500.A15A4/2552
The Ambassador in Italy (Long) to the Secretary of State
[Received June 13.]
Sir: I have the honor to inform the Department that the political atmosphere of Europe is obscured by doubt and fear. The imminent meeting of the Disarmament Conference is looked upon as if it would mark the end of the period of hope for disarmament, as well as the possibility for limitation of armament, and is generally considered [Page 89] as if it would be the date on which would begin a race in armament. Indeed preliminary steps are being taken to prepare for increased armament, as if the failure of the disarmament movement, already discounted, had actually transpired.
Confidence in the ability of the governments of Europe to come to any understanding on the fundamental problems of disarmament is lacking. Members of the Government and members of the Diplomatic Corps here are practically unanimous in their belief that the movement is at an end, and in their fears for what the future holds as a consequence of a renewal of the race for armament, though they are equally reticent on both subjects. However, where people gather, in Court, Government or diplomatic circles, the developments of the future are constantly the subject of dubious speculation, and I am constantly asked what I think of the probability of war, how long I think it can be avoided, and what America will do. The subject matter is in the foreground of the thought of the leaders in political and social circles, as is evidenced by constant reference to it.
To the questions as to what I think of the probability and as to the time at which war might develop, I am quite noncommittal, but as to America’s attitude in case it should come I take the position that, in spite of our great and altruistic interest that peace continue in the world, if Europe should, by some unfortunate chance, be thrown into another conflict, America would be a discouraged spectator.
Germany
It is well understood that Germany is arming, and it is generally believed that, being unable to make large calibre guns without danger of discovery, she is concentrating on high explosive, gaseous and chemical means to be launched from the air. There seems to be little knowledge of actual gaseous or chemical preparations, though it is generally taken for granted, but it is reported, unofficially, that no glycerine is permitted to be exported from Germany and that she is in the market for that basic ingredient of high explosives. Sir Eric Drummond, the British Ambassador here, and formerly for so long Secretary General of the League of Nations, said to me that he had no doubt at all of the intensive preparations of Germany and that he, himself, would hate to be a member of an armed force to invade Germany, for he believed such an expedition would be annihilated.
It is rumored that the French Government has compiled a large dossier on German preparations, the material for which was obtained largely from Jewish refugees, many of whom had been engaged in factories and laboratories in Germany before the Hitler anti-Semitic decrees.
It is also rumored in quarters other than French that the French themselves are loath to take the offensive against Germany because of [Page 90] the generally accepted belief that the German preparations have assumed proportions which would make it difficult, if not impossible, for France to operate successfully against her.
The announcements of the German budget for aircraft have not surprised as much as they have served to confirm the popular belief that extensive preparations for offensive, as well as defensive, warfare were well progressed in the Reich.
France
The attitude of France vis-à-vis the Disarmament Conference is not the subject of conversation in either Government circles or in circles of the diplomats representing the Governments of Central, Slav or Balkan Europe. In Scandinavian diplomatic circles alone is heard any criticism of the French position, and that very guarded. However, from persons in and around official circles one hears here definite criticism of French “obstinacy” and unwillingness to participate in any movement for the solution of the one problem they all consider as a necessary pre-requisite to the continuation of peace—if not for the continuation of European civilization. For all seem to be of opinion that—if it comes—when it comes, gas and chemicals will decimate the population, destroy the physical properties of the countries, and eliminate from Europe culture and the qualities of its accumulated civilization.
France is believed to be prepared—well prepared—to resist an attack on her borders, and prepared to carry an offensive movement into Germany or Italy, via the air, with the use of such materials as may be necessary or advisable to secure desired results, but it is also believed that single-handed, as against Germany, France would have more difficulty than she imagines, for the popular mind has somehow assigned to Germany a place in the scientific world, and particularly in the chemical laboratory, superior to France and to any other European country, and has credited her with a mystical and awful power in the field of explosives and poisons, which the same mind believes is able to destroy before being destroyed.
