Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1935, General, The Near East and Africa, Volume I

500.A15A5/564

Memorandum by Mr. Noel H. Field of the Division of Western European Affairs of a Meeting Held November 19, 1935, at the Executive Office of the White House

[Washington,] November 23, 1935.

Present:	The President.
	The Secretary of State.
	Mr. Norman H. Davis.
	Mr. William Phillips.
	Admiral William H. Standley.
	Mr. James Clement Dunn.
	Captain Ingersoll.
	Commander Schuirman.
	Mr. Noel H. Field.

Mr. Davis began by explaining that he did not desire to take the President’s time in a discussion of technical naval questions since we had discussed these from time to time with him and since they had been dealt with rather thoroughly in our bilateral conversations with the British, but that he did want to discuss the more fundamental questions. Mr. Davis then read out a brief memorandum (a copy of which is attached), summarizing the present situation and the main points of the American position. The President indicated his approval of the individual points in this memorandum, with certain comments and exceptions which may be summarized as follows:

On the basic issues of Japanese claims for a common upper limit, for an increased ratio, and for the abolition of capital ships, aircraft carriers and cruisers A (paragraph 2 (e) and (f)), the President confirmed the position heretofore taken by the United States that these claims are unacceptable and that no concession or compromise can be made concerning them.

With respect to paragraph 2 (g) and (h), Mr. Davis pointed out that, on the one hand, our Navy was inclined to consider Great Britain’s insistence on additional cruisers sympathetically, bearing in mind British responsibility throughout the world; on the other hand, our Naval Experts are convinced that it would be extremely difficult to compensate for increases in cruiser tonnage by reductions in other categories. Admiral Standley said the United States had been in the undesirable position in the past of attempting to prove to the British that they did not need what they claimed they needed. The President agreed we should not try to determine British requirements; nevertheless, he did not feel that the American people would approve of a treaty which simply increased existing theoretical limits. He suggested as a compromise that the cruiser increase might be absorbed at least in part by reductions in other categories, for instance, by reduction of the number of capital ships from 15 to 13. This would reduce the total theoretical capital ship tonnage for the British Empire and the United States by 70,000 each, or approximately half the proposed increase in cruiser tonnage. A further gradual reduction might be brought about through reducing the unit displacement of future capital ships by some 2,500 tons. The President said that he would agree to a treaty giving Great Britain the increased cruiser tonnage she needs providing about 50% of this increase can be absorbed in other categories and the resulting increase in total tonnage can be held down to about 75,000 tons. All present at the meeting agreed that the President’s suggestion provided the most hopeful basis for a constructive solution of the problem.

With respect to the question of qualitative without quantitative limitation (point 3 of the memorandum), it was brought out that to admit the possibility of our agreeing to this method at the outset might remove the incentive for any further quantitative limitation now or in the future. Great Britain’s primary interest is in qualitative limitation and if she can get it, she will be quite satisfied to go along indefinitely without any restrictions on quantity. Nevertheless, some form of qualitative limitation appears to be the best that can at this time be hoped for in the way of a multilateral treaty. Mr. Davis therefore felt that the Delegation should be authorized, after making every attempt to obtain as much quantitative restriction as possible, to agree to qualitative limitation even without quantitative limitation. The President agreed.

As regards a possible bilateral treaty between the United States and Great Britain (paragraph 5), the President considered a treaty between these two Powers alone as politically undesirable, although he would not object to a trilateral or quadrilateral treaty without Japan. It was the President’s view that any agreement with Great Britain alone should be embodied in non-contractual form. After discussion of the possibilities of such methods as joint declarations or unilateral, simultaneous declarations, the President thought it might be better just to have an exchange of notes which might be published. This exchange might include something along the lines of the statements made last August by Craigie to Atherton, namely, an agreement on the established principle of Anglo-American parity and on the intention of both Powers to maintain, in substance, the 5–5–3 ratio.

Mr. Davis then went over some of the subsidiary questions which might come up at London, as embodied in the draft questions and answers previously prepared in the Department.

On the question of political cooperation with Great Britain, the President approved the Department’s draft formula which reads as follows:

“It is possible that the British Government may again bring up the thought that some form of agreement for Anglo-American political cooperation, particularly in the Far East, might be a determining factor in Great Britain’s attitude toward naval limitation. The Delegation should repeat the position taken in the conversations a year ago, namely, that any agreement of this sort is out of the question. On the other hand, the Delegation may emphasize the inevitable and growing community of interests of the British Empire and the United States throughout the world and particularly the Far East (maintenance of treaties and rights accruing thereunder, stabilization of political and economic relations, maintenance of Open Door, opposition to expansion by means of military aggression, et cetera). From this community of interests, it would appear evident that despite the absence of any mutual commitments, the United States and the British Empire are likely, in their own interests and in the interests of the community of nations, to follow, in general, a parallel, though independent policy, notably in the Far East.”

Mr. Davis emphasized the importance of the question of overage tonnage which has to be scrapped in accordance with the Treaties before the end of next year. The British, he pointed out, are determined to retain their large overage cruiser tonnage and, in his opinion, they would, if we did not come to an agreement to permit their retention, invoke the escalator clause for the purpose of saving these cruisers. Admiral Standley was of the opinion that the United States should not consent to the retention of overage tonnage in excess of Treaty totals since, to do so, would, in practice, amount to a change in the Treaty ratios. The President made the suggestion that the parties to the Washington Treaty might agree, in view of the special situation in the Mediterranean, to extend the time limit for scrapping overage tonnage by six months or one year. This would give time for a reconsideration of the problem at a later date. This suggestion was not further pursued, however, when it was pointed out that it would amount to our proposing the abandonment now of a vital provision of the London Treaty, and the President agreed that it would be virtually impossible for the United States to consent to alter the scrapping provisions of the Treaty by agreement without jeopardizing the position of the United States.

