765.84/1410
Memorandum by the Under Secretary of
State (Phillips) of a Conversation With the Italian
Ambassador (Rosso)
[Washington,] September 20,
1935.
The Italian Ambassador said that he desired to leave with me
certain observations with regard to the Italian-Ethiopian crisis
and at the same time to give me his personal views. Accordingly,
he left with me the accompanying paper, which he did not wish to
dignify by calling it a memorandum or an aide-mémoire.
The Ambassador spoke about the trend over the last 100 years of
over-crowded European countries finding room and opportunities
for their peoples in Africa, that Italy had not been able to
acquire a worth while foothold and that the decision had been
finally reached that Italy was entitled and obliged to find room
in Africa for the expansion of her over-crowded population; the
whole undertaking, therefore, was governed by the necessity for
expansion and was merely following the system which had long
been adopted of permitting whites to settle and improve
territories which had formerly been occupied by backward
peoples; the Ethiopians, he said, had merely taken advantage of
their membership in the League of Nations to withstand Italy’s
desire for expansion; he could not understand the British
attitude because months ago the Italian Government had made it
clear to the British that their interests would not be involved
in any way whatsoever and it was, therefore, a great surprise to
find Great Britain now adopting its rigid position vis-à-vis
Italy’s aspirations.
At this point the Ambassador asked me whether I had any views as
to how determined the British were, to which I replied that
nothing in our despatches from London gave us any information on
this point. I asked him whether he felt that the suggestions
emanating from the Committee of Five in Geneva held out any hope
for a peaceful solution; Rosso was clearly of the opinion that
they did not go nearly far enough and that, unless they were
substantially modified, the plan would not be acceptable to his
Government; what Italy wanted, he said, was a protectorate over
Ethiopia and the Committee’s plan did not provide for it.
The Ambassador brought to my attention particularly the last
paragraph on page four of his informal memorandum, in which it
is stated that:
“that a withdrawal of Italian forces from the border
would increase the Ethiopian arrogance in a very
dangerous way”.
In conclusion the Ambassador asked me whether I had any thoughts
or observations with regard to the attitude of this Government
which
[Page 763]
I might care to
give him. He said he had followed, of course, with great
interest the Secretary’s remarks and statements and he made this
inquiry of me merely for the purpose of keeping up-to-date and
in close touch with us. I said that I knew of no change, that we
were praying that a solution might be found in Geneva or
elsewhere, that the slight delay which had occurred as a result
of the report of the Committee of Five76
gave me a little hope that the “die had not yet been cast”;
that, as he knew, the opinion of this country was one of deep
concern at the possibility of war.
The Ambassador said that he assumed we were working on our list
of articles which would be forbidden under our neutrality
legislation, that various people were advising him as to what
the list would represent, that some of his informants had told
him that cotton and copper would be among the articles listed,
but he realized that I was not in a position to give him any
information and I assured him that I was not.
The Ambassador seemed to me greatly depressed and to feel that
there was little hope of a successful conclusion to the Geneva
negotiations.
[Annex]
The Italian Ambassador (Rosso) to the Under Secretary of State
(Phillips)
Among the European Nations Italy has been the first—almost a
century ago—to take an interest in that section of Africa,
covering the territories which became later on a part of the
Ethiopian State.
Through her explorers, scientific missions and missionaries,
Italy has worked, since Cavour’s times, to bring Abyssinia
within the sphere of European civilization.
Between 1883 and 1887 Italy signed several treaties with
various countries of Inner Ethiopia and, among other chiefs,
with Menelik who was at that time the King of Scioa. It was
chiefly through Italian help (Italy being interested in and
desirous of stopping the state of anarchy prevailing in that
part of the world) that Menelik was able to establish his
authority upon the other Ras [Rases?]
and to proclaim himself as the Emperor of Abyssinia.
By the treaty of Uccialli, signed in 1889 with Emperor
Menelik,77 Italy was given the
right of representing Ethiopia in all her dealings with
foreign Powers. The Ethiopian Government refused
[Page 764]
however to comply
with that obligation and her attitude in that matter gave
rise to a situation which developed in the armed conflict of
1895–1896.
The result of this—for Italy—unfortunate war was to limit
Italian possessions in Africa to comparatively narrow
stretches of land on the sea coast, which became the two
first Italian colonies of Eritrea and Somaliland.
