreement with us. Mr. Davis then requested the views of the others present. Admiral Standley said that he was in complete agreement with Mr. Davis’ concluding statement.

General Embick agreed.

Mr. Dunn agreed.

Mr. Dooman agreed.

Mr. Davis remarked that once we begin discussing the proposal of the British with them the fat is in the fire. The pact of non-aggression would bob right up.

Admiral Standley observed that Japan was still holding out for the recognition of parity. He did not believe that while the Japanese were in this state of mind we should stick our necks out.

Mr. Dunn said that he could see no good reason why we should ignore the fact that the Japanese have refused to come into the Naval Treaty.

General Embick stressed his belief that we should not discuss a renewal of Article 19.

Mr. Dooman observed that not only was the naval situation in a state of flux; the political situation in the Far East was also in a state of flux. Until that situation had become more stabilized it would be highly dangerous to lift out one factor in the situation and crystallize it.

Mr. Davis remarked that at Washington we had agreed to surrender our position of superiority in the Pacific in consideration of a pledge of political stability. Instead, we have had a condition of extreme political instability.

Here Mr. Hickerson observed that in his conversation with Mr. Mallet, the British Chargé d’Affaires,⁶ he had asked him if the Japanese had recently made fresh inquiries with regard to the renewal of this Article. Mr. Mallet had replied that he did not know.

Mr. Davis said that he believed the British had probably let the matter rest until Ambassador Yoshida’s arrival in London. Yoshida was seeking a general agreement with the British and this matter had probably come up in connection with this fresh effort on the part of the Japanese.

Mr. Dooman said that just before the meeting he had made a search of the unpublished Minutes of the Washington Conference with regard to the manner in which the provision relating to the status quo on fortifications in the Pacific had come into the Washington Naval Treaty. He then read the following:

On December 1, 1921, Mr. Balfour had a private conversation with Admiral Baron Kato, Chief of the Japanese delegation, in the course of which Baron Kato had suggested that there be a cessation of fortification in the Pacific.⁷ The minutes of that conversation are not, unfortunately, available, but I shall go back to the minutes of a conversation which took place on the following day between Mr. Hughes, Mr. Balfour and Baron Kato,⁸ underlying the views upon which that suggestion was based (quoted from the minutes):

… The ratio of 10–10–7 which the Japanese experts had supported had, as a matter of fact, been worked out some time ago in Tokio. Moreover, these views were supported by the Japanese Government and Parliament. On the present occasion, however, he had no desire to argue the question on technical issues, as such a controversy was likely to lead to no result. He would only say that he himself believed that Japan was entitled to a ratio of 70 per cent in capital ships. As an instance he also referred to the question of the Mutsu. He recalled that this ship had been practically completed some months ago; that she had steamed 500 miles under her own steam; and, finally, that she had been put in commission two days ago, and was about to join the active fleet. To put her on the scrap heap would be most difficult for him to justify, and very unwelcome to public opinion in Japan. In these circumstances he had had to ask himself, supposing we were willing to concede the 60 per cent, by what arguments could he justify it to his own people? Unless he could completely satisfy them, the concession to the American point of view in regard to the 60 per cent ratio in capital ships and the Mutsu would rankle in the minds of the Japanese people and leave public opinion in a state which was contrary to that good feeling between the two peoples which was an essential part of a real settlement and which he himself so warmly desired. He had pondered deeply over these matters during the last few days, with the result that he felt in a condition of the utmost difficulty and doubt. He would like to be helped by suggestions as to how he could justify himself to his own people. It was in these circumstances that he had had his conversation with Mr. Balfour. Baron Kato admitted that the conclusion of the proposed quadruple agreement in regard to the Pacific would be of great assistance to him. Yet another thought had occurred to him which might help matters. He had noticed that whenever news was received in Japan of the erection of fortifications in the American Islands in the Pacific it had caused a feeling of alarm and apprehension. It would therefore be of great assistance if an agreement could be reached to maintain the status quo in the Pacific in regard to the fortification and the creation of naval bases. What would help him would be if the United States of America could agree not to increase the fortifications or the naval bases at Guam, the Philippine Islands and Hawaii. If this could be conceded, Japan on her part would agree not to fortify the four islands named to Mr. Balfour. (The islands named to Mr. Balfour by Baron Kato were:—Formosa, the Pescadores and Oshima). Even if this were granted, however, Baron Kato said he would have considerable difficulty in accepting the 60 per cent.