The President inquired as to the status of the global tonnage idea and Admiral Standley explained that, in addition to France, it was possible that Japan might support a global tonnage limitation on the basis of a common upper limit. The President wondered whether a global quantitative limitation, combined with qualitative provisions, might not be acceptable to us. Admiral Standley explained that any form of global limitation would work out to the disadvantage of the large naval Powers, since it would enable the smaller Powers to concentrate their building in the smaller and cheaper units and the larger Powers would have to freeze a portion of their global allotment in types of ships designed to counteract this building instead of in types essentially required by fleet needs.

The question of fortifications in the Pacific was discussed at some length but without any definite conclusion, although the consensus appeared to be that it might be advantageous to continue the non-fortifications provisions in any multilateral treaty which might be negotiated.

The President agreed that we could accept anything acceptable to the British with regard to France, Italy, Germany and Russia.

The President thought his letter of last fall to Mr. Davis could be used as a general basis for our attitude with minor revisions.

In the Delegation’s relations with the public, he thought it would be wise strategy to stress the fact that the United States has two coast lines to defend which are separated by a vulnerable canal. He also felt the Delegation should make all its public statements so simple that the man in the street could easily understand them, and should avoid the use of such words as qualitative and quantitative, the meaning of which few people understood. The Delegation should also bear in mind that it might again run into the problem of having to counteract Admiralty propaganda.

In conclusion, the President jokingly said he felt as though he were sending the Delegation on a Cocos Island treasure hunt.

[Annex—Memorandum]

[Washington,] November 19, 1935.

Summary of American Position on Naval Questions

(1) Although the United States has consistently favored and still favors the conclusion of a new comprehensive naval agreement, providing for the greatest possible over-all reduction of naval tonnage, or, at least for a continuance of the present treaty limits, it is necessary to recognize that under present conditions the achievement of this objective appears to be impracticable.

(2) Briefly, the situation today is that

(a) Japan has denounced the Washington Treaty and both the London and Washington Treaties will expire at the end of 1936;

(b) Japan insists on recognition of her claim to a common upper limit, i. e., parity with Great Britain and the United States, and refuses to agree to any limitation which would perpetuate the ratio system;

(c) Japan will not agree to qualitative without quantitative limitation;

(d) Japan favors a reduction in naval armaments, but by the method of abolishing capital ships, aircraft carriers and 8 inch cruisers;

(e) The United States and Great Britain, on the contrary, insist on continuance of the present treaty ratios, in fact if not in form, and reject the Japanese claim for a common upper limit or for an increased ratio;

(f) The United States and Great Britain oppose the abolition of capital ships, aircraft carriers and 8 inch cruisers;

(g) Great Britain has determined to increase the number of her cruisers from about 50 to about 70, necessitating a great increase in total cruiser tonnage;

(h) The United States cannot join in a new treaty which, in effect, will serve to increase total naval armaments, and therefore maintains the position that increases in one category should be compensated for by decreases in other categories.

(3) In the light of the above, a new comprehensive multilateral treaty at this time is ruled out by the fundamental divergence between the United States and Great Britain on the one hand, and Japan on the other, respecting relative fleet strengths. A treaty covering qualitative limitation is also ruled out as long as Japan refuses qualitative without quantitative limitation. The British, however, seem quite hopeful that Japan will ultimately agree to qualitative limitation and that while no power would be bound as to quantitative limitation, an agreement can be reached for giving advance notice of building programs.

(4) The United States believes, and the other naval Powers seem to share the view, that even if no inclusive treaty is now possible, the effort to limit and ultimately reduce naval armaments by international agreement cannot and must not be abandoned. With a view to bridging the gap until a new comprehensive treaty can be negotiated, we must at least endeavor to get a limited agreement, if possible in a new multilateral treaty or, if that is impossible, at least in non-contractual form, such as declarations, which will prevent a naval race and tend to prevent any undue tension or effort to alter the status quo until a more opportune time for a new conference to negotiate a comprehensive agreement. If a new race is allowed to develop through the failure to achieve a new multilateral limitation treaty at this time, the obstacles to such an agreement in the future may become insuperable, and, fortunately each naval power seems to want to avoid a race.

(5) In case it is not possible to negotiate a multilateral treaty now providing for qualitative limitation and salvaging such other portions of the existing naval treaties as may be possible, but exclusive of quantitative limitation, it is at least possible for the United States and Great Britain to enter into a naval treaty continuing the essential principles of the Washington and London Treaties, thus making an Anglo-American naval race impossible, which would include a broad escape clause designed to meet excessive building by other naval Powers and which would serve as a powerful stimulus throughout the world for avoiding a naval race and to pave the way for a multilateral agreement later on. It might also be possible to include in such a treaty France and Italy, as the British have indicated, in case Japan refuses even qualitative limitation. Since Great Britain seems determined to increase her cruiser tonnage above the present Treaty limitations by 20 cruisers, we should explore the possibility of finding ways and means of providing compensatory reductions in other categories, such, for instance, as through a reduction in the number of battleships and possibly, later on, some slight reduction in the unit tonnage.