I know you and your colleagues are facing a very complicated and
difficult task in the present troubled situation and I want you to know
that I and the other officers of this Department connected with the
problem will strive constantly to give you our fullest cooperation in
your efforts to insure the continuance of the limitation of naval
disarmament by international agreement.
[Enclosure—Memorandum]
[Washington,] November 23,
1935.
American Position Regarding Forthcoming Naval
Conference
Parity.
(1) Is it the firm understanding of the British Empire and the United
States that whatever the future settlement may be, and even
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if there be no treaty
settlement, parity as between the two Fleets shall continue as the
controlling concept of their naval relations?
The Delegation should go on the assumption that this has been settled
once and for all in the affirmative and should bring it up with the
British only in the event that they make any statements or take any
action which appears to be in conflict with the principle and
practice of parity. Parity need not be ton for ton, category by
category. In essence, parity in effective fleet strengths must be
assured, even if small variations in individual categories are
agreed upon. The measure of parity should be the fleet of the
British Commonwealth of Nations as a whole, and the Delegation
should reject any proposal to provide separate quotas for the
Dominions.
Ratio.
(2) What should be our attitude toward Japan’s demand for a common
upper limit or for an increased ratio?
The United States remains unalterably opposed to a common upper
limit. In no case can the United States accept a treaty which
actually permits Japan to achieve or approach parity, or to increase
the present treaty ratio. Minor adjustments of individual categories
might be arranged for through limited transfer provisions or through
compensation in other categories, but final instructions on such
minor changes should be sought before any commitment is made.
Increase in Total Strengths.
(3) Must we insist that there be a reduction in global tonnage or at
least no increase, or can we accept a settlement which will permit
an increase in present treaty strengths?
The Delegation should stress the importance of retaining the
principles and methods of the Washington and London Treaties as a
means of stabilizing the world naval situation and should continue
to emphasize this Government’s view that the object of any new
treaty should be to reduce or at least not to increase naval
armaments. Great Britain’s insistence on increased tonnage renders
it virtually impossible to compensate entirely for these increases
by reductions in other categories. The Delegation should insist that
at least 50% of any total increase absolutely necessary to prevent
the failure of all quantitative limitation should be absorbed by a
reduction in other categories. The total increase in present
allotted tonnage should not in any case exceed approximately 75,000
tons.
Qualitative Limitation.
(4) Can we agree to qualitative limitations even without quantitative
limitations?
The Delegation should continue to emphasize this Government’s desire
for comprehensive limitation, both quantitative and qualitative.
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In view of the
probability, however, that a comprehensive multilateral naval
agreement at this time may not be practicable, the Delegation may
declare its willingness tentatively to discuss qualitative
limitations without quantitative limits, it being understood that
its ultimate acceptance of a general agreement for qualitative
without quantitative limitation will have to depend on the
qualitative limits found acceptable and on such other provisions as
may be included. The United States can agree to qualitative
limitations with Great Britain, subject, however, to suitable escape
proviso. It is interested in the qualitative limits of other naval
Powers primarily to the extent that they affect the building of
Great Britain or Japan.
Form of Agreement.
(5) If a treaty covering the five principal naval Powers is
impossible, can we agree (a) to a
quadrilateral or trilateral treaty, (b) to a
bilateral treaty with the British, (c) to a
non-contractual agreement with the British?
The Delegation should, of course, strive for at least a five Power
agreement, but in the event this proves impossible a quadrilateral
or even a trilateral treaty without Japan may be sought containing
adequate safeguards in the form of an “escape clause” or automatic
provisions permitting increases in the event of undue construction
by any non-contracting Power. No bilateral treaty should, however,
be negotiated.
The Delegation should, as a last resort, and after failure of every
attempt to conclude a multilateral treaty or extend the life even
for a year of the present treaties, seek to work out with Great
Britain a method of avoiding an Anglo-American race through the
method of unilateral but parallel and simultaneous public statements
of policy or preferably through a public exchange of notes. In
substance, such statements or exchanges might re-assert parity as
between themselves as a guiding principle of the policies of both
Powers; affirm a determination of the two Powers to avoid a naval
race between themselves and not to take the initiative in starting a
naval race with any other Power; reserve the right, nevertheless, to
engage in such construction as may be required to maintain the
relative strengths with other Powers provided by the Washington and
London Treaties; provide for the exchange of information on each
other’s building programs and on the building programs of other
Powers; express the hope that a new naval conference and limitation
might be achieved at a future date, to include all naval Powers.
Political Cooperation.
(6) What attitude should the Delegation take in connection with
possible British suggestions for political cooperation with the
British Empire?
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It is possible that the British Government may again bring up the
thought that some form of agreement for Anglo-American political
cooperation, particularly in the Far East, might be a determining
factor in Great Britain’s attitude toward naval limitation. The
Delegation should repeat the position taken in the conversations a
year ago, namely, that any agreement of this sort is out of the
question. On the other hand, the Delegation may emphasize the
inevitable and growing community of interests of the British Empire
and the United States throughout the world and particularly the Far
East (maintenance of treaties and rights accruing thereunder,
stabilization of political and economic relations, maintenance of
Open Door, opposition to expansion by means of military aggression,
et cetera). From this community of interests, it would appear
evident that despite the absence of any mutual commitments the
United States and the British Empire are likely, in their own
interests and in the interests of the community of nations, to
follow, in general, a parallel, though independent, policy, notably
in the Far East.
