500.A15A5/487: Telegram
The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Atherton) to the Secretary of State
London, September
12, 1935—8 p.m.
[Received September 12—4:25 p.m.]
[Received September 12—4:25 p.m.]
439. My 435, September 12, 7 p.m. In transmitting the text Craigie made following observations.
- 1.
- Unless the Abyssinian crisis69 renders the summoning of a naval conference this year absurd, the British Government envisage such a conference being summoned (presumably at their initiative) even though the scheduled bilateral talks with France and Italy have not taken place. This year offers the last occasion for holding a naval conference under the provisions of and therefore in consonance with the terms on which existing naval treaties are based. Any conference after this year would be called under a new set-up wherein Japanese demands would probably be impossible of acceptance. The end of October would be the last moment at which invitations might be issued for a conference in the present year, but before that time the proposed informal exchange of views between the United States and Great Britain should have made considerable headway.
- 2.
- In any conference held this year the British, for want of better, would put forward their 6-year program proposals, but if quantitative limitation were found impossible, then the British would like to know before the conference began what would be the American attitude towards a qualitative agreement only, both to ships and guns and a possible zone of no construction. Furthermore, the British would seek advance expression from the United States as to whether, if Japan would not join in any agreement the United States would be willing to consider a pact (to include France and Italy) with a “let-out clause” in view of Japan’s indefinite position. In such an eventuality the British would hope that if Japan could not see her way to sign at the same time with other nations she might fall into line, informally if not even eventually formally.
- 3.
- Craigie pointed out that any conference which placed emphasis on qualitative limitation would be almost doomed if these informal Anglo-American conversations did not reach some approximation of agreement on the size of cruisers incidentally, but more especially battleships. As between 25,000 and 35,000 an obvious agreement need not be 30,000-ton battleships but he hoped there might be some fruition to the autumn talks of last year, and that the American Government [Page 110] might find it possible to favor even a 2,000 or 3,000-ton reduction in battleships. Such an attitude of the United States would definitely help the British position in determining its maximum battleship tonnage as well as render their task of negotiation with other countries easier.
- 4.
- I explained to Craigie, on expression of his desire for early opening of suggested informal talks, that instructions must first be received from Washington, and then asked, if such government representatives as he contemplated took part in these discussions, whether other governments would be notified as to this Anglo-American exchange of views. Craigie was very definite that the Japanese at least should be informed that he and a United States representative were discussing the pros and cons of a conference in the present year. I outlined as my personal point of view that it seemed to me that in the preliminaries any conversations should be limited to the Naval Attaché and representatives of the Admiralty. Craigie pointed out that he had no objections to this, provided the Foreign Office and presumably this Embassy were also represented and added that last autumn considerable emphasis had been laid on the necessity for Foreign Office and Japanese Embassy representatives being present whenever the Admiralty and Japanese naval officers met.
Atherton