Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1935, General, The Near East and Africa, Volume I

500.A15A5/491

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Noel H. Field of the Division of Western European Affairs

[Washington,] September 14, 1935.

Present:

For the Department of State:	For the Navy Department:
The Secretary of State.	Admiral Standley.
Mr. James Clement Dunn.	Admiral Greenslade.
Mr. Noel Field.	Captain Van Keuren.

The Secretary opened the discussion by stating that he thought it desirable, in view of developments in the Naval situation, for the Navy and State Departments to keep in close touch with each other with a view to developing this Government’s position, and he said that he had called this meeting in order to get informally the Navy Department’s reaction to telegrams No. 435 and 439 of September 12 from London, containing the latest suggestions of the British.

Admiral Standley thereupon read these telegrams aloud and commented on the individual paragraphs as he went along. His principal remarks may be summarized as follows:

Admiral Standley said he believed Mr. Davis would bear him out in declaring that it was not the understanding, at the time of the closing of last year’s conversations, that the British should undertake conversations with non-signatory Powers. It was, on the contrary, clearly understood that the British would continue negotiations through diplomatic channels with the other Treaty Powers with a view to finding a basis of agreement for calling another meeting or conference of these Treaty Powers. (Mr. Dunn at this point read a telegram relating to the conversations during the summer of last year indicating that the British themselves were opposed to including any non-Treaty States in the preliminary conversations or in the final conference. See telegrams No. 360 of June 26, 1934, from London,⁷⁰ last paragraph, and No. 271 of June 27, 1934, to London⁷¹). What the British are now in fact trying to do, contrary to their disclaimer, is to line up the European Powers in such a way as to put us in a hot spot on the question of qualitative limitation.

With regard to Craigie’s statement that the British had to take into account both European problems and world problems, Admiral Standley remarked that the British must also consider that the United States has a particular problem in the Pacific which calls for characteristics in American Fleet construction which are not required by other Powers. As to the reference in telegram No. 439, to a British six year program, Admiral Standley said this program had never been officially put on record but had been informally and confidentially given to him by Admiral Chatfield⁷² last fall.

Admiral Standley raised the question as to how far we should go in laying our cards on the table in talking with the British. He did not believe they had as yet been frank with us; for instance, he doubted whether the British really wanted to limit battleships of 25,000 tons. Admiral Greenslade here suggested that we might begin by asking the British how they envisaged such a limitation in view of the fact that the Italians had already been building two 35,000 ton ships for over a year. He thought it was unlikely that the Italians could at this stage be induced to abandon these ships or reduce their tonnage. In general, it would be impossible to reduce the tonnage of battleships to an appreciable extent without cutting down on the number and caliber of guns. Thus, a 25,000 ton ship could not well carry more than nine guns of a maximum caliber of 12 inches.

Admiral Standley said Craigie’s reference to the possibility of the United States reducing battleship tonnage by 2 or 3,000 tons was the direct result of his conversations last fall with Chatfield. At that time he had pointed out that we could only agree to limits which would enable us to build a balanced ship with adequate power of survival, speed, et cetera. None of the Powers having engaged in any battleship construction for the last 15 years, there had been tremendous development in naval architecture which had not as yet been tested in actual practice. The first battleships to be built by any Powers would therefore be largely experimental. It would be most unwise to fix new limits for a long period which might result in being forced to build ships at great expense which would prove to be inadequate. On this basis, Admiral Standley had suggested to Admiral Chatfield the possibility that we might agree to a limit of 32,500 or 33,000 tons for the first few ships to be built. After these ships had been completed and tested the Powers could meet again and then, on the basis of their new experience, agree upon new limits for a longer period.

In this connection, Admiral Standley thought it desirable for us, even in the absence of a treaty, to remain within the replacement provisions of the Washington Treaty, as deferred by the London Treaty. These provisions would permit us to lay down two new ships a year. Two ships would be all Admiral Standley would want for the trial period; in fact, he would be satisfied with one. Thus a slowing down of replacements under the Treaty might be agreed upon for the trial period. Then, if any other Power should exceed the replacement provisions of the Washington Treaty, it would clearly have shouldered the burden of going beyond the Treaty limits.

In conclusion, it was agreed that the Navy Department would attempt to prepare a telegram to Captain Anderson setting forth in a general way the basis on which he might enter discussions with the British Admiralty without giving our detailed final position and without definitely committing us. It was felt that it would be perhaps unwise to lay all our cards on the table at present but rather to seek to determine the real objectives of the British and then, in the course of informal exchanges of views, determine whether there is any basis for agreement between the two Governments on technical details.

There was no discussion of the question of exactly how the conversations should be initiated and proceeded with in the light of the British desire to conduct them primarily through diplomatic channels rather than as between the Naval Attaché and the Admiralty.

70. Foreign Relations, 1934, vol. i, p. 276.
71. Ibid., p. 278.
72. Admiral of the Fleet Sir A. Ernle M. Chatfield, British First Sea Lord and Chief of the Naval Staff.