894.20/133
The Chargé in China (Gauss) to the Secretary of State
[Received February 9.]
Sir: I have the honor to report that a conference of a number of important Japanese military officers, which was held on January 4 and [Page 10] 5 at Dairen, has created some uneasiness in China because of the character of the attending officers and their views with regard to China as reported in the press.
These officers appear to be definitely of the most reactionary type, including Majors-General Doihara and Itagaki, both of whom are regarded as having been leaders in the plotting and carrying out of the seizure of Manchuria, as well as Lieutenant-Colonel Kagesa, Assistant Military Attaché stationed at Shanghai, who has made during recent months a number of inflammatory statements expressing dissatisfaction with the attitude of China toward Japan. The significance of a meeting of this character may be the greater because of the fact that Lieutenant-Colonel Shibayama, who holds relatively moderate views and who at the time of the conference was still Assistant Military Attaché stationed at Peiping and chief negotiator with the Chinese over problems affecting North China, did not attend the conference, although it would seem that he normally ought to have done so. Moreover, the conference was held within 10 days after the arrival at Hsinking of General Minami (who was Minister of War at the time of the Manchurian incident), for the purpose of taking over the duties of Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army and Ambassador to “Manchukuo”.
According to the press (including a Japanese newspaper published at Tientsin and subsidized by the Japanese military), these officers expressed strong dissatisfaction with General Chiang Kai-shek and with the failure of the Chinese to carry out certain terms of the Tangku Truce of May 31, 1933. This is by no means the first time that Japanese military officers have expressed dissatisfaction with regard to the “sincerity” of General Chiang Kai-shek. However, whether the expression of dissatisfaction at this conference has any especial importance, it is difficult to say. It may merely have been made to intimidate the Chinese; or it might have been a part of the policy advocated by at least a section of the Japanese military, namely, a policy of weakening the position of General Chiang Kaishek in order to effect a more rapid disintegration of China.
With regard to the charge of Chinese failure to carry out the pledges of the Tangku Truce, it was understood that the principal promises had finally been fulfilled, with the exception of the establishment of aerial communication; but the Japanese press itemizes the unfulfilled pledges, in addition to aerial communication, as direct telegraph and telephone service, through railway-freight service, and a customs agreement: The questions of direct telegraph and telephone service and of through railway-freight service do not appear to be of vital [Page 11] importance. There exists, for example, telegraph service between Peiping and Mukden by way of Chefoo while telegrams addressed to Harbin from Peiping go by radio from Tientsin. The direct telephone service which existed prior to the Manchurian incident was not satisfactory. The establishment last July of through passenger train service between Mukden and Peiping would seem to reduce considerably the importance of any question of a through freight service between those two cities.
The reference to a customs agreement is difficult to understand. Chinese customs houses were established last summer along the Great Wall, and revenue is being collected at them only on products which did not originate in Manchuria. It is possible that the Japanese military may refer to certain technical questions, or to “a closer cooperation” for the alleged purpose of making it unnecessary for travelers to undergo two examinations, one at “Manchukuo” stations north of the Great Wall and one at Chinese stations south of it. It is also possible that the question of customs is related to some larger problem of the Chinese customs tariff which, it is understood, is now under revision. When the Chinese official in charge of Chinese customs houses along the Great Wall was questioned a few days ago in this regard, he stated that he did not know to what the Japanese military referred.
Respectfully yours,