611.4231/883

Memorandum by the Acting Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs (Hickerson)

In my conversation yesterday afternoon with Major Herridge about the possibilities of a provisional trade agreement (summarized in [Page 846] another memorandum2a), Major Herridge talked long and earnestly about the desirability of undertaking negotiations looking to a broad comprehensive trade agreement at the earliest possible moment. He said that he did not know whether or not Canada could expect very much from us in the way of tariff reductions because of our agricultural program visualizing reductions in production. He went on to say, however, that Canada must increase her trade and that if she can not do it with us she will have to look elsewhere. He said that they wanted very much to make this increase with us but that if we could not make a trade agreement with them making it possible for them to increase their sales to us they would be compelled “to purchase” tariff reductions elsewhere.

He said that the Bennett Government faced an election next year and that if they did not succeed in getting a trade agreement with the United States they would be very bitterly criticised by the Liberals in the campaign. He said that if we could not get a trade agreement between the two countries he proposed to forestall such criticism by announcing that from March 4, 1933, on Mr. Bennett had waited patiently for the time when he could negotiate a trade agreement with the United States and that he had on numerous occasions informed us of his willingness to enter upon such negotiations. He said that he would refer in particular to the Prime Minister’s visit to Washington in April, 1933,3 at the invitation of the President at which time it would be recalled that joint statements were made expressing the hope that trade negotiations could be started at an early date. He said that he proposed to continue that the American Government had adopted policies which appeared to make it unlikely that a trade agreement could be made. With these policies the Canadian Government had no quarrel and as an old and sincere friend of the United States, they wished us well; but that it appeared that Canada, regardless of what Government happened to be in power in either Canada or the United States, apparently must look elsewhere for markets for her goods.

I told Major Herridge that I believed that he was allowing himself to become unduly discouraged and alarmed. I said that he would recall that on frequent occasions I had stated to him that although I personally would prefer to see a satisfactory trade agreement between the United States and Canada than between any other two countries in the world, I added that I frankly did not know whether we could reach such a trade agreement or not, chiefly because of some of Canada’s obligations which she had seen fit to assume in pursuance of the [Page 847] Ottawa Agreements.4 I said that naturally I could not express any opinion of how far this Government could go in respect to tariff reductions and that I supposed that his Government would likewise face difficulties in making reductions to American products. I went on to say that I hoped very much that the two Governments would be able to tackle the problem in a broad spirit and reach a satisfactory result but that I was enough of a realist to understand that there are great obstacles to be surmounted on both sides of the border.

Naturally I did not inform Major Herridge of my belief that Mr. Mackenzie5 and the Liberal Party would be delighted if the Conservative Party issued a statement along the lines which he had outlined to me.

  1. Infra.
  2. See Foreign Relations, 1933, vol. i, pp. 501503.
  3. Agreements concluded at the Imperial Economic Conference, 1932 (Ottawa, F. A. Acland, Printer to the King’s Most Excellent Majesty, 1932).
  4. Presumably W. L. Mackenzie King, leader of the Liberal Party.