Having in mind the valorization and development of these two
colonies, Italy started in 1896, and pursued for almost 40
years a policy of friendship towards Ethiopia. Such policy
was aiming at the establishment of good relations based upon
a mutually advantageous program of economic collaboration
between the Italian colonies and Ethiopia. Unfortunately
every effort Italy made in that direction was met by bad
will and hostility.
Notwithstanding this lack of cooperation from the Ethiopian
side, Italy took the initiative in 1928 following the visit
to Addis Ababa of H. R. H. the Duke of Abbruzzi, of the
conclusion of a Treaty of Friendship which was signed August
2, 1928.78
The treaty was supplemented by a special Convention79 giving
Ethiopia a free zone in the Italian port of Assab and
providing for the construction of a motor road between Assab
and Eritrea and Dessie in Ethiopia. While the special Road
Convention was meant to foster trade relations between the
Ethiopian Empire and the Italian East African Colonies,
Italy felt justified to expect, as a result of the Treaty of
Friendship, that the Ethiopian Government would give to
Italian interests an equitable share, if not a privileged
situation, in the economic development of the country. As a
matter of fact the Italian Government undertook considerable
works and expenses in preparing for the expected increase of
traffic between her colonies and the neighbouring Empire.
Her expectations however were shattered by the persistent
lack of good will and by the open hostility of Ethiopia.
From 1923 to the present time one can count at least 90
cases of very serious acts of aggression, of brigandage and
armed incursions from Ethiopian bands on Italian
territory.
Besides these acts of unruled violence, it is a proved fact
that every time Italy found herself engaged in other fronts,
the military moves of Ethiopia obliged the Italian Command
to distract forces in order to face the menace from the
Abyssinian side. Such things occurred for instance during
the Libyan occupation when 50,000 armed men were massed in
the Tigre border, while in 1915, during the world war, Negus
Micael concentrated along the Italian frontier about
150.000.
[Page 765]
In 1926 Ethiopian intrigues in Somaliland were responsible
for the clash of Buloborti, where some officers and many
Italian soldiers were massacred. At the same time the
Migiurtine rebels were receiving arms and munitions from
Ethiopia.
In 1931 the Degiac Gabré Marian was the leader of an armed
incursion along the river Uebi Scebeli.
We could not help being alarmed by acts of this kind,
revealing a menacing attitude towards our colonies each time
that Italy’s attention was concentrated elsewhere. Our
concern has grown from 1928 on, when we saw the Ethiopian
Emperor devote most of the resources of the State to
increase his armaments. That such a policy or [of] armament was aimed towards Italy
we have always had good reasons to suspect. But our
suspicion has become a certainty after the aggression of
Ual-Ual.
The way in which such an aggression had been prepared and
accomplished, as well as the attitude of the Government of
Addis Ababa in dealing with the situation created therefrom
have brought into the Italian mind the deep conviction that
the Treaty of Friendship of 1928 had been signed by Ethiopia
in bad faith and that the policy of cooperation Italy
intended to follow had failed completely.
At the same time the Ual-Ual incident made Italy alive to the
impending danger for her Colonies and forced the Government
to take the necessary measures for their security.
That such measures might assume a radical character should be
understood by those who can appreciate the extent of the
Italian interests involved, as well as the special features
of the situation, wherein the problem cannot be solved by
half measures.
It is contended that the decision of Italy to have recourse
to arms, if necessary, to protect her rights and interests
is contrary to the obligations of the Covenant of the League
of Nations and of the Kellogg-Briand Pact.
In answer to that, it is pointed out:
1) That Ethiopia was admitted into the League of
Nations with the undertaking on her part to satisfy
the conditions necessary for belonging to a society
of civilized nations. These conditions have not been
satisfied.
Two millions of slaves still exist in Ethiopia and
slavery continues to be the chief source of trade.
The country is under a semi-barbaric feudal regime
and the State is unable to administer and control
most of the territory.
The Kellogg-Briand Pact cannot restrict the right of
a Country to take the measures necessary for the
legitimate defense of her rights and security. Such
an implication is derived from the fact that various
Governments accepted the Kellogg-Briand Pact with
reservations concerning their freedom of action in
certain regions having a vital interest for their
security.
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In her present dealings with Ethiopia, Italy has to take into
account the following facts:
- 1)
- that Ethiopia is today much stronger in armaments
than she was a few years ago;
- 2)
- that the hostility and intolerance of the country
towards the foreigners, and chiefly towards Italy,
is constantly increasing;
- 3)
- that a withdrawal of Italian forces from the
border would increase the Ethiopian arrogance in a
very dangerous way.
