800.51W89 France/1019
The Ambassador in France ( Straits ) to the Secretary of State
[Received January 7, 1935.]
Sir: I have the honor to inform the Department that at 5 p.m., on Thursday, December 20th, I called by appointment on the Minister for Foreign Affairs, M. Laval.
I spoke to M. Laval about the ratification of the double taxation treaty. He said that he had the matter on his mind and would do his [Page 585] best to push it through. He explained that it was his own neglect, as well as parliamentary neglect, that nothing had been done. He did not know that Paganon had been substituted for Baréty as Rapporteur of the Finance Commission on the Double Taxation Convention. He denied lack of interest and said that he was favorable to ratification and would ask for a report from the Finance Commission at once. He said that he would let me hear from him again on the subject.
I then spoke of debts. His point of view has not changed since my last talk with him and though he said that at some time in the future my suggestions as to a refunding might be the basis of negotiation or tender on the part of the French Government, he felt that the present time was very inopportune to take the matter up. He stressed the connection between reparations and debts, referring to the Hoover moratorium and the Washington communiqué, stating that it had been initialed by him and President Hoover and that it represented the views of the then head of the Government of the United States which must be regarded as authoritative. He interpreted the moratorium as applying to debts as long as reparations were not paid to France by Germany and stressed the fact that the moratorium agreement had been ratified by Congress56 with the sole proviso that the debts be not reduced in amount. He said that he recognized the obligations of France to the United States but that it was politically impossible to agitate the question at the moment; that were the Cabinet to open the subject at the present time he believed the Cabinet would fall and that there would not be ten favorable votes in Parliament towards seeking a settlement. He said that the Cabinet would be “pulverized” were they at this time to agitate the question. He hoped that with a better rapprochement with Germany he would be able at some future time to open up the question of reparations with them, but that if at the moment he were to discuss it with the German Government, Hitler would undoubtedly “hit the ceiling,” but that the future might bring about a change. He said that under the Mellon–Bérenger Agreement (1926), France would have been obliged to pay the debts whether Germany paid reparations or not had it not been for the Hoover moratorium which he stated was forced upon France much against his objection (he was then Prime Minister but had not yet been to the United States), and that it had been forced upon France by Mr. Hoover because he, Mr. Hoover, felt that he was saving the world from a complete debacle and threatened that if France were not willing to agree to it, the moratorium, he would notify the world of France’s intransigence.57 He said that he had among his own personal [Page 586] notes a procès-verbal of his conversations when in America, and he believed that Mr. Ogden Mills58 likewise had notes of the conversations. He had suggested to Mr. Hoover that a procès-verbal be formally prepared, to be initialed by both of them, but that Mr. Hoover had replied that that was unnecessary. He said that at some time when he could get at his papers he would show me his notes of the conversations and stated that there were no doubt many records in the files of the Embassy as to the whole transaction during the Mellon–Bérenger discussions and as to the moratorium discussions and that Mr. Marriner would doubtless have a very clear recollection of what had transpired during Mr. Marriner’s trip to America with him. He considers the moratorium to be indefinite by inference if Germany doesn’t pay.
He asked me what I thought of the suggestion that he had in mind that France should turn over to the United States the amount, approximately one billion francs, that France would, after the Saar plebiscite, receive from Germany. He stated this laughingly but apparently thought seriously of the idea. I replied that the suggestion was very interesting, not as a liquidation of the debt as he suggested, but as a payment on account and an earnest of good faith.
He reiterated the desire of France at some time to pay the full amount, explaining that he realized fully that France might at some time have to turn to the United States for financial aid and that he appreciated that under present conditions they could not, with any hope of success.
He stated that M. Léger had prepared for him, while he was in Geneva, a reply to the notification of our Government of the amounts due on December 15, 1934, but that the reply was in terms that displeased him exceedingly and that he had torn it up and on his return to Paris had himself drafted the reply.
My conclusion from the conversation, which was most pleasant and in a spirit of banter and good humor on his side, as well as on my own, is that Mr. Laval is more interested in the settlement of European questions than in the consideration at the moment of problems between France and the United States.
At the end of about forty-five minutes, his next visitor was announced and he told me that it was Mr. Raymond Patenôtre,59 “who is half-American,” and I left.
Very respectfully yours,
- For text of Joint Resolution of December 23, 1931, see Foreign Relations, 1931, vol. i, p. 248.↩
- For correspondence concerned with acceptance by France of the moratorium proposal, see ibid., pp. 42 ff.↩
- Secretary of the Treasury, February 1932–March 4, 1933.↩
- Proprietor of the Petit Journal.↩