500.A15A5/486: Telegram
The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Atherton) to the Secretary of State
[Received September 12—3:04 p.m.]
435. Craigie sent for me this afternoon to hand me the appended aide-mémoire on naval disagreement [disarmament?]. We agreed, as reported in my 407 of August 27, noon, that this written communication should also be regarded as a précis of conversation.
“The aide-mémoire communicated by the United States Embassy to the Foreign Office on the 17th August68 on the subject of the recent discussions on naval limitation appears to betray a certain misapprehension of the real purpose of the memorandum of the 30th July which was addressed to the French and Italian Governments. It is desirable that this misapprehension should be cleared up without delay.
When the conversations between representatives of the Governments of the United States, Japan and the United Kingdom ended in December, it was understood on all sides that the next step would be for the United Kingdom to enter upon conversations with certain of the European powers. Conversations were accordingly arranged with representatives of the German Government, but up to the present it has not proved possible to institute any further bilateral discussions with the French and Italian Governments. As an alternative method of procedure His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom have set forth in the form of a memorandum what they had understood, from the earliest conversations held in 1934, to be the desiderata of the French and Italian Governments so far as qualitative limitation was concerned and they inquired of those Governments whether the limits mentioned did in fact correspond with their views. The objective of His Majesty’s Government has been, not to make to the United States or the Japanese Government anything in the nature of joint European proposals, but simply to ascertain, by the only method remaining open to them, the definite views of the French and Italian Governments on those points. Once the facts had been ascertained and the views of the French and Italian Governments as to the holding of a conference had been made known, it had been the intention of His Majesty’s Government to communicate these facts to the Governments of the United States and Japan and to invite an expression of their views before attempting to reach a final opinion as to whether a conference could be held this autumn. Thus His Majesty’s Government had in any case contemplated the holding of further Anglo-American conversations on the lines suggested in the United States Embassy’s memorandum before anything in the nature of ‘proposals’ for submission to a conference of the Washington Powers could be drawn up.
It is doubtless a misconception of the intentions of His Majesty’s Government on this point of procedure which led the United States Government to state in their memorandum that His Majesty’s Government [Page 108] are endeavoring to put forward ‘as a European view’ proposals which His Majesty’s Government must have known to be unacceptable to the Government of the United States. His Majesty’s Government have made no such endeavor and their proceedings throughout have been strictly in accord with the understanding reached with the representatives of the United States and Japanese Governments before they left London.
In this connection it is observed that the United States aide-mémoire, when speaking of the qualitative provisions of the British ‘middle course’, states that these ‘were not to be devised in an effort to change existing types, but were rather to prevent competition in new types’. To avoid misunderstanding it should be made clear that the British proposals have always visualized the taking of measures not only to prevent competition in new types but also to secure some reduction in the maximum displacement of ships and the calibre of guns as one means of diminishing the burden of naval armaments in the protocol at large. Although they are aware of the preference of the United States Government for a larger ship and a larger gun than those favored by His Majesty’s Government they have hoped that the Government of the United States would be prepared to contemplate some appreciable reduction in the Washington limits. They have always believed that when the United States Government are prepared to indicate definitely to His Majesty’s Government what are their minimum views in the field of qualitative limitation no great difficulty should be experienced in reaching a friendly understanding on the point.
Furthermore, the Government of the United States will readily recognize that the countries of the British Commonwealth of Nations have to take into account both European problems and world problems. Obviously if the other European countries were prepared to agree to a lower limitation, there would be a general advantage if such qualitative limits were acceptable to the oceanic powers, as against the alternative of setting the pace all ’round in the matter of size.
His Majesty’s Government had concluded from previous conversations—and they still hope—that there is no considerable divergence of view between the two Governments on this question. They feel with the United States the desirability of establishing as close an approximation of views as possible in this sphere and for this reason they agree with the United States Government that an informal exchange of view would be a helpful course. Such conversations would most naturally take place through the ordinary diplomatic channel between a representative of the United States Embassy and of the Foreign Office, it being of course understood that the Naval Attaché of the United States Embassy and a representative of the British Admiralty would also be present. If this procedure is agreeable to the Government of the United States it is suggested that the proposed exchange of views should take place as early as possible in the present month.”