Political Issues.
(7) What should be the attitude of the American Delegation if Japan
should raise political issues?
If political issues are brought up by Japan, the Delegation should
seek instructions.
Fortifications.
(8) Can we agree to the continuance of the non-fortifications
provisions?
The United States would accept the continuance of the
non-fortifications provisions in any new limitation treaty which
preserves the present ratio with Japan. As to their inclusion in a
more restricted agreement or their separate continuance, without
naval limitation, the Delegation should ask for instructions.
France and Italy.
(9) What should be our attitude toward the French and Italian naval
positions?
The United States is interested in the positions of the continental
naval Powers primarily as a result of their effect on the positions
of Great Britain. The Delegation while working for the inclusion of
France and Italy in a new treaty and assisting in a mediatory
capacity in adjusting their views among each other and with
reference to Great Britain, should, nevertheless, leave the main
burden of negotiations with them to the British Delegation which is
primarily interested. Any naval position on the part of France or
Italy acceptable to Great Britain would presumably not call forth
any insuperable difficulties on our part.
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Participation of Germany and Russia.
(10) What should be our attitude toward the inclusion of Germany and
possibly of Russia during the later stages of the Conference?
Although we feel that increasing the number of participants may
increase the obstacles to agreement, the inclusion of Germany and
Russia may prove to be of value in obtaining the adherence of Japan
to a comprehensive limitation agreement, hence the Delegation should
interpose no objection to the issuance to these Governments of an
invitation to participate. The question of the inclusion of Germany
and Russia is primarily a matter for the British, as initiators of
the Conference, to determine. In any case, it would seem desirable
to achieve a fairly close harmonization of the views at least of the
United States, Great Britain, France, and Italy before inviting any
other European state to attend.
Attitude toward German or Russian Positions.
(11) What should be our attitude toward the naval positions of
Germany and Russia?
As in the case of France and Italy, the Delegation should leave the
burden of negotiations to Great Britain. In particular, the question
of incorporating the present Anglo-German naval agreement into a
general naval treaty, is one in which we are not primarily
interested, unless it would serve to assist in obtaining a
comprehensive general agreement. If such inclusion is acceptable to
the states primarily concerned, we should not raise any objection.
With respect to Russia, it will have to be borne in mind that any
agreement regarding the size of the Russian fleet will inevitably be
an important factor in determining future Japanese building and
Japanese willingness to participate in a reasonable agreement.
Treaty Period.
(12) How long should the new treaty period be?
In general the Delegation should favor as long a treaty period as
possible, up to 10 years, with adequate escape provisions. However,
a shorter period would be acceptable, for instance, a period up to
the end of 1942. The length of the treaty period must depend to a
large extent on the nature of the limitations agreed upon. The
question of the treaty period should, therefore, be referred back
for further instructions in the light of circumstances at the time.
In any case, it is important that a further conference be made
mandatory at least one year before the end of the new treaty
period.
Submarine Warfare.
(13) What should be our attitude with respect to Part IV of the
London Treaty (submarine warfare)?
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The Delegation should suggest that the provisions of Part IV of the
present London Treaty be incorporated in a separate treaty or
protocol, since they do not properly belong in a limitation treaty.
This matter should not, however, be insisted on.
General Strategy.
(14) What should be the general strategy of the Delegation?
Past discussions have indicated that despite considerable
divergencies on technical points there appear to be no insuperable
obstacles to agreement between the United States and Great Britain
on naval questions. The basic divergencies appear to lie between the
United States and Great Britain on the one hand and Japan on the
other. Although the British have at times taken a less strong stand
against excessive Japanese claims, partly due to their preoccupation
with the European situation, there is an essential similarity of
views between the United States and the British Empire respecting
Japanese claims. Under the circumstances, the Delegation, while
carrying on negotiations with the British for the removal of such
technical differences as remain, should place the main emphasis on
seeking a common point of view with the British in the face of
Japanese claims. At the same time, no impression of a common front
against Japan should be given and every effort should be made to
demonstrate to the Japanese the reasonableness and equity of our
position and to find such elements of agreement with them, or
approaches to an agreement with them, as may be possible.
With respect to the principles on which our position towards Japan is
based, these were set forth in full during the conversations last
fall, notably in Mr. Davis’ speech of December 6, 1934, a copy of
which is attached.95 These
principles should be re-emphasized on appropriate occasions, but the
Delegation should avoid as far as possible a fruitless debate
between the Japanese and ourselves regarding general principles.
Press.
(15) What should be the Delegation’s policy with respect to the
press?
The American press representatives should be kept as fully informed
of our position as possible, without, however, giving any
encouragement to indulgence in recriminations. It is desired that
relations with the press be centered in London and that as little
discussion of the situation as possible should be carried on in
Washington in order to avoid crossed wires. The Delegation should,
nevertheless, keep the Department immediately and fully informed of
its principal statements
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to the press, in order that similar and reinforcing remarks may, if
advisable, be made in Washington.
Instructions.
(16) Should the Delegation seek frequent instructions?
The Delegation’s instructions have been made sufficiently full to
enable the Delegation to decide the majority of issues that may
arise without reference to Washington. While full reports on
developments should be made, we anticipate, therefore, that it will
not be necessary to ask for instructions except as envisaged in the
preceding pages or as important points not adequately covered may
come up.
