765.84/1381: Telegram
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State
[Received September 25—3:48 p.m.]
472. My 468, September 25, 2 p.m.80 I saw the Foreign Secretary today and with reference to recent American legislation had occasion to discuss generally the American viewpoint very much as set forth in your 262 of September 20, 11 a.m.81 He specifically asked me whether consideration had been given to the possibility of consultation among the signatories to the Kellogg Pact. I told him I had no information on this subject but that I felt the possibility of such action being agreed to by my Government had been limited by there being no precedent therefor. Sir Samuel said that he had no intention of attempting to urge any course of action upon the United States Government but that he hoped it might be possible for my Government to take steps which would tend to limit the war between Italy and Abyssinia in scope and time; that as the Italian Government was practically bankrupt they could not carry on the war for any considerable length of time unless they should be able to secure foreign exchange through the sale of products to other countries. I then referred again to recent legislation in the United States and said that in my opinion the United States Government would give consideration to this subject when and as occasion arose to do so; that I did not think it probable that my Government would join in sanctions in any Italian-Abyssinian conflict, my Government was interested in reducing the scope and time of the war and would give consideration to appropriate methods of doing so in the event of unanimous collective action by other powers. Sir Samuel then went on to say that he felt the French were supporting the British position at Geneva and, mentioning Sweden and Holland specifically, said that sentiment generally was hardening against Mussolini. I asked what position he thought Germany would take and he replied that he [Page 767] thought it unlikely Germany would take sides in this conflict but would wait rather like a scavenger to see what might be picked up. However, the economic condition of Germany was so bad that it was unlikely they could furnish much to Italy even if they desired to do so.
I told Sir Samuel that my Government was gratified at the frank information which he had given to me and to Mr. Atherton and hoped that this would continue. He assured me that it would and asked me specifically to express his thanks to the Secretary for his recent statement. Returning to the immediate question of Mussolini’s intentions, Sir Samuel said he had no doubt that an Italian military advance will be begun within the next 2 or 3 weeks. He said that the policy of the British Government would be to invoke economic pressure, in the hope of limiting the duration of the war, as far as possible short of actual sanctions which he evidently wished it might not be necessary to invoke. He added that he hoped consideration would be given by the United States Government to aiding this effort as far as they might deem it proper to do so.
In conclusion he deplored the tendency in at least a portion of the United States press to misconstrue the British Government’s effort to find a peaceful solution through the League and to represent that effort as a practical state of war against Italy on the part of Great Britain for the selfish object of protecting the British Empire. He further stated that his Government had been strengthened by the assurance of complete support from the Dominions, including South Africa.