711.42157SA29/1275½

The Assistant Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs ( Hickerson ) to the Secretary of State

Mr. Secretary: In the vote on the St. Lawrence Treaty in the Senate on March 14, 1934, there were 46 votes in the affirmative and 42 in the negative. In addition there were two votes (Senators Murphy [Page 972] and Norbeck) paired for the Treaty and one (Senator Glass) against. The 46 votes in favor of the Treaty were made up of 31 Democrats, 14 Republicans and 1 Farm Labor; against the Treaty were 22 Democrats, and 20 Republicans. Senators Fletcher, King, Caraway, Trammell and Thomas (Oklahoma) all Democrats, did not vote and were not paired. The major portion of the vote against the Treaty came from the Eastern States. From Maine to Florida east of the Allegheny Mountains, there were only four votes (2 from South Carolina, one from Vermont, and one from New Hampshire) in favor of the Treaty, as opposed to 24 adverse votes, and no vote at all either way from the State of Florida. The second most important source of opposition was in the Mississippi Valley where there were 8 adverse votes, one abstention (Mrs. Caraway) and two adverse votes (McGill of Kansas and Connally of Texas) from adjoining states understood to have been influenced by considerations affecting the Mississippi Valley.

From the foregoing it seems clear that if a St. Lawrence Treaty is to receive a ⅔ majority in the Senate, a considerable number of votes must be picked up from the Atlantic Seaboard and adjacent States where sectional antagonism to the project is strong or the Mississippi Valley States must be brought into line. It seems probable that it would be easier to bring the Mississippi Valley States into line than to influence any large number of votes along the Atlantic Seaboard, but even if all of the votes of the Mississippi Valley were obtained it would still be necessary to get a few additional votes to put the Treaty through.

I do not believe that there is much chance of obtaining a ⅔ majority for the existing Treaty in its present form. The arguments which were made against the present Treaty in the debate really boiled down to two points:

(1)
The Chicago diversion matter (Article 8 (a) of the Treaty incorporating the substance of the Supreme Court decree of April 21, 1930,64 limiting the diversion at Chicago after December 31, 1938 to 1500 cubic second feet plus domestic pumpage, with provision for emergency diversions).
(2)
The provision in Article 3 (b) of the Treaty for the expenditure of American funds on Canadian labor and materials for those parts of the works in the International Rapids Section of the river which lie within Canadian territory; the amount of American money to be expended for Canadian labor and materials under this provision would amount to approximately $54,000,000.

There were other arguments made against the Treaty, as for example that of Senator Lewis, that the British Government desired the construction of the St. Lawrence waterway as “an avenue of [Page 973] approach for their warships”, but the two foregoing are the principal serious arguments made against the Treaty per se. Senators Walsh, Wagner and Copeland argued against the general project rather than against the Treaty specifically.

If it be correct that the Treaty in its present form cannot obtain a ⅔ majority in the Senate, the question arises as to the means by which the Treaty could or should be altered. This could be done in either of two ways: (1) to draft several amendments to the Treaty which would be discussed with the Canadian Government with the view to obtaining their acquiescence; (2) to write and sign another treaty (assuming of course that the Canadian Government would be agreeable; on this point we have no information whatever at this time). It is my belief that the second of these methods, that is, drafting a new treaty would be more desirable for the following reasons: (a) it would be simpler and the final result would be a clearer, more coherent document. We have already exchanged notes with the Canadian Government clearing up a status of the Aluminum Company’s diversion at Massena;65 additional reservations would tend to make the final product even more complicated. (b) It is believed that a new Treaty would give additional prestige to the project because of the fact that it would be a work of the present Administration. I do not believe that we would run the risk of losing one of the Republican votes if a new Treaty were to be submitted, (c) There are several purely minor unimportant matters of drafting in the present Treaty which could be improved in a new draft.

I wish to make it clear in connection with the foregoing that we have no information as to the attitude of the Canadian Government in this matter. Public sentiment for the St. Lawrence project has never been strong in Canada, and I suspect that there was a considerable feeling of relief in the Dominion at the result of the vote in the Senate last week. Premier Bennett’s Government faces the certainty of a general election not later than August 1935 and their political position is by no means good. On this account, it would be difficult for Mr. Bennett to acquiesce in changes in the Treaty which might appear to be more advantageous to the United States than the pending Treaty.

John Hickerson