That thought contemplates the accessibility by air of Berlin from points in England, France, Italy, Poland, and even Russia, and answers that in this day of swift-moving circumstance all of those points will not simultaneously have Berlin as their objective and that it is just as close from Germany to Paris as vice versa, or as close to Milan, Trieste and Turin as vice versa, and just as close to England and to Poland.
In spite of the valor of Frenchmen and the organization of the French military machine, there is seen in semi-official circles here [Page 91] that those qualities are surpassed in Germany by a greater development in science and a more intensive organization. And in corroboration of that last point, I have recently talked to observing persons who have been travelling in Germany, amongst others Lieut. Comm. Pennoyer, just departed from Rome for Washington in relinquishment of his assignment as Assistant Naval Attaché at this Embassy, and they all remark upon the excellence of the military training constantly being paraded throughout Germany.
There is also, as regards France, the impression that her internal political difficulties will detract from her ability to effectively organize, particularly so for a movement beyond her borders, but that does not take in contemplation the probable aerial nature of the next conflict, which will not involve the movements of such masses of men in offence and consequently will render unnecessary a complete state of political control.
The rapprochement between France and Russia is being watched suspiciously, partly because it is predicated upon the return of Russia to the League—which is not popular here—and partly because it would, if consummated in the form of an offensive and defensive alliance, upset the whole political scheme in Europe and minimize the remaining influence of the League.
England
The action of England in case of a continental struggle involving France, Germany, perhaps Russia, the Little Entente, and Poland, or any number of them, provided the combatants included both France and Germany—the position of England, in that case, it is considered, will be one of neutrality.
In case either France or Germany were not involved, then England might participate on the sea, but not on the land.
Generally speaking, it is believed England will not participate, though she will prepare and be a competitor in the race for armament which is now taken as a foregone conclusion.
Poland
The Foreign Office seems to think Poland is in a key position but her non-aggression pact with Russia78 and her rapprochement with [Page 92] Germany79 seem to place her in the category of peacefully inclined states and to remove her from the list of aggressors.
Russia
Russia is considered as desiring membership in the League in order to strengthen her own political fences, particularly those near Japan and Manchuria—or the so-called Manchukuo. On the other hand, Marchese Soragna, of the Foreign Office and Representative to the Disarmament Conference thinks that the Polish-German rapprochement is mainly responsible for Russia’s anxiety to enter the League and to ally herself with France. The air force of Russia is given credit for being its most effective weapon and the thought here is that if Russia joined the League her European position would be calm in prospect and she would be free to concentrate in Eastern Siberia.
Little Entente
The Little Entente is seen as wavering in their adherence to France. They see Germany looming large and seem to be willing to play it safe in case Germany should evolve the victor in a contest. Czechoslovakia particularly is contiguous to Germany and to some large extent dependent on Germany’s trade. Roumania is well removed, but still mindful of Germany’s possibilities. But Jugoslavia is playing France against Italy and seems to threaten to cool her ardor for a French alliance, and to make a gesture toward Germany instead, every time France makes a gesture of rapprochement toward Italy, or receives one graciously.
The point of it is that the Little Entente is not considered to be as enthusiastic about a French binding alliance as formerly and is perhaps somewhat apprehensive of the prospect of an armed Germany and willing to modify a foreign policy to meet future changes in military strength.
Italy
Italy pays little attention to the Little Entente, as such, but deports herself, perhaps a little arrogantly, toward Jugoslavia. Italy does not consider Jugoslavia of prime political importance, except insofar as its large commercial relations have a political bearing, but that boundary is well protected.
Italy is anxious for a reduction in armament but believes herself to be “practical” in seeing the impossibility of achieving it and being [Page 93] desirous of the next best line of defence, which is limitation, or maintenance of the status quo for the time being. Failing an agreement on either, she will join the race for armament—as fast as money is available. She has a program, as just announced by Mussolini,80 of spending one billion lire for air and one billion lire for naval construction in the next six years. The work will probably be expedited if the funds can be found.
Captain McNair, Naval Attaché to this Embassy, has some information to the effect that Italy is ready to proceed with plans for increased armament which will include one—perhaps two—ships of the line of possibly 33,000 tons each, with a total addition of 70,000 tons.
Italy thinks the former allies should reduce armament and/or that Germany be permitted a limited armament. She will not enter an agreement without Germany, because Germany would not be bound by it, and thinks it too late to come to an outside agreement and ask Germany to sign because she feels Germany would refuse such a demand.
She foresees German armament—and believes Germany is already well advanced on that road. She will take a definite stand against Germany expanding into Austria, as was recently demonstrated. She will not have Germany on her northern border. She is willing to be friendly toward Germany, and I believe anxious to include her in her general peaceful ambitions even though the German Ambassador81 here recently said to me that Mussolini did not really desire peace except that for the time being he was not prepared for war.
As regards France, there is still a feeling of subdued antagonism, but not of hostility, and I believe the Italian Government would be glad of a rapprochement with France if it could be arranged on terms which would recognize that Italy had been unfairly treated in Africa.
If England stays neutral, Italy can probably avoid a general conflict, because the Mediterranean will be open to her. If England goes into a war, Italy may be forced in on the same side.
Summary
To summarize—the outlook from Rome sees a very dark picture over Europe. If the Disarmament Conference fails next week, as seems now imminent, there will be nothing to prevent a renewal of a race for armament. And this race will take place under conditions highly prejudicial to the peace of Europe. In the first place, there has developed an ultra-nationalism. In the second place, there is a high degree of concentration of power in the hands of most of the governments. This is not so in England and France. But it is so in [Page 94] Italy, Germany, Austria, Hungary and Russia. In the third place, there are two powder boxes, one in the Saar and one in Austria.83 Whether Germany and France come to an agreement as to their respective attitudes toward the population of the Saar, it seems possible that the intense propaganda which will be directed from each quarter at the qualified voters will assume a character and will so excite the people that there may at any moment be an incident which might come under circumstances which would develop into an explosion. The next twelve or fourteen months seem to be highly dangerous.
In addition to the Saar and to the continuing German intentions in regard to Austria, there are the increasingly difficult economic conditions reported to be developing in Germany, which may force Hitler to make an offensive move to solidify his people and to take their minds off their difficulties at home—even risking a possible defeat.
As seen from Rome at this time, the picture for the future is clouded in mystery and darkened by thoughts of a conflict. It is constantly the subject of conversation and is so pervasive that the general mental attitude toward it constitutes the most important political feature in Rome at this time. War is the constant subject of conversation, War is in the background of the popular mind. War is the thing they really fear here. Its atmosphere pervades the intelligent thought.
This despatch has been written without the intention of portraying political situations as they may actually exist in other places but simply to give the point of view as it appears from Rome. And if these situations may seem to be over-emphasized in one form or minimized in another, the despatch is, as I see it, properly reflective of the mental attitude of the officials and other persons with whom I come in contact here.
Respectfully yours,
- On May 5, 1934, Poland and the Soviet Union had signed a Protocol which extended for 10 years the nonaggression pact of July 25, 1932. For texts of these documents, see Russia, Annuaire Diplomatique du Commissariat du Peuple pour les Affaires Etrangères pour l’Année 1933 (Moscow, 1933), p. 154; ibid., 1934, p. 158; Republic of Poland, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Official Documents concerning Polish-German and Polish-Soviet Relations, 1933–1939 (Published by Authority of the Polish Government, London and Melbourne, Hutchinson and Company (Publishers) Ltd. [1940?]), pp. 170, 179.↩
- A nonaggression pact between Poland and Germany was signed on January 26, 1934; for text, see Official Documents concerning Polish-German and Polish-Soviet Relations, 1933–1939, p. 21; or British and Foreign State Papers, vol. cxxxvii, p. 495.↩
- Benito Mussolini, Italian Prime Minister.↩
- Ulrich yon Hassell.↩
- For documents covering Austro-German relations, see vol. ii, pp. 1–58 passim.↩