Going back to the meeting on December 1, Mr. Hughes averted to the fact that Baron Kato had emphasized that there would be strong naval and military opposition to the proposal for naval limitation put forward by the American delegation. Mr. Hughes said that in the United States also naval and military opinion had a way of becoming reflected in Congress and in the press. He went on to say (quoted from the minutes):

… The American people would probably refuse to fetter themselves in regard to their right to fortify their own possessions. In this connection, Mr. Hughes differentiated between the establishment of a base which might be regarded as an offensive work, and the mere fortification for defensive purposes. He then proceeded to outline a plan of his own, explaining that it was a purely personal idea, which he had not laid before his colleagues or the President. This plan was that America and Japan should reciprocally agree that if either one or the other were to desire to erect fortifications in the Pacific, the opposite party should be notified, and should then have the right to terminate the whole of the naval agreement. If, for example, the American public were to insist upon the fortification of Guam, Japan should have the right to denounce the whole arrangement and would be free to build ships.⁹

Following the statement made by Admiral Kato which is outlined in the minutes first quoted above, Mr. Hughes gave a very comprehensive discussion of the entire position of the United States with regard to the problem of naval limitation. He said that the Japanese proposal with regard to the status quo of fortifications and naval bases in the Pacific could not be given consideration except as part of the acceptance by the Japanese of a comprehensive agreement including the Four Power Treaty¹⁰ in the Pacific and the American proposal on naval limitation. He stressed the point that it would be impossible, after having made the important concessions involved in the American naval proposal, for the United States to continue to make further concessions. Mr. Hughes then said that the American delegation might be willing to consider some such proposal as that put forward by the Japanese, provided that the limitation on fortifications would be undertaken mutually and reciprocally by all the parties to the Four Power Treaty.

It is entirely clear from the records that the status quo on fortifications was a matter which the Japanese earnestly desired, and that it was agreed to by the United States largely by way of concession to Japan.

Whether or not fortifications in the Pacific are today as important a factor as they were in 1922 is, of course, a purely technical question. However, the desire expressed by the Japanese for continuance of the status quo would seem to indicate that the question of fortifications is still today an important matter, at least to the Japanese.

It is equally clear from the records that an agreement was reached with regard to this question in the course of an agreement being reached of the most comprehensive character, involving naval construction, matters of policy and matters of international relations. During the course of the making of the latter arrangement there were involved a number of concessions and counter-concessions. In my opinion it would be unwise to separate a factor in the making of an agreement—moreover, a factor which was a concession made by the United States—, and set it up as an independent agreement without the giving by the other parties to the agreement of a compensating concession.

Important changes are today taking place in the Far East. The situation in that area is confused, it is changing, and finally it is changing under the application of force. The interests of the United States in the Far East are also changing, and approximately ten years hence there is likelihood that the United States will have to consider a totally new situation. It would be, in my opinion, most unwise to tie down during that period of change any factor so important as the maintenance of fortifications and naval bases in the Pacific area.

In conclusion, Mr. Davis said that, in his view we should reply to the British that unless there is more in this matter than we can see from the information that has been furnished us, we cannot discuss it.

Admiral Standley said that he agreed with this conclusion, that very evidently the Japanese were merely trying to work up a trade.

Mr. Dooman remarked that the Embassy at Tokyo had cautiously suggested that the possibilities of an Anglo-Japanese alliance were worth watching. In his opinion however, an arrangement of this sort would have to be based on the possibility of each side protecting its economic interests. The British would want the situation stabilized in China. The Japanese would want the British to keep open British controlled markets for Japanese goods. However, these markets were more important to the British than their interests in China. The reply should be made to the British that we do not propose to join in an initiative of this nature. We must keep our hands free.

Mr. Dunn said that an oral reply would be made on the basis of prepared notes.

4. British Assistant Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
5. For correspondence concerning the London Naval Conference, see pp. 22 ff.
6. See memorandum by the Acting Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs, September 11, supra.
7. See note dated December 1, 1921, Foreign Relations, 1922, vol. i, p. 74.
8. Ibid., p. 75.
9. Note dated December 1, Foreign Relations, 1922, vol. i, p. 74.
10. Signed at Washington, December 13, 1921, ibid., p. 33.