862.00/3385
The Ambassador in Germany (Dodd) to the Secretary of State
[Received August 31.]
Sir: Referring to my cable No. 171, of August 21, 10 a.m., I have the honor to report that the outcome of the plebiscite of August 19th showed that 89.9 per cent of the valid votes cast approved the assumption of the presidential powers by the Führer and Reich Chancellor.
There is enclosed herewith the latest count available at present of the vote, showing the result in the 35 election districts of Germany, issued by the Deutsches Nachrichtenbüro of August 20, 1934,37 which it is believed will be but slightly altered when the final figures are published. The results show that 95.7 per cent of the electorate voted, and that 89.9 per cent of the valid ballots were favorable to Hitler.
There is given below a brief summary, for purposes of comparison, of this preliminary total count of the plebiscite of August 19, and also of the total votes cast in the last plebiscite of November 12, 1933, for the Reichstag ticket presented by the National Socialist Party. The question of the withdrawal from the League also voted on November 12, 1933, was approved by approximately one million more citizens, [Page 246] only 2,101,000 opposing, and in addition 750,000 invalid ballots being thrown out.
| Plebiscite August 19, 1934, on assumption of presidential powers by the Fuhrer. | Plebiscite November 12, 1933. Approval of Nazi candidates for the Reichstag. | |
| Qualified Votes | 45,473,635 | 45,178,701 |
| Total Votes | 43,529,710 | 43,053,473 |
| “Yes” | 38,672,760 | 39,655,224 |
| “No” | 4,294,654 | * |
| Invalid | 872,296 | 3,398,249 |
The result is, of course, claimed as a great victory. One must not, however, forget that while the election was carried on in an orderly and quiet manner, and while it would be fair to assume that in most cases the secrecy of the vote was actually observed, yet the mass of “Yes” propaganda which was promulgated during the past week was unopposed, unless one takes into consideration a few surreptitious Communist leaflets. This propaganda is believed to have been effective with the masses, particularly the emotional appeal of Hitler’s speech in Hamburg. A vote of “No” was obviously a mere expression of opinion without any practical value. Every effort was made to bring the people to the polls. It was officially announced over the radio that one sick and aged woman, who was taken to the polling booth, voted “Yes” and then died.
Under these circumstances—and with the electorate uncertain as to whether a non-favorable vote would not somehow be discovered—it is perhaps creditable to the opposition that it was able to register a specific vote of 4,294,654, which is to say, over 10 per cent of the electorate. The principal centres of opposition, where the Führer holds only 80 per cent of the votes, were in Berlin itself, Hamburg, and in the Cologne-Aachen district. It is claimed by the National Socialists that these regions are naturally centres of dissension. A negative vote is, nevertheless, found widely distributed in various sections throughout Germany, as can be seen from the table given in enclosure 1.38
The Führer has announced that this “No” vote must be overcome, but the methods to be used have not yet been announced.
In addition to the “No” vote of 4,294,654, there are invalid ballots amounting to 872,296, and those who failed to register their vote, namely, 1,943,925. One might guess that perhaps the majority of those who spoiled their ballots, or failed to vote, were on the “No” side, but, if so, there must be a great many exceptions to such a statement; so that one can only say that there is a total of 7,110,875 who [Page 247] were not prepared to vote “Yes” when urged to do so by the authorities.
Considerable attention, as is usual, has been devoted to foreign opinion. This has, of course, been made to appear as favorable as possible: in this connection it may be mentioned that the American press received a good note in the Deutsches Nachrichtenbüro reports. Nevertheless, intelligent Germans must be aware that in view of the one-sidedness of the plebiscitory operation, foreign opinion will not be much impressed.
As to the effect in the Saar, which is presumably one of the most important points outside the borders of the present Reich, where public opinion is a matter of consideration to the Government, it is too soon for this office to express an opinion as to the impression produced, if any.
In general it may be said that the plebiscite has proved once again that Hitler, relying on mass propaganda, backed by the energetic activity of the “Brown Shirts”, and with the tacit acquiescence of the Reichswehr, can continue to dominate the German people, unless some fundamental change occurs. It is difficult to predict from what quarter such a change may be expected. Many believe that exchange difficulties and the scarcity of raw materials may render the situation of the Government impossible; yet in view of German ingenuity and organizing capacity on the one hand, and docility and capacity to stand punishment on the other, it would not be surprising if these increasing difficulties should notwithstanding fail to produce sufficient leverage for change.
An unsatisfactory vote in the Saar would be damaging to the administration—to what extent, however, it is impossible to gauge. Too radical policies might arouse the Reichswehr. Religious discontent has its dangers, but these have so far not reached an assessable point any more than has the very critical attitude of the intelligentsia and propertied classes.
Hitler’s nervous system may break under the strain of the combined functions of Chief of State and Chancellor, or political assassination might suddenly strike him low. These are some of the more obvious sources of danger. Yet at the moment it would be rash to predict that any of them will cause the Dictator’s downfall.
The three statements summarized in the cable referred to in the beginning of this despatch, which were issued this morning by Chancellor Hitler, namely, one to the voters, the second to the Party, and the third to the Reichswehr—are enclosed herewith in translation.39
Respectfully yours,
Counselor of Embassy