Office of the Historian

500.A15A4 General Committee/966: Telegram

The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State

Geneva, June 6, 1934—midnight.
[Received June 7—2:45 a.m.]

878. At the Bureau this afternoon I asked the British and French if they would care to come to our office to see if we could smooth out the chief difficulties, which they gladly agreed to do.

2.
It soon became evident that the differences between those two nations in respect to the resolution were deeper than could be bridged by a mere searching of a formula. The British frankly stated that they were concerned rather with the intentions behind the resolution itself. They wanted to be convinced that the French were really desirous of attacking in the near future the fundamental problems of disarmament. They had no objection to the French going ahead with their security arrangements provided they were based on the Locarno principle and were not to encircle Germany and so long as there was no undue postponement of coming to grips with the real problem of disarmament.
3.
The French on their part made it equally clear that while they did not exclude an endeavor to reconcile the differences brought out in the diplomatic exchanges, this seemed to them something that could be better negotiated between governments than by any conference organ so long as Germany was absent. While they recognized the necessity of German participation in negotiation they were unwilling as a [Page 108] matter of strategy that the resolution should take the form either of an indirect invitation to Germany or of anything that might be construed as an obligation on their part to modify the position already taken in notes to Germany and Great Britain.
4.
The difference in conception seems to lie in this. Both desire the return of Germany to the League of Nations and to the Conference. They differ however in the manner of accomplishing this. The French believe it can be accomplished through political measures by which Germany may be induced to return to the fold. The British do not feel that Germany would enter a Locarno agreement except in connection with a disarmament agreement but they would look with favor on an Eastern Locarno and are quite prepared to wait a reasonable time for the French to try their method, provided that the real objective of the French is an ultimate program of disarmament.
5.
It was also made evident that Eden desires to find out from the French what their real political objectives are and that from what Massigli said the French want to know the real position of Great Britain with regard to German rearmament, which they claim has shifted from time to time to such an extent that France wants to be assured, before taking any steps with Germany, that they know not only where Great Britain stands now but where Great Britain will stand in the future. Massigli said in fact, that for 10 months they had been trying to get a definite answer out of the British on this, the vital problem for France, and as they were unable to do so, they were compelled in the face of actual active rearmament on the part of Germany to seek means other than cooperation with Great Britain for dealing with the situation.
6.
Eden then said he thought it would be advisable for Barthou to come to London to talk matters over with the British Government and he was thinking of suggesting this to his Government.
7.
We will meet tomorrow after Eden has consulted London. It was agreed that meanwhile, efforts would be made to redraft the resolution having in mind that the British and ourselves are willing for the Conference to welcome an Eastern Locarno as a benefit to the consummation of a treaty, the French to bear in mind that we desire some expression of a determination to go on with disarmament.
8.
The effect of the crisis that was reached in the Bureau yesterday has been to clear the atmosphere considerably and to bring out more definitely than we had thought to be the case that there is a clearer recognition of the necessity for going on with the work and a desire on the part of France to find a practical way to do so.
9.
As you know the Italian position since October last has been that no work can be usefully carried on by the Conference in the absence of Germany, I therefore fear that the setting up of committees may [Page 109] bring about a definite refusal on Italy’s part to participate. I share your desire to go forward with the question of manufacture of and traffic in arms, but hope that you will give me discretion in the matter as insistence now upon one phase of the armament problem might endanger the success of the broader issue.
10.
I feel more hopeful as to the general situation in respect of ultimate agreement than I have at any previous time during this session provided we can agree upon a program on which the Conference can continue.
11.
The main question on which I, therefore, desire your instructions is whether you feel that the importance of keeping the Conference alive is sufficient to justify the acceptance of a resolution along the lines of that of the French with such improvements as we can secure. In this connection I point out that the French resolution provides for immediate study of the problem of the manufacture of and traffic in arms, to which they tell us that they attach considerable importance. It is impressed upon me that in the event that the Conference breaks up it would be extremely difficult in such an atmosphere to institute immediately negotiations for a separate treaty governing the manufacture of and traffic in arms or to expect to undertake such negotiations within a reasonable period.
12.
I will appreciate an immediate reply as the Bureau meets on Friday morning.